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 2 
Abstract 
 
 
This research focuses on the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) on social 
inclusion over a period of ten years. It analyses the participation of people who 
experience poverty and/or social exclusion and anti-poverty associations in the 
OMC. The main objective is to explore whether such participation triggers the 
redirection of participants’ expectations, political activities and loyalties from the 
national to the EU level. The research focuses on participation at domestic and EU 
level. It identifies the core responses (or non-responses) of British and Greek 
governmental and non-governmental actors to the EU pressures for participation. 
National responses to EU pressures help understand the participation of the above 
mentioned stakeholders in the domestic policy-making process. Additionally, by 
focusing on the participation of British and Greek delegates to the European 
Meetings of People Experiencing Poverty, this research seeks to understand whether 
participation through the OMC, at EU level, influences expectations, political 
activities and loyalties. The empirical findings of the research show that participation 
in the OMC indeed influences redirection of expectations, political activities and 
loyalties. However, the differences between the UK and Greece, and the differences 
between participation domestically and at EU level were found to be significant. This 
research contributes to existing theory by analysing the effects of participation of 
wider numbers of citizens in EU processes. It addresses the lack of empirical data 
regarding the participation of non-traditional stakeholders.  
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Introduction 
 
 
It is not an exclusive academic interest to find out more about European Union (EU) 
citizens’ expectations, political activities and loyalties. In fact such citizens’ attitudes 
have become essential for the survival of the European project. Increasingly lower 
turnouts in the European Parliament (EP) elections, negative responses to referenda 
that ask for citizens’ support for further European integration, the economic/Euro 
crisis and the democratic deficit are issues which have all intensified the debate about 
citizens’ attitudes towards the EU. The following sections illustrate why this thesis 
focuses on a topic which is of great political relevance in the contemporary debate 
about European integration.     
 
Studying expectations, political activities and loyalties 
 
It can be argued that the disagreement with or at least the disinterest in European 
integration by the citizens of the EU member states, has expressed indirectly through 
a continuously falling turnout in the EP elections. As shown in table A, in 1979, 63% 
of the registered to vote citizens participated in the elections. A two per cent decline 
was recorded in 1984 when 61% of the electorate of the then ten member states 
voted. Since then, every five years the falling turnout in the EP elections has been 
alarming the EU executives more intensely. In 1999 the participation dropped for the 
first time to under 50% (i.e. 49.51%). In 2004 the very low turnout in the newly 
accessed member states led to an EU average turnout of only 45.47%. And in the 
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latest EP election in 2009 the turnout reached its lowest point so far with a 
disappointing 43%. 
 
Table A (author’s compilation): European Parliament elections’ turnout 
 
Year 
 
Total Turnout 
 
Turnout 
UK 
 
Turnout 
Greece 
1979 61.99% (Nine member states) 32.35% - 
1984 58.98% (Ten member states) 32.57% 80.59% 
1989 58.41% (Twelve member states) 36.37% 80.03% 
1994 56.67% (Twelve member states) 36.43% 73.18% 
1999 49.51% (Fifteen member states) 24.00% 70.25% 
2004 45.47% (Twenty five member states) 38.52% 63.22% 
2009 43% (Twenty seven member states) 34.70% 52.61% 
Source: official portal of the EP, 
 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/000cdcd9d4/Turnout-%281979-2009%29.html, 
accessed on 10.03.2010 
 
Table A also illustrates that the UK has always been below the EU average as 
regards to the turnout for European elections. In 1979, 1984, 1989 and 1999 UK 
citizens participated (out of all member states) least in the EP elections, and in 1994, 
2004 and 2009 they were among those with the lowest turnout. In contrast, Greece 
has often been among the five member states with the highest turnout in EP elections 
previously to the last EP elections in 2009. The only time Greece was not ranked 
among the top five in terms of turnout to EP elections was in 2004 when it ranked 
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sixth with a recorded turnout of 63% percent. However, in 2009 this percentage was 
reduced to less than 53% and Greece ranked ninth in the EU27.1  
 
The low turnout in the EP elections has been seen as reflecting the lack of citizens’ 
interest in and awareness of the EU and revealed their reluctance for further 
integration (e.g. Hix 2005[1999]; Jiménez 2003). Questions have been increasingly 
asked about the EU’s democratic deficit. However, the democratic deficit is not 
limited to the turnout in the EP elections but extends to the continuing conflict 
between the intergovernmental and the supranational forces that define the EU 
integration process. In addition to the Council, which conducts mainly 
intergovernmental negotiations, the EU is also made up by supranational bodies such 
as the EP, Commission, European Court of Justice and European Central Bank. Yet,  
 
[t]he credibility and authority of the European Union’s supranational 
institutions … rests upon their claim to represent the ‘European interest’ over 
and above that of the individual member states. This, however, presupposes a 
transnational European public whose ‘general will’ arises from common 
interests that can be represented and championed by these supranational 
bodies (Shore 2000: 19).  
 
Shore claims that the absence of a European demos is at the core of the EU’s 
legitimacy problem. Similarly, Sáncez-Cuenca (2000: 166 –emphasis in the original) 
holds that for a supranational system to be legitimate people should feel that ‘they 
belong to a wider, supranational demos’. The European demos has been considered 
                                                 
1
 Official portal of the EP, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/000cdcd9d4/Turnout-
%281979-2009%29.html, accessed on 10.03.2010. 
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synonymous with a community in which people share a European identity (e.g. 
Shore 2000). As will be highlighted below, the European identity has, in turn, been 
treated as synonymous with citizens’ loyalties to the EU (Risse 2005; Shore 2000 –
both draw on Haas 1958). Scharpf (1999: 10-11) has argued that the lack of a 
collective identity which is taken for granted in the member states ‘emphasises the 
irremediable aspects of the European democratic deficit’. Bernhard (2005) holds that 
if the EU is to overcome its legitimacy problem then it needs to acquire one of the 
major characteristics of the modern nation state: the collective identity that connects 
the polity with the public. In the same vein, Decker (2002: 258) warns that,  
 
the democratic prerequisites of further centralization in Europe cannot be 
fulfilled, because we are missing the necessary social and cultural 
preconditions … The most important of these preconditions is the presence of 
a common political identity which serves as a basis upon which all 
governmental or parliamentary decisions can be interpreted as being 
expressions of democratic self-determination.  
 
Paradoxically, the ratification process of the Maastricht Treaty, which was meant to 
provide the context and impetus for constructing a kind of European identity (Shore 
1998), experienced a crisis after a no vote in a referendum in Denmark and only a 
petit oui in a referendum in France in 1992. Since then, the European citizens have 
often expressed their negative stances towards the EU integration process at different 
opportunities. Examples include the referenda in Ireland in 2001 and 2002, the 
Swedish referendum concerning the Euro in 2003 and the French and Dutch 
rejections of the proposed draft Constitutional Treaty in 2005. The negative 
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outcomes of these referenda have made it clear that European integration is not in 
people’s minds and hearts. In other words, such developments ‘left no doubt that the 
public acceptance of further integration can no longer be taken for granted’ (Mayer 
and Palmowski 2004: 573).  
 
The purpose of the thesis 
 
The main aim of this thesis is to research whether active participation in EU 
processes and projects has an impact on the participants’ expectations, political 
activities and loyalties towards the EU. The approach to expectations, political 
activities and loyalties used in this thesis draws on Ernst Haas’s definition of political 
integration as is shown in the first chapter. Suffice to say that Haas considered the 
redirection of expectations, political activities and loyalties from national to 
supranational level as part of the process of European integration. As Risse (2005: 
293) argues, for Haas, this type of redirection was an indicator ‘for the degree of 
integration’. However, past scholarly work (e.g. by neofunctionalists) on such 
attitudes has focused on a narrow range of actors, namely the political and economic 
elites i.e., politicians, higher civil servants, officials from trade and labour 
associations (Haas 1958: 17). The so-called Open Method of Coordination (OMC), 
which is a relatively new method, opens up a new field for research on the 
emergence of expectations, political activities and loyalties of other actors towards 
the EU. The main reason for this is that the OMC is a process which is not limited to 
the political and economic elites but intends to involve a wider range of stakeholders. 
Thus, one of the OMC’s main principles is the mobilisation and participation of a 
wide range of new actors in the ‘design, implementation and monitoring’ of the 
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public policy (European Commission 2005a: 5; see also European Council 2000a). 
As is explained in more detail below, this thesis draws on specific studies (e.g. Inbas 
and Engender 2012; Heywood 2007, 2000) in order to assess critically the entire 
policy-making cycle by focusing on the agenda-setting, decision-making, 
implementation, and monitoring stages. 
 
The OMC on the fight against poverty and social exclusion provides a particularly 
promising area of research because, according to the continuously updated objectives 
of the Lisbon strategy2, it requires ‘the mobilization of all relevant bodies’ (e.g. 
Council of the EU 2002). Among these relevant bodies (or new actors), the social 
inclusion OMC has been designed to include people who work in anti-poverty 
associations (i.e. networks and NGOs) and people with direct experience in poverty 
and social exclusion (European Council 2000b). Importantly, the terms ‘primary 
stakeholders’ and ‘secondary stakeholders’ are used in the context of the social 
inclusion OMC to distinguish between people who live in poverty and NGOs, 
experts, trade unions, etc. (e.g. Inbas and Engender 2010). The differentiation 
between primary and secondary stakeholders is used in this thesis although the 
European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN-EU 2010a) has criticised the use of these 
two terms by arguing that NGOs who campaign in favour of people in poverty 
should also be regarded as primary stakeholders. This thesis refers to people in 
poverty and social exclusion by using the term ‘primary stakeholders’ while the term 
‘secondary stakeholders’ is reserved exclusively for the anti-poverty organisations 
and networks. 
 
                                                 
2
 The Lisbon strategy was in 2010 renewed under the name Europe 2020. 
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Since EU-related expectations, political activities and loyalties among the above 
mentioned groups of people comprise an under researched topic, the OMC on social 
inclusion is the main focus of this thesis. The social inclusion OMC (compared to 
other OMCs) involves a much wider range of primary and secondary stakeholders 
(Noël and Larocque 2009; de la Porte and Pochet 2005) and is together with the 
OMC in employment the ‘the oldest, most fully developed, and best institutionalized 
OMC processes.’ (Zeitlin 2010: 255). The assessment of the social inclusion OMC in 
this thesis refers especially to its application in Greece and the UK for reasons 
explained in section 1.3 below.  
  
Previous research has argued that participation in EU institutions (particularly the 
Commission) and processes influences the expectations, political activities and 
loyalties of people who participate in it (e.g. Hooghe 2005; Shore 2000; Haas 1958). 
Since the launch of the Lisbon strategy, there has been growing literature which 
focuses on similar cognitive changes which the participation in the OMC processes 
induces in the involved stakeholders (e.g. Schönheinz forthcoming; PPMI 2011; 
Vanhercke 2010; Zeitlin 2009; Vifell 2009; Zeitlin 2005b; Haahr 2004; Jacobsson 
2004). Both kinds of participation could therefore be used to explain shifts in 
expectations, political activities and loyalties. However, so far little research has 
been undertaken on the non-state/non-traditional stakeholders. Ironically, in 
particular people who are the primary and secondary stakeholders for EU policies 
aimed at combating poverty and social exclusion are largely neglected by research on 
the attitudes of citizens towards the EU. This thesis puts forward new empirical 
findings in addressing the following main research question: To what extent will 
primary and secondary stakeholders who participate in the social inclusion OMC 
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shift their expectations, political activities and loyalties from the domestic to the EU 
level? 
 
Structure  
 
Chapter 1 puts forward the analytical framework of this thesis. It first presents the 
reasons behind the launch of the OMC, the method’s provisions on the widening of 
stakeholder participation and the effects of this participation on EU governance. The 
chapter then assesses theories of Europeanisation and theories of EU identities, 
defining the analytical framework through which participation and its impact on 
participants’ expectations, political activities and loyalties will be analysed. 
Additionally, chapter 1 highlights the importance of qualitative methods in 
answering the above stated research question. In doing so it explains the reasons for 
the use of semi-structured interviews, clarifies the selection of the interviewees and 
the core documents that have been studied for this thesis. 
 
Chapter 2 explains the most important developments at EU level regarding the 
combating of poverty and social exclusion. A central concern of chapter 2 is to show 
that participation of primary and secondary stakeholders has been regarded by the 
Commission, academics and anti-poverty associations as an important counter-
weight to the strong focus on growth and jobs in the EU’s Lisbon strategy. In this 
context a critical analysis is provided of the Brussels European Meetings of People 
Experiencing Poverty (EMPEP) which took place under the social inclusion OMC in 
the period 2001-2010. 
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Chapters 3 and 4 initially provide an overview of the social situation in the UK and 
Greece respectively. In the context of Europeanisation, these chapters examine the 
domestic adaptation to the social inclusion OMC in these two countries in general, 
and in terms of participation in particular. This is an important step before the 
presentation of participation’s impact on the expectations, political activities and 
loyalties of the participants in relation to the EU. Chapter 5 serves as the comparative 
chapter. It provides the comparative analysis of the main research findings in Greece 
and the UK. Chapter 6 draws the conclusion on the empirical findings in relation to 
the analytical and methodological framework that has been set out in chapter 1.    
 
An overview of the findings 
 
This thesis has found and analysed important differences in the –intended through 
the OMC– process of Europeanisation (see section 1.1.5) of the Greek and British 
public policy. These differences refer explicitly to the participation of primary and 
secondary stakeholders in the domestic application of the social inclusion OMC. 
Between the years 2001 and 2010, British primary and secondary stakeholders were 
found either to be involved or to collaborate with the policy-makers according to the 
agenda-setting, implementation and monitoring stages of the NAP process (for 
degrees and stages of participation, see section 1.3.1). In the same period in Greece, 
secondary but not primary stakeholders participated in the NAP process. These 
stakeholders were either only consulted or informed by the policy-makers but only 
during the agenda-setting stage. These differences helped draw an analysis of the 
degrees of Europeanisation which was missing from the OMC literature. Based on 
such approach, this thesis found that differences in participation can explain 
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differences in shifts in British and Greek non-traditional stakeholders’ expectations, 
political activities and loyalties. Thus, due to their satisfactory participation in the 
OMC, British primary and secondary stakeholders considered the EU framework as 
more possible to provide benefits to them than the national framework. Based on this 
rational assessment of the EU framework, British stakeholders redirected 
expectations, political activities and loyalties from the national to the EU framework. 
On the contrary, despite their initial redirections of expectations and political 
activities towards the EU level, Greek secondary stakeholders were soon 
disappointed by their limited participation in the domestic application of the social 
inclusion OMC. Therefore, their expectations and political activities did not last long 
and no loyalties to the EU level have emerged.  
 
Concerning participation in the EU level, only limited redirections of expectations 
political activities and loyalties were found among Greek and British primary 
stakeholders. However, different reasons explain this similarity between participants 
from these two countries in the European Meetings of People Experiencing Poverty. 
Greek delegates in the meetings initially redirected their expectations towards the EU 
level. This seems to have happened due to the fact that for Greek primary 
stakeholders the EU level was the only framework for participation in the policy-
making process. However, these stakeholders were eventually disappointed by the 
fact that their participation did not have an impact on the policy-making process.  
Whereas, delegates from both Greece and the UK did not see the EU framework as 
possible to provide positive outcomes to their daily lives, British participants were 
additionally satisfied from their participation in the domestic application of the 
OMC. Therefore, the EMPEP did not provide an added value to them. In both cases, 
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contrary to academics’ expectations for the OMC’s potential to create a framework 
for socialisation under common EU concerns and objectives (e.g. Zeitlin 2005b; 
Jacobsson 2004; Haahr 2004), the OMC did not appear to be able to create such a 
strong framework by promoting participation at the EU level.    
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Chapter 1: Analytical and Methodological Framework 
 
 
1.1 The launch of the Open Method of Coordination 
 
The OMC was launched by the Lisbon strategy to coordinate member states’ actions 
towards the overall goal of making the EU ‘the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth 
with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’ (European Council 2000a). 
Since the Lisbon summit in 2000 many areas which are excluded from the 
competences of the EU have started to be coordinated with the OMC.3 Given the 
various areas the OMC has been applied to, some scholars have proposed that it 
should not be regarded as a single method but rather as a ‘label attached’ to many 
processes which run in different fields of public policy (Tholoniat 2010: 95). Thus, 
there are certain common characteristics in the various processes which permit the 
use of the single label ‘OMC’: 
 
(a) establishing guidelines for the Union; (b) translating the European 
guidelines into national and regional policy by setting specific targets and 
adopting measures to meet them; (c) establishing quantitative and qualitative 
indicators and benchmarks as a means of comparing best practice; and (d) 
periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review (e.g. Jacobsson 2004: 357)  
                                                 
3
 Employment, social inclusion, pensions, education, youth and training, research/ innovation, 
information society/ eEurope, enterprise promotion, structural economic reform, education and 
training, immigration and asylum, environmental protection, disability, fundamental rights, youth 
policy (Zeitlin 2011: 136; Zeitlin 2005b: 19-20; see also Featherstone and Papadimitriou 2008: 3). 
Zeitlin (2011: 137) also clarifies that the OMC has not been launched as the only tool to meet the 
Lisbon Agenda’s objectives. It has rather been launched to be combined with other instruments such 
as legislation, structural funds, social dialogue etc.  
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Therefore, with the launch of the OMC the EU member states have been called to act 
towards commonly agreed objectives which are decided on at the EU level (by the 
Council) and translated into guidelines and targets according to the needs of the 
national, regional and local levels. The domestic actions taken by each member state 
to implement the OMC strategy are outlined in the so-called National Action Plans 
(NAPs). The NAPs are government documents which report the member states’ 
policies towards the OMC’s objectives to the European Commission and the Council 
of the EU. In 2005 the Commission decided to streamline three strands of the OMC 
(i.e. social inclusion, social protection and health and long-term care) and introduced 
a single social OMC. Following the streamlining of the OMC the member states 
have had to incorporate the NAPs on the three different strands into overall National 
Strategic Reports (NSRs).  
 
Finally, the features which facilitate the coordination of national actions are the 
sharing of good practices among the member states and the monitoring and 
evaluation of progress with peer reviews (Zeitlin 2011; Bruno et al. 2006; Zeitlin 
2005a; Zänge 2004). It is for these reasons that the OMC has been described as a 
‘soft law’ coordination process in contrast to the traditional Community method 
which is based on ‘hard law’ which stipulates legally binding common rules (Trubek 
and Trubek 2005: 343). Under the OMC formal sanctions for the states which are 
lagging behind in respect to commonly agreed guidelines are not provided (ibid.).     
 
While the OMC has been referred to as a novelty (e.g. Radaelli 2003a) a critique 
emerged regarding whether it can indeed be seen as an entirely new method. Certain 
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features of coordination of member states’ actions can be found already in the 1993 
Copenhagen criteria towards the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
(Hatzopoulos 2007).4 This led to the ‘managerial technique’ benchmarking being 
adopted by the EU to achieve convergence of the member states’ actions (Bruno et 
al. 2003: 523). One further step was taken by the Treaty of Amsterdam which 
formally initiated the process of the European Employment Strategy (EES) which in 
turn offered the context for advancing this new mode of governance for ‘developing 
“sensitive” policy areas’ (Lopez-Santana 2006: 482).5 Nevertheless, even if the 
OMC features were not introduced during the Lisbon summit, the summit made the 
following important threefold contribution:  
 
a) it gave the method a name; b) it recognised that it may be used in fields for 
which there is no Treaty basis; and c) it designated it as the core instrument 
of the so-called Lisbon objectives… (Hatzopoulos 2007: 311)  
 
The indisputable novelty of the method refers to its provisions for widened 
participation of actors in public policy, as section 1.1.2 below shows. For now, the 
next section of the present thesis explores the reasons for the emergence of the 
OMC. 
 
 
                                                 
4
 Zeitlin argues that the coordination techniques used in the EMU are not similar with the OMC 
techniques (Zeitlin’s comments in Hatzopoulos 2007) 
5
 Methods such as the OMC can be found outside EU processes as for instance in the OECD, the 
International Monetary Fund (A. Schaefer, (2004) ‘A New Effective Form of Governance? 
Comparing the OMC to Multilateral Surveillance by the IMF and the OECD’, Max Plank Institute 
http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de in Hatzopoulos 2007: 311)  
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1.1.1 Reasoning behind the design and launch of the OMC  
 
As chapter 2 will show, one of the EU’s primary tasks has historically been to find a 
balance between the need to improve economic competitiveness (which has been 
welcomed by the member states), and the need to build up a social Europe in order to 
tackle economic and social ‘disfunctionalities’ (Borrás and Jacobsson 2004: 186).6 
Prior to the Lisbon European Council in 2000, the EU had already taken important 
steps towards economic and financial outcomes. Yet, employment rates and social 
cohesion within the community were not reflecting the same positive developments 
(Lopez-Santana 2006). Lopez-Santana (ibid: 481) noted that since the mid-1990s the 
unemployment rates in the EU were ‘dramatically high and welfare states did not 
have the capacity to handle these pressures’. Accordingly, the Lisbon summit’s 
conclusions in 2000 acknowledged that ‘[t]he number of people living below the 
poverty line and in social exclusion in the Union is unacceptable’ (European Council 
2000a: Point 32). 
 
Unemployment and poverty were issues which attracted the attention and required 
the response of governments (see also chapter 2). However, there are certain reasons 
why the OMC has been used instead of the Community method. Rodrigues (2001: 3), 
who initiated and developed the OMC’s theoretical context for the EU and acted as 
special advisor of the Portuguese Prime Minister during the Lisbon summit, holds 
that ‘[t]he open method of coordination was elaborated after a reflexion (sic) on 
governance aiming at defining methods for developing European dimension’. In the 
same vein, Jacobsson (2004: 357) has argued that the OMC emerged as a response to 
                                                 
6
 This is also known as the debate between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ integration (Hix 2005[1999], 
Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999) 
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the ‘need to view national policies as a “common concern” and the need to achieve a 
certain policy convergence’. Certain socio-economic issues could not be addressed 
with EU legislation. As the case of employment had shown, the member states had 
similar problems that needed to be addressed at the European level although without 
the binding nature of the Community method (Heidenreich 2009; Lopez-Santana 
2006). A series of compromises needed to be made in order to enable the EU to 
trigger common action in policy fields where it either had only weak or no explicit 
competences (Borrás and Jacobsson 2004). Drawing on Borrás and Jacobsson, the 
OMC is an effort to respond to certain challenges: the need for social Europe and the 
need for citizens’ support, the need for further integration with enhanced democratic 
legitimacy, and the need for unity in diversity. The following sections assess these 
challenges in detail. 
 
1.1.1.1 The need for social Europe and the need for citizens’ support  
 
While economic competitiveness was desired by the member states, a harmonised 
response at European level to social challenges such as unemployment and poverty 
would have been opposed by governments. National welfare states, which typically 
cope with these issues, have been sectors that the member states consider as part of 
their sovereignty in such a way that ‘the prospects for the development of a European 
level welfare state are poor’ (Wincott 2003: 2). Much of the citizens’ support for the 
state –and therefore much of the state’s legitimacy– derives from welfare provisions 
(Mazower 2000[1998]; Esping-Andersen 1990). Additionally, social policy is a 
sensitive area of exclusive national concern (Trubek and Mosher 2003). For these 
reasons, any kind of delegation of power towards a supranational level would not be 
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acceptable to citizens as previous efforts to increase EU competences have shown 
(Heidenreich and Bischoff 2008).7 Nevertheless, following the member states’ 
paradigm in terms of citizens’ support, the EU has also intended to draw legitimacy 
and support from its citizens and it has looked for ways to set up a European social 
policy (Wendler 2003). According to Daly (2007), there have been the following 
three different periods in which the EU intended to adopt a social dimension: (1) 
early 1970s; (2) late 1980s and early 1990s; and, (3) early 2000s. The latest period 
reached its high points with the adoption of the Lisbon strategy (one of the objectives 
of which was to achieve ‘greater social cohesion’) and the application of the OMC in 
fields of social protection and inclusion under the Nice Treaty. Drawing lessons from 
past attempts and experience, the EU focused especially on social inclusion as ‘an 
element of a successful European society’ (ibid: 4). The OMC was designed both to 
preserve member states’ social policies and to establish EU welfare provisions. The 
latter were expected to balance economic integration and to draw support and 
legitimacy for the EU from the member states’ citizens.  
 
Efforts for a European social policy have not prevented the EU from being described 
as a ‘welfare laggard’ (Majone 1993: 155). However, the intervention of the EU in 
the field of social inclusion has already attracted support from citizens. As section 
1.2.3 shows, there is a gap in the support for the EU between the (national and 
supranational) elites and the public: EU public is far less supportive of EU 
integration and membership than the national and EU elites. However, in detailed 
comparative research on the attitudes of the EU and domestic elites and the attitudes 
of the public towards the EU integration, Hooghe (2003) found that citizens are more 
                                                 
7
 Prominent examples are the Social Chapter (rejected initially from the UK), the EU Constitution 
(rejected from the citizens of France and the Netherlands) and the Maastricht Treaty (rejected in the 
first referendum by the citizens of Denmark). 
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supportive than the elites concerning the involvement of the EU in the social field. 
Thus, Hooghe’s research showed that 62% of member states’ citizens support EU 
policies on social inclusion. At the same time, only 29.3% of Commission elites and 
40.7% of national elites support the intervention of the EU in the field of social 
inclusion (ibid: 284).  
 
1.1.1.2 The need for further integration and democratic legitimacy 
 
The second challenge for the EU was to continue with further integration in a period 
when its democratic legitimacy has been questioned. The democratic deficit did not 
refer solely to the lack of the public’s representation in the EP and the latter’s role in 
EU decision-making. It started to extend also to matters of transparency, 
accountability and openness especially after the problems with the ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty and the corruption allegations which the Commission faced in the 
late 1990s (Borrás and Jacobsson 2004; Harlow 2002; Bunyan 1999). Many scholars 
theorised the OMC to be a tool which would help the EU’s quest for democratic 
governance mainly because of its normative provisions for transparency, 
accountability and participation (Sabel and Zeitlin 2008; Zeitlin 2005a; Telò 2002; 
Larsson 2002; Rodrigues 2001). With the periodic evaluation of member states’ 
actions through, for example, the submission of NAPs and the composition of Joint 
Reports (i.e. reports by the Commission and the Council of the EU after assessments 
of the NAPs), the EU was intending to increase ‘the transparency and intelligibility 
of the policy co-ordination cycle and thereby its visibility and impact’ (European 
Commission 2002a: 3, 10; see also Borrás and Greve 2004). Particularly on the issue 
of participation which is discussed in section 1.1.2 of this chapter, it has been argued 
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that the participants in the Lisbon summit were concerned by the criticism about the 
EU’s democratic deficit (Borrás and Greve 2004). According to the same 
researchers, this was the reason why the Lisbon summit conclusions drew up explicit 
rules on the need to widen participation through the OMC.  
 
1.1.1.3 The need for unity in diversity 
 
The third challenge for the EU was ‘to find a feasible balance between the need to 
respect diversity among member states, and the unity – and meaning – of the 
common EU action’ (Borrás and Jacobsson 2004: 186). This balance between 
diversity and unity became more pressing with the preparations of the enlargement of 
the EU by the Central and Eastern European states. In 2004 the EU was joined by ten 
new member states with wide structural diversities as regards to both their welfare 
systems and the ways in which they were implementing their public policies 
(Copeland 2011; Maravegias 2010; Heidenreich and Bischoff 2008). Esping-
Andersen’s (1990) influential theory regarding three diverse types of welfare states, 
which was extended by other researchers by the Mediterranean welfare state, can 
explain why harmonisation of member states’ social policies has been proven 
impossible (Wincott 2003; Esping-Andersen 1990; Ferrera 1996).8 Instead, the 
domestic policies’ adaptation to the objectives posed by the EU governance (i.e. 
Europeanisation) could be achieved by the coordination of member states’ actions 
through the use of an OMC (Armstrong 2006). 
 
                                                 
8
 Arguments that the ‘Welfare Modelling Business’, the academic pursue of clustering the national 
welfare states, is downplaying differences even between neighbour regions (e.g. Abrahamson 1999) 
can be seen as extra obstacles to this type of harmonisation of welfare. 
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In fact, for all these reasons, the coordination of the member states actions was seen 
as the only way to express common European concerns. However, during the 
implementation of the OMC, which theoretically allows for the coordination of 
member states’ actions in social policy and other fields, it became clear that central 
to this type of coordination was the participation of a wide group of stakeholders in 
the policy-making process. The next sections intend to show why participation has 
been linked to the OMC’s provisions. 
  
1.1.2 The OMC and the provisions for participation 
 
According to some scholars, the main innovative aspects of the OMC have been the 
new participation patterns which it created. The reason why the OMC has often been 
called a new method of governance or a new policy instrument is due to its 
provisions for participation of wide range of actors (de la Porte and Pochet 2005; 
Borrás and Jacobsson 2004; de la Porte and Nanz 2004; Telò 2002). The traditional 
main EU actors –member states, Commission and Council of the EU as well as, 
although to a lesser extent, the EP are not the only participants in the domestic and 
EU decision-making processes of the OMC. The OMC has also trigged the setting up 
of committees –most notably the Social Protection Committee (SPC) and the 
Employment Committee (EMCO)– which are made up of member state 
representatives and Commission officials.9 Through the OMC the ‘privilege’ of 
participation (Jacobsson and Johansson 2007: 17) in the policy-making process has 
been extended to ‘the regional and local levels, as well as the social partners and civil 
society…’ (European Council 2000a: point 38). According to the European Council, 
                                                 
9
 A brief description of the role of these committees is provided in section 1.1.5 below. 
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all these actors ‘…will be actively involved, using various forms of partnership’ 
(ibid: point 38).  
 
Especially for the application of the OMC in the field of social inclusion (social 
inclusion OMC), the European Council in Nice (2000b), called for the participation 
of all of the relevant stakeholders as one of the main objectives of the strategy.10 
These calls for wide participation explain, according to some scholars, the ‘openness’ 
of this method of coordination (Borrás and Jacobsson 2004: 199; Telò 2002: 265). 
Additionally, the same calls for wider participation under the OMC have opened up 
space for the involvement of primary and secondary stakeholders in the EU and 
member states’ social inclusion strategies. According to the Nice European Council 
(2000c: 9) which set the objectives for the fight against poverty and social exclusion, 
the OMC in social inclusion should not only aim to involve anti-poverty associations 
‘in the fight against the various forms of exclusion’ but also, 
 
promote, according to national practice, the participation and self-expression 
of people suffering exclusion, in particular in regard to their situation and the 
policies and measures affecting them.  
 
The opportunities for participation offered to primary and secondary stakeholders 
must be seen in the context of the EU’s efforts for improved governance. These 
efforts were expressed in the Commission’s White Paper on European Governance 
                                                 
10
 The overall objectives of the social inclusion OMC according to the Nice European Council: to 
facilitate participation in employment and access by all to the resources, rights, goods and services 
(objective 1), to prevent the risks of exclusion (objective 2), to help the most vulnerable (objective 3), 
and to mobilise all relevant bodies (objective 4) (European Council 2000b).  
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which listed participation as one of five new principles11 while listing proportionality 
and subsidiarity as other fundamental principles of governance (European 
Commission 2001).12 As the White Paper (ibid: 10) was highlighting,  
 
[t]he quality, relevance and effectiveness of EU policies depend on ensuring 
wide participation throughout the policy chain – from conception to 
implementation.  
 
Four years later, the communication of the EU Commission for the streamlined 
social OMC (see above) focused again on the involvement of stakeholders 
(European Commission 2005a). Importantly, the Commission set as an objective of 
the social OMC the participation of stakeholders in the ‘design, implementation and 
monitoring of policy’ (European Commission 2005a: 5). Finally, in an effort in 2008 
to reinforce the social OMC, the Commission specified that particularly in social 
inclusion, the policies should involve all ‘relevant actors’ (European Commission 
2008a: 9). Explicit reference was again made to the people experiencing poverty. It 
is for these reasons that Zeitlin (2005b: 3) has noted that the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of the OMC policies  
 
arguably depend on the participation of the widest possible range of actors 
and stakeholders at all levels, from the European through the national to the 
                                                 
11
 These were: openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness, coherence (European 
Commission 2001) 
12
 The White Paper explains the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality using the following 
wording: ‘From the conception of policy to its implementation, the choice of the level at which action 
is taken (from EU to local) and the selection of the instruments used must be in proportion to the 
objectives pursued. This means that before launching an initiative, it is essential to check 
systematically (a) if public action is really necessary, (b) if the European level is the most appropriate 
one, and (c) if the measures chosen are proportionate to those objectives’ (European Commission 
2001: 10-11) 
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regional and local, in order to ensure the representation of diverse 
perspectives, tap the benefits of local knowledge and initiative, and hold 
public officials accountable for carrying out mutually agreed commitments.  
 
Before assessing further the extension of participation towards legitimate and 
efficient policy-making process, it is important to show whether the OMC’s 
participatory provisions have been indeed put into practice when the method was 
implemented in the member states. Thus, part 1.1.3 will show that although the 
OMC has in general often been considered as closed and invisible to potential 
participants, the social inclusion OMC has been successful in involving a wider 
number of stakeholders.   
 
1.1.3 The OMC as an invisible method and the social inclusion OMC as an open 
method. 
 
Despite the provisions for participation of stakeholders, the application of the OMC 
in different fields of public policy has not been followed by the full application of the 
method’s participatory provisions. In general the OMC processes are unknown to the 
citizens in the member states (Büchs 2008). Thus, according to Zeitlin (2005b: 460; 
see also Kröger 2009), the OMC in its application in the field of employment is a  
 
narrow, opaque and technocratic process involving high domestic civil 
servants and EU officials in a closed policy network, rather than a broad, 
transparent process of public deliberation and decision-making, open to the 
participation of all those with a stake in the outcomes.  
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Another assessment by the Public Policy and Management Institute (PPMI) of the 
social OMC has shown that the method is rarely referred to in the domestic media 
and that even journalists who are specialised in social policy issues are unaware of it 
(PPMI 2011). Other independent experts and academics have also shown the lack of 
‘media and public awareness’ of the social OMC while adding that no political 
debate about the process has emerged in most member states (Frazer and Marlier 
2008: 2; Armstrong et al. 2008: 439). As a result, the social OMC is known only to a 
limited number of participants, mainly civil servants, politicians and members of 
NGOs of, for example, the EU level European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN-EU) 
(Frazer and Marlier 2008). In other words, the method lacks ‘institutional visibility’ 
(e.g. Vanhercke 2010: 117). The lack of institutional visibility of the social OMC 
prevents people who would otherwise be interested in being involved in the process 
from doing so (de la Porte 2010). In 2005 the EU Commission acknowledged the 
limited visibility of the social OMC by stressing the importance of involving 
stakeholders in the design, implementation, and monitoring of the social inclusion 
policies (European Commission 2005a). The above mentioned assessment by the 
PPMI argued that wider participation will make this OMC a ‘more visible’ method 
(PPMI 2011: 14).  
 
However, the OMC in social inclusion has –under its participatory provisions (see 
part 1.1.2 above) achieved the highest mobilisation of secondary stakeholders in an 
effort to push political issues of their concern onto the national agendas (de la Porte 
and Pochet 2005). According to de la Porte and Pochet (ibid.) the more the secondary 
stakeholders participate in the domestic implementation of the social inclusion OMC, 
the more the primary stakeholders also get involved in the same process. Other 
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studies have also shown that the OMC in social inclusion has the most successful 
record of primary and secondary stakeholders’ participation at both domestic and 
European levels (PPMI 2011; Zeitlin 2010; Zeitlin 2009; Noël and Larocque 2009; 
Armstrong 2005). As regards to the involvement of stakeholders in the social 
inclusion OMC at the EU level, since 2001 primary stakeholders from all member 
states have also participated in the annual European meetings of people experiencing 
poverty (e.g. Schönheinz forthcoming; PPMI 2011; de la Porte and Pochet 2005; 
First EMPEP 2001). The purpose of these meetings is for the people with direct 
experience in poverty and social exclusion to feed their views and experiences into 
the EU policy-making process. 
 
1.1.4 Participation, governance and loyalties 
 
According to theoretical provisions for participation of the OMC and its application 
in the member states, participation of stakeholders has two interrelated dimensions 
for the EU and the member states. First, it can offer increased democratic legitimacy 
in the sense that there is a wider range of people involved in the policy-making 
process (Bernhard 2005; Borrás and Jacobsson 2004; Borrás and Greve 2004). 
Second, it can increase efficiency when the stakeholders involved are specialised in 
the issues on which the OMC is applied. The views which these stakeholders offer 
are then expected to be fed into the EU and domestic decision-making process 
(Barnes et al. 2007: 34; Trubek et al. 2005: 16-17; de la Porte and Nanz 2004: 269; 
Council of the EU 2002). Consequently, ‘more and better public participation is 
viewed as capable of improving the quality and legitimacy of decisions … as well as 
having the potential to address the democratic deficit’ (Barness et al. 2007: 1).  
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Therefore, the opportunities for widened actors’ involvement in public policy bear up 
to a certain degree similarities with the concepts of input and output legitimacy 
(Scott and Trubek 2002). According to this normative claim, this new mode of 
governance shows resemblances to Scharpf’s (1999: 6) ‘government by the people’. 
The latter means that  
 
[p]olitical choices are legitimate if and because they reflect the ‘will of the 
people’– that is, if they can be derived from the authentic preferences of the 
members of a community (ibid: 6).  
 
Thus, wide participation of ‘societal actors’ in the policy-making process adds a 
democratic dimension to (EU) governance (Borrás and Conzelmann 2007: 533). At 
the same time, the widening of participation offered by the OMC provides 
opportunities for increased output legitimacy (‘government for the people’ according 
to Scharpf). In this sense, there is a higher degree of correlation between the EU 
policy outcomes with the actual needs of the people (Scott and Trubek 2002).  
 
However, despite the normative approach to participation, there are important 
restrictions which could affect claims that the OMC is an example of governance by 
and for the people. Apart from the fact that national governments have the first and 
last say on policies developed under the OMC, and apart from the issues of 
opaqueness and invisibility of the method as were discussed above, there are certain 
preconditions which must be fulfilled in order to link participation and democracy. 
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Only when these preconditions are in place can participation through the OMC be 
considered as a step towards democratic governance.  
 
The first precondition has to do with the fact that ‘input-oriented arguments often 
rely simultaneously on the rhetoric of “participation” and of “consensus”’ (Scharpf 
1999: 7). Who participates? How representative is the number of participants 
regarding the problems the community faces? Are the problems brought forward 
which lead to European guidelines being shared amongst an important proportion of 
the population? Is each individual represented through a meritocratic system? As 
shown above, the norm for wide, meritocratic, and inclusive participation is 
mentioned in official EU documents which refer to the OMC. Particularly the OMC 
in social inclusion has indeed triggered the participation of primary stakeholders (i.e. 
people who experience poverty) and secondary stakeholders (i.e. antipoverty NGOs 
and networks) as section 1.1.3 above has shown.  
 
Secondly, the national policy-making process takes for granted that collective 
identities are shared between those who decide and those who are affected by these 
decisions (Bernhard 2005; Decker 2002). This is the basis on which national self-
determination has been built in modern states (Liakos 2005; Kedourie 1960). The 
existence of a national identity is a necessary condition for a state’s policy-making 
process to be considered as legitimate (Smith 1991). Yet, such collective identity has 
always been missing from the EU political discourse (ibid.). As is shown in part 2 of 
this chapter, Haas (1958) approached the issue of collective identity by arguing that 
European integration towards a political community entails the shift of citizens’ 
expectations, political activities and loyalties from the national to the supranational 
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level. It seems that the terms European identity and loyalties to the EU are synonyms 
for Haas. This is certainly the case for Thomas Risse who is a prominent scholar in 
the field of European identity and Europeanisation. In 2005 Risse published an 
article which referred to Haas’s approach on people’s loyalties. In this article Risse 
‘translated’ Haas’s approach to loyalties ‘into a statement about collective identity 
formation’ (Risse 2005: 292). Haas (1958) himself seems to allow for these 
assumptions not only by resembling supranational loyalties to ‘a new nationalism’ 
(ibid: 10) or to a ‘new national consciousness’ (ibid: 14) but also by changing the 
term ‘loyalties’ for the term ‘community sentiment’ (ibid: 9).    
 
1.1.5 Europeanisation of social inclusion and loyalties13 
 
The OMC itself shows an effort to solve domestic problems with EU level 
contributions. This fits nicely with Börzel’s (1999: 574) definition of 
Europeanisation ‘as a process by which domestic policy areas become increasingly 
subject to European policy-making’. However, it is not clear whether such a 
definition implies domestic adaptation to the Community method (i.e. hard law) or if 
domestic adaptation to other modes of governance, which are not based on hard law 
but on soft law, can also be regarded as Europeanisation. Börzel and Risse (2003) 
state clearly that for the emergence of adaptational pressures there must be a misfit 
between authoritative European decision-making and national decision-making. 
According to Radaelli (2003b: 30) broader references to European public policy 
instead of specific references to EU laws and decisions allow for the inclusion of 
                                                 
13
 I am grateful to my supervisor Prof. Wurzel for his invaluable contribution to the development of 
this analytical framework. Any erroneous interpretation of the theories of Europeanisation would 
however be my own responsibility.  
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‘modes of governance which are not targeted towards law making, such as the open 
method of coordination’ in the definition of Europeanisation.  
 
The OMC does not amount to governance by authority, but facilitates instead 
governance by coordination (Bulmer and Padgett 2004). As shown above, the OMC 
recognises that the goals set by the 2000 European Council in Lisbon concern areas 
which go beyond the EU’s competences (Tholoniat 2010; Featherstone and 
Papadimitriou 2008). For this reason, the OMC is not implemented through the 
adoption of EU legislation. It also does not rely on the involvement of (all of) the 
main European institutions within the formal EU policy-making process. Moreover, 
although it does not overrule domestic legislation, the softness of the OMC does not 
rule out domestic legislative responses (Featherstone and Papadimitriou 2008; 
Trubek and Trubek 2005; for legislative responses to the social inclusion OMC 
stimulus see Sotiropoulos 2011). Yet, it has been shown that the OMC can indeed 
produce adaptational pressures. Armstrong (2006: 86), who assesses the domestic 
adaptation of the social inclusion OMC in the UK, argues that the fact that the formal 
EU institutions do not have the same ‘coercive’ powers under the OMC as under the 
Community method does not mean that ‘the institutional structures at EU level are 
unimportant’ for the implementation of the OMC. The incorporation of the OMC in 
social inclusion in the Lisbon strategy was decided on the highest political level 
through the Nice European Council in 2000. For the functioning of the OMC, the EU 
Commission issues together with the Council of the EU a set of recommendations 
and assessments of the progresses made. The role of the committees (e.g. EMCO and 
SPC) in the OMC process should also not be neglected (Heidenreich and Bischoff 
2008). These committees, which are made up of representatives from the member 
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states and the Commission, help to prepare the discussions on the OMC in the 
Council with Joint Reports and with the production of other reports and opinions on 
the OMC processes.14 However, Bart Vanhercke (2010: 116) has questioned whether 
the design of the method (i.e. its ‘institutional setup’) has ‘actually influenced 
policies and policy making processes’ both at the EU level and domestically. He has 
found evidence about both substantive and procedural impact of the OMC. 
Substantive impacts can be found where the OMC has created hard law in the 
member states (see also Sotiropoulos 2011), pushed issues onto the domestic 
political agendas (e.g. child poverty) and made member states reassess their domestic 
policies (e.g. pension and welfare policies). Procedural impacts can be found where 
the OMC has triggered horizontal (i.e. between ministries) and vertical (between the 
central government and the local authorities) cooperation, made domestic NGOs’ 
aware of ‘policies, practices and performance’ in other member states, and thus 
triggered the participation of stakeholders in the NAPs processes (ibid: 130). 
Vanhercke concludes that despite its softness the OMC has promoted the 
Europeanisation of the domestic structures due to ‘its capacity to stimulate creative 
appropriation and action by European, national and sub-national actors’ (ibid: 116). 
By ‘creative appropriation’ Vanhercke means the ‘strategic use of OMC tools, EU 
concepts, objectives, guidelines, targets, indicators, performance comparisons and 
recommendations by national and sub-national actors as a resource for their own 
purposes and independent policy initiatives’ (ibid. 133).  
 
Caviedes (2004) has argued that the reluctance of the member states to coordinate 
their immigration policies through the OMC should not be seen as a weakness of the 
                                                 
14
 The official portal of the EU, the Social Protection Committee: 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=758, accessed on 10.11.2011 
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method. The member states are acting so because they are aware of the fact that a 
comparison and evaluation of their policies in the context of the OMC will involve ‘a 
risk of losing control over the agenda-setting process’ (ibid: 306). Therefore, the 
OMC can indeed be seen as a method which entails adaptation pressures for the 
Europeanisation of the member states’ policies that are coordinated through the 
method at the EU level. 
 
What is of particular importance for this thesis in Armstrong’s above mentioned 
work, is that the author assesses the Europeanisation of British public policy on 
social inclusion through the analytical prism of ‘the domestic adaptation to the OMC 
technique itself’ (Armstrong 2006: 84). In other words, Armstrong (ibid) proposes 
that research on the OMC should focus on the ‘extent to which the national system is 
prepared to open out to, and engage with, the different elements of the OMC 
methodology’.   
 
Therefore, this thesis examines the British and Greek domestic adaptation to the 
OMC’s provisions for participation which is one of the core objectives of this new 
method.  As stated earlier in this chapter, the theoretical provisions for participation 
refer to the participation of stakeholders in the social inclusion OMC policy-making 
process. Additionally, in the beginning of this chapter, it has been explained that the 
member states’ responses to the OMC’s overarching objectives are outlined in the 
NAPs/NSRs which are submitted to the Commission. For these reasons the focus of 
this thesis is on the participation of (primary and secondary) stakeholders in the 
agenda-setting, decision-making, implementation and monitoring of the NAPs/NSRs 
process as section 1.3.1 will explain. As Armstrong (2006: 92) has argued ‘[t]he 
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most obvious indication of domestic adaptation to the inclusion OMC rests with the 
development of a participative approach to the NAPincl [NAP in social inclusion].’   
  
Europeanisation theories focus both on changes at the EU and member state levels 
which result from the interactions between the European political system (i.e. 
policies, institutions and processes) and the political systems of the member states 
(Börzel 2003). Most Europeanisation concepts are therefore concerned with the 
domestic response to EU pressures but also with EU response (e.g. the deepening of 
integration and emergence of institutions and actors) to member states’ pressures 
(Armstrong 2010; Olsen 2002). In other words, most Europeanisation concepts seek 
to analyse the ability of member states to ‘upload’ practices and policies to the EU 
which then have to be ‘downloaded’ from the EU level by other member states 
(Börzel 2002). Much of the existing Europeanisation literature focuses primarily on 
the member states’ response to the EU pressures (e.g. Olsen 2002; Cowles et al. 
2001; Börzel and Risse 2003; Radaelli 2003b; Armstrong 2010, 2006, 2005). 
 
Regarding many Europeanisation concepts, the ‘misfit’ between the European and 
national political systems is a necessary condition for the emergence of ‘adaptational 
pressures’ which can lead to changes on the domestic level (Börzel and Risse 2003: 
58). Cowles and colleagues (2001: 2) explain that a ‘poor fit’ between the European 
system (e.g. formal and informal institutions and collective understandings of actors) 
and the domestic political system will create strong adaptation pressures while a 
‘good fit’ will create only weak pressures for domestic changes (ibid.). As Börzel 
and Risse (2003) underline, the existence of a misfit between EU and national 
policies, processes and institutions is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
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Europeanisation. The latter depends on the domestic response to the EU pressures. 
Before the domestic response is explained in more detail, it is important to make 
clear at the outset that Europeanisation is not (necessarily) a convergence process. 
Member states (and other domestic actors) do not respond in exactly the same way to 
the adaptational pressures from the EU; isomorphism therefore does not take place 
(Featherstone 2003). There may be different degrees of adaptation which can vary 
significantly among member states and between policy fields (Armstrong 2006; 
Börzel 2002). For Featherstone (2003: 4) Europeanisation is therefore ‘a matter of 
degree’. Therefore, degrees of adaptation vary among member states, policy fields 
and time periods (Armstrong 2006; Börzel 2002). Based on Radaelli’s (2003b) and 
Börzel and Risse’s (2003) taxonomies of domestic change, the domestic response 
can lead to the following four main outcomes: (1) no domestic change (‘inertia’), (2) 
low degree of domestic change (‘absorption’), (3) modest degree of domestic change 
(‘accommodation’), and (4) high degree of domestic change (‘transformation’).15 
Inertia means that no domestic change is induced. However, the taxonomy of 
domestic change into absorption, accommodation and transformation refers to the 
different degrees to which the member states incorporate European policies, 
processes and institutions into the domestic policy-making process. Additionally, it 
refers to the degree to which the member states change their pre-existing policies, 
processes, institutions and ideas (Börzel and Risse 2003).  
 
However, the degree of domestic change depends on several mediating factors. 
Cowles, Caporaso and Risse (2003) identify five such factors:  
                                                 
15
 Radaelli (2003b: 38) refers also to the possibility of retrenchment of the member states. This 
happens when the Europeanisation pressures result in the national policy becoming ‘less “European” 
than it was’. However, this inducement of Europeanisation is beyond the scope of the present 
research. 
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1. Multiple veto points: obstacles posed by domestic actors who oppose 
Europeanisation and whose agreement is a necessary condition for domestic change 
(see also Radaelli 2003b; Tsebelis 1995). In fact, the veto actors are not always able 
to prevent Europeanisation but they can delay the process especially when other 
facilitating factors are not available (Cowles at al. 2001);  
2. Mediating formal institutions: domestic formal institutions which provide the 
(material and ideational) resources to circumvent veto points. Börzel (2005) gives the 
example of regions which due to their relationships with European policy-makers are 
able to circumvent veto points posed by the national governments.  
3. Political and organisational cultures and collective understandings: domestic 
cultures and understandings can influence domestic actors to respond positively to 
Europeanisation pressures. As Risse (2001) illustrates, the post-WWII reconstruction 
of German identity favours the European unification project as the alternative to 
nationalism or as the alternative way to the American West and the Russian East.     
4. Differential empowerment of domestic actors: this seems to have the opposite 
effect of the multiple veto points. While in the case of the latter actors oppose change 
in order to protect their interests, in the case of the differential empowerment 
domestic actors are expected ‘to use Europeanization as an opportunity to further 
their goals’ (Cowles et al. 2001: 11).   
5. Learning:  Europeanisation can influence domestic actors to redefine their interests 
and preferences. However, in the case of the OMC which has mutual learning in its 
toolkit, learning can serve as another means for actors’ empowerment. This said, 
through mutual learning actors are potentially exposed to a wider (European) forum 
(Sabel and Zeitlin 2008). This forum contains a wider number of ideas and 
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paradigms to overcome domestic problems than the ideas and paradigms available in 
the domestic arena (de la Porte and Pochet 2012).   
 
Europeanisation concepts are used for the analysis of the application of the OMC’s 
(social inclusion) participatory provisions in the UK and Greece. However, before 
such an analytical framework can be used it is important to ask whether 
Europeanisation can also explain the redirection of expectations, political activities 
and loyalties from the national to the EU level. Are there veto points which prevent 
and/or facilitating factors which promote the Europeanisation of loyalties?  
 
Risse (2001: 198) has shown how the fit/misfit between a European identity and 
national (French, German and English) identities can challenge the latter. He argues 
that since there is ‘no contractual obligation to develop a common EU identity’ the 
concept of ‘adaptational pressure’, which emanates from EU rules and regulations, 
does not make much sense (ibid: 200). This does not exclude adaptational pressures 
in general, other than the ones which follow the authoritative power of the EU. Thus, 
Risse argues, that continuous involvement of the EU in the daily life of its citizens is 
expected to alter the way in which citizens define themselves in relation to collective 
identities. For Risse, ‘it is a relevant question to ask how Europeanisation influences 
collective understandings and loyalties toward the nation-state’ (ibid.). As said 
earlier, Risse (2005, 2001) uses interchangeable the notions of identity and loyalty 
when assessing Haas’s contribution to the concept of European identity. According 
to Risse, Haas’s focus on expectations, political activities and loyalties links them to 
the European identity.  
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For Risse (2001), the following two facilitating factors could affect the people’s 
loyalties: rationalism and socialisation. These two factors are driving the emergence 
of loyalties towards the EU. From a rationalist perspective, loyalties towards the EU 
emerge when people perceive the European framework as more positive in terms of 
satisfying interests than the domestic framework.16 From the perspective of 
socialisation, loyalties to the EU emerge after people are socialised under EU norms, 
values and common concerns. As the following paragraphs intend to show while 
Haas predicted in 1958 the importance of shifts in people’s expectations, political 
activities and loyalties for the study of European integration, a debate has aroused 
regarding whether such shifts follow a rational assessment of the EU or a process of 
socialisation in the EU norms and values.  
 
Following Haas’s work on national actors’ attitudes towards the EU, the following 
section intends to assess briefly the Commission’s actions to influence citizens’ 
expectations, political activities and loyalties towards the EU. The objective of this 
assessment is to show that the EU intended to trigger shifts in citizens’ expectations, 
political activities and loyalties mainly by intervening in the ‘cultural field’ (Shore 
2000: 53). Therefore, the Commission has neglected the potential of citizens’ 
participation in EU initiatives to bring about the above mentioned shifts. As 
mentioned above, participation in EU processes can trigger shifts in expectations, 
political activities and loyalties which are based on rational and/or socialisation 
factors.     
 
                                                 
16
 In some studies, the ‘rational’ approach to the EU identity has been used interchangeably with the 
‘utilitarian’ approach. Like the rational approach, utilitarian also means ‘“rational” calculations of 
costs and benefits of integration…’ (McLaren 2002: 551). Yet, this thesis only refers to the term 
rational to avoid any confusion between the terms. 
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1.2 The redirection of expectations, political activities and loyalties and efforts 
to construct a European identity 
 
In The Uniting of Europe, which has been characterised as ‘founding moment of the 
field of what we now routinely term “EU studies”’ (Rosamond 2005: 328), Ernst 
Hass (1958: 16) has argued that,  
 
[p]olitical integration is the process whereby political actors in several 
distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations 
and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or 
demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. The end result of a 
process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed 
over the pre-existing ones. 
 
For Haas, the process of shifts in expectations, political activities and loyalties would 
follow a rational assessment of the benefits that the emerging European framework 
entailed for the concerned actors (see also Risse 2005). However, in the early 1970s, 
due to economic and political developments at European level, the vision of a united 
Europe seemed to be no longer involving the self-emerging redirection of 
expectations, political activities and loyalties (Rosamond 2007[2003]; Rosamond 
2005; Laursen 1995). Haas (1967: 325) himself acknowledged that he had not 
foreseen developments such as the ‘rebirth of nationalism’. Since this type of self-
emergence of loyalties theorised by Haas did not proceed, the ‘construction of the 
united Europe’ was in 1973 intended to be facilitated by a ‘European identity’ 
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(Bulletin of the European Communities 1973: 118). The European identity would be 
built on common values and interests of the then nine member states (ibid.). Such 
stated intensions are the focus of the analysis in part 1.2.1. For now, Haas’s 
analytical contribution on the issue of citizens’ attitudes towards the EU is still 
indispensable. Instead of using the abstract analytical concept of an emerging 
European identity (as section 1.2.1 will show), Haas was more specific when he 
theorised EU related loyalties as being the result of the redirection of expectations 
and political activities towards the EU. The links between European identity and 
expectations, political activities and loyalties are made obvious in Thomas Risse’s 
(2005) article Neofunctionalism, European identity, and the puzzles of European 
integration. As said earlier, Risse (ibid: 292) argues that Haas’s ‘shifting loyalties’ 
can be perceived as ‘a statement about collective [EU] identity formation…’  
 
Therefore, by making reference not only to loyalties but also to expectations and 
political activities, Haas argued that political actors’ loyalties towards the 
supranational level would follow the reorientation of these actors’ interests (see also 
Cram 2001[1996]). For European political integration, the shift of loyalties was 
neither the first nor the only important change. For loyalties to emerge, expectations 
had first to be reoriented (from the domestic) to the European level for ‘long periods’ 
(Haas 1958: 5; Cram 2001). This statement is confirmed by Haas’s (1958: 5) 
definition of loyalties:  
 
A population may be said to be loyal to a set of symbols and institutions 
when it habitually and predictably over long periods obeys the injunctions of 
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their authority and turns to them for the satisfaction of important 
expectations. 
 
Haas referred also to political activities since he was preoccupied with certain 
political actors, namely the elites. As Risse (2005: 292) underlines, ‘Haas was not 
that much concerned about mass public opinion and the loyalties of the ordinary 
citizens, as he regarded European integration as an élite affair.’ Thus, Haas referred 
to the actors who actively participate in the EU, i.e. actors who intend to influence 
the policy-making process. While as shown in the above citation he defined loyalties 
through expectations (for the satisfaction of interests) he did not explicitly define the 
term ‘political activities’. Nevertheless, before he defined political integration he 
paid extra attention in referring to political actors’ political activities. Political actors 
would, according to Haas’s neofunctionalist approach, shift their political activities 
from the national to the EU level, in an effort to pursue their interests and to 
influence the policy-making process. Such shifts were, after all, indicators of 
loyalties/‘community sentiments’ (e.g. Haas 1958: 9).  
 
An example can be used to help towards the better understanding of the terms 
expectations, political activities and loyalties as they have been used by Haas (1958). 
Stakeholders aiming at combating of poverty may redirect their expectations to the 
EU when they believe they are more easily able to satisfy their goals at the EU level 
than the national level. Following their emerging expectations, these stakeholders 
redirect their political activities to the EU level when they try to combat poverty (e.g. 
through lobbying, campaigns or street protests in front of the EU buildings). They 
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can be said to be loyal to the EU when their expectations and political activities are 
directed to the EU for long periods of time. 
 
For the sake of clarity, the present thesis uses the terms ‘loyalties, expectations and 
political activities’ in Haas’s definition of political integration in a different order 
(ibid: 16). In the process of European integration, first comes the redirection of 
expectations and then the redirection of political activities to satisfy these 
expectations. Finally, only if these expectations and political activities are redirected 
to the EU level for long periods does it make it safe to discuss about redirection of 
loyalties towards the EU. Therefore, the present thesis focuses on expectations, 
political activities and loyalties over a ten year period.  
 
1.2.1 A ‘people’s Europe’ through a European culture 
 
In the early 1990s, the decline of public support for the EU (e.g. Buhr 2010), which 
has also become known as the ‘end of the permissive consensus’ (Hix 2005[1999]: 
151), intensified the European Commission’s efforts to construct an EU identity 
based on shared European cultural and symbolic values (e.g. Shore 2000). Such a 
construction and diffusion across the EU was expected to have an impact on the 
loyalties and interests of the public and to stimulate support for the EU integration 
(ibid.). 
 
In fact, the more European integration was evolving, the more intense the legitimacy 
debate became. Consequently, public support for European integration was becoming 
more urgent. The political elites argued that ‘European unification will only be 
 52 
achieved if Europeans want it. Europeans will only want it if there is such a thing as 
European identity’ (European Commission 1984: 2 as cited in Shore 2000: 45). Thus, 
in addition to trying to build a social Europe (see section 1.1.1.1 above), the 
Commission attempted to build also a European identity in order to trigger support 
for the EU. Accordingly, the Commission has tried to construct a European identity 
through the diffusion of European cultural values in the same way that the modern 
states have constructed national identities (e.g. Cinpoes 2008).  
 
The Adonnino ad hoc committee, which was established by the Fontainebleau 
European council, published its report A people’s Europe in 1985 (Adonnino 1985). 
The report proposed a number of actions among which were the abolition of any 
customs formalities at the intra-Community borders and the introduction of symbols 
of the Community’s existence (i.e. flag, anthem and coinage). Again, it seems that 
the Commission intended to ‘build’ a European identity by making use of some of 
the core characteristics which constitute a national identity.17 The Adonnino Report 
also proposed the promotion of a European citizenship, involvement of the audio-
visual industry, establishment of a European lottery and creation of European sports 
teams. However, soon after some of the measures which the Adonnino’s report had 
proposed were adopted, the citizens’ support for the EU started to decline (Hix 
2005[1999]: 151). As a consequence, the EU intensified its efforts by embodying in 
its Treaties its right to getting involved in the ‘cultural field’ in order to bring ‘the 
common cultural heritage to the fore’ (Maastricht Treaty, Art. 128 as cited in Shore 
2000: 53)  
                                                 
17
 The term ‘build’ is used here to imply a ‘top-down’ construction of the nation. This is accordant to 
Gellner’s theory that states make the nations and not the other way round (Gellner 1983). 
Nevertheless, it is a term which is derived from the critique of nation rather than from the nationalist 
discourse. Smith (e.g. 1999) argues against such top-down construction: for him nations are based on 
pre-existing ethnic attachments.   
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These efforts of the EU Commission to build a European identity triggered a debate 
in academia which has focused on the potential to influence EU citizens’ attitudes. It 
is not possible to identify a precise model of European identity and its constituent 
cultural, political, social, ideological elements (Tătar 2010). There are ‘rival and 
contrasting “European identities” regarding not only the borders of Europe in 
geographic terms, but also how each of them perceives Europeaness’ (Shore 1993: 
791; see also Marks and Hooghe 2003). Additionally, some authors have dismissed 
the analytical role of the concept ‘identity’. For example, in their widely cited article 
‘Beyond Identity’, Brubaker and Cooper (2000: 34) argue that ‘it [the concept 
‘identity’] is riddled with ambiguity, riven with contradictory meanings, and 
encumbered by reifying connotations’. This thesis therefore does not focus on an 
abstract European identity concept, but follows instead Haas’s concepts of 
expectations, political activities and loyalties of the citizens (as explained above).  
 
1.2.2 New and pre-existing collective loyalties: incompatibility and rationalism 
 
One group of theories which were developed to explain the potential future of a 
European identity concluded that it would be incompatible with national identity. 
This incompatibility refers to this specific effort to build a European identity upon 
cultural and symbolic elements. In fact, these theories assume that there is no room 
for the EU to construct an identity on cultural and symbolic elements because they 
are already attached to well-settled national sentiments (Smith 2006; 1992). For 
example, the case of England shows that certain factors such as its ‘island location’, 
‘strong national state’ and other historical reasons lead to a ‘distinct lack of 
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widespread enthusiasm in England for European integration and a European 
identity…’ (Smith 2006: 448-9).  Similar conclusions have been drawn from 
research on the compatibility between Greek national identity and European identity 
(Sereti and Kokosalakis 2003). According to Sereti and Kokosalakis, the emergence 
of a European identity in the Greek population cannot be based on cultural or 
symbolic elements since these are dominated by national feelings (ibid.). These brief 
examples seem to confirm the argument that citizens perceive the European 
integration as a threat to their national cultural identity (McLaren 2002). Moreover, it 
has been argued that a strong sense of national identity means a low level of support 
for European integration (Carey 2002).  
 
Yet, while citizens perceive European integration as a threat to their national identity, 
this should not substantially restrict the emergence of positive attitudes towards 
deeper EU integration (McLaren 2004). Positive attitudes about the EU appear to be 
based not on cultural elements but on an analysis of the benefits that EU membership 
and integration entail for individuals and their countries (ibid.). In other words, 
national loyalties can coexist with loyalties to the EU since they are based on 
different criteria: national loyalties are based on cultural elements while the loyalties 
related to the EU are based on its ability to satisfy citizens’ interests. For Haas 
(1958), loyalties towards the supranational level can emerge because this level is 
better able to satisfy people’s interests than the national level. In other words, 
loyalties towards the EU can emerge only if it satisfies personal and national interests 
(Deflem and Pampel 1996). According to Haas (1958: 14), for shifts in loyalties to 
take place, people do not even need to be ‘attracted by “Europeanism” as such’. 
Importantly, shifts in expectations, political activities and loyalties do not mean that 
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citizens will abandon their national loyalties (Risse 2005). Haas (1958) also 
predicted such attitudes. According to him, shifts in loyalties do not mean the 
‘immediate repudiation’ of the national loyalties (ibid: 14).  
 
Citizens’ interests can be material (e.g. money) and/or non-material (e.g. social 
provisions, status) (Clements 2011; Risse 2005; Jiménez et al. 2004; Hooghe 2001). 
According to utility theories, individuals’ decisions are ‘consistent with reasonable 
calculations of costs and benefits’ (Hooghe 2001: 14). From Haas’s perspective, the 
choice about the direction of loyalties is a rational one; based on interests. However, 
interests in turn are shaped by values which ‘include nonmaterial benefits’ (Haas 
2005: xv). 
 
Similarly, research has shown that support for the EU can emerge for reasons such as 
the effectiveness of supranational institutions (Sánchez-Cuenca 2000). In fact the 
Eurobarometer surveys have shown that in many countries citizens trust the EU more 
than their national government and parliament (e.g. Eurobarometer 2011b: 44-46). 
This trend is not the case in eight member states among which include the UK but 
not Greece.18 In the UK only 17% of the citizens who took part in the survey trust the 
EU. However, trust to the British government and the parliament is not significantly 
higher. Indeed the percentages are 21% and 24% respectively. In Greece 29% of the 
citizens trust the EU, 8% trust the national government and 12% the national 
parliament. According to Sánchez-Cuenca (2000: 152), ‘[m]aximum support for the 
EU will be found among the citizens that have a good opinion of European 
institutions and a poor one of their national political system’. This is again a rational 
                                                 
18
 The countries whose citizens trust the EU less than their national government and parliament are: 
Denmark, Germany, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Sweden and the UK. 
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assessment of the EU since for Sánchez-Cuenca people support the EU because they 
perceive it as a solution to domestic problems which emerge from the poor 
performance of domestic institutions (e.g. state and political parties – see also 
McLaren 2002: 553).  
 
However, in most of the theories which analyse potential shifts in expectations, 
political activities and loyalties, such shifts usually apply only to a specific and 
relatively narrow group of people. The next part intends to show who those 
individuals are who eventually shift their expectations, political activities and 
loyalties towards the EU. 
 
1.2.3 Shifts in loyalties limited to the elites 
 
The often cited A View from the Top, which contained research that was carried out 
for the European Commission in the mid-1990s, identified that top decision-makers’ 
attitudes towards the EU were far more positive than those of the general public (Top 
Decision Makers Survey; 1996).  The top decision-makers where ‘[e]lected 
politicians, such as members of national and the European Parliament’, ‘[s]enior 
national civil servants in all Member States’, ‘[b]usiness and labour leaders’, 
‘[m]edia leaders – including heads of both broadcast and print media’, and ‘[p]ersons 
playing a leading role in the academic, cultural or religious life of their country’ 
(ibid: ii). The same gap in attitudes between the public and the top decision-makers 
was according to the same survey recorded in the issue of the perceived benefits by 
the EU integration. Ninety percent of the top decision-makers who participated in the 
survey argued that membership in the EU had benefited their country. The figure of 
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the citizens from the general public who agreed with that view was 43% (ibid: 4). 
For Greece the figures regarding the perceived benefits from the EU were 92% for 
the top decision-makers and 59% for the public. For the UK these figures were 84% 
and 38% respectively. 
 
 More recent studies also show higher rates of positive attitudes for European 
integration amongst the elites compared to the public (Kaina 2006; Flockhart 2005; 
Risse 2005; Risse 2004).19 The redirection of expectations, political activities and 
loyalties which Haas (1958) considered a central ingredient for European integration, 
still seems to have affected primarily the elites. The problem for European 
integration therefore seems to be the lack of a diffusion of shifts in expectations, 
political activities and loyalties within wider groups of the general population. The 
degree to which shifts in expectations, political activities and loyalties towards the 
EU have emerged among politicians, executives and other elite actors (who have 
been traditionally involved in EU processes and projects) could provide an indication 
for the kind of shifts which are needed in a more inclusive group of stakeholders.  
 
1.2.4 Participation in EU processes and socialisation 
 
Shore’s notion of engrenage20 provides a sound analysis of the dynamics of 
participation in EU processes (Shore 2000). Shore argues that participation in the EU 
system affects –through the engrenage– the attitudes and loyalties of the participants 
and that ‘the image it [i.e. engrenage] evokes of individuals becoming snared in the 
                                                 
19
 As has been shown in section 1.1.1.1 above, citizens are more supportive to the European 
integration than the elites in terms of social policies. 
20
 ‘As a figure of speech, however, it is used to convey the idea of being “caught up in the system”…’ 
(Shore 2000: 147) 
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EU’s expanding webs and networks, is crucial for understanding the way European 
integration is conceptualised by EU elites’ (ibid: 147). Shore develops further 
neofunctionalists’ predictions about the cognitive change that European integration 
could offer by stating that engrenage’s  
 
…‘functions’ are to integrate and socialise national subjects into the 
structures, norms and values of the EU: to draw individuals into the EU’s 
institutional web of meanings in order to change the way they see themselves 
(Shore 2000: 148).  
 
Shore’s theory was derived from empirical data collected among EU executives and 
particularly with Commission officials. His theory is heavily based on the 
socialisation of fonctionnaires under norms and values that participation in the EU 
Commission entails. One of the most notable examples in Shore’s research is the 
following statement by a Commission official:  
 
I suppose neofunctionalist theory is correct. Living and working in the EU 
does change you. I’ve certainly become more federalist in my outlook – not 
as much as some of those who have been here for ages – but I can see the 
process working on me. It’s obvious really; you have a vested interest in 
promoting the EU because you live here and work for it, so your fortunes 
become tied up with the fate of the Union… (Shore 2000: 152).  
 
This citation emphasises two central dimensions of socialisation. First, according to 
Hooghe (2005: 9), ‘the longer one’s involvement in an organization, the more one’s 
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beliefs can be expected to approximate that organization’s norms.’ However, the EU 
is not only perceived as a real entity through participation in its formal supranational 
institutions (e.g. Commission) but also through participation in its processes, policies 
and projects. As Tătar (2010: 48) states, loyalties towards the EU can emerge 
‘through continuous exposure to EU’s symbols, institutions, processes and policies’. 
This seems to happen because such participation provides participants with ‘shared 
experiences and shared social norms that enhance group identity and community 
feeling’ (Herrmann and Brewer 2004: 14).  
 
Second, it seems that even if socialisation in EU values can trigger the redirection of 
expectations, political activities and loyalties, its precise impact on expectations, 
political activities and loyalties cannot be assessed without taking into account the 
rational assessment of the EU by participants who are involved in EU activities. As 
the above quoted statement by a Commission official reveals, the promotion of the 
EU’s interests is normally expected to promote the personal interests of individuals 
(Shore 2000: 152). Hooghe (2005) has reached the same conclusion while focusing 
on the socialisation of individuals in the EU Commission. The Commission has been 
perceived as an independent ‘steering body’ for European integration that defends 
the ‘European interest over and above’ (ibid: 4). However, in addition to a 
socialisation process there is also a process of ‘utility maximization’ that leads to the 
redirection of interests and loyalties of participants (ibid: 13). If one accepts this line 
of argument then expectations, political activities and loyalties towards the EU 
emerge also when personal (and national) interests are promoted through the EU. 
This argument seems to confirm theories which argue that individuals’ attitudes 
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towards the EU are based on rational assessments (McLaren 2004; Mayer and 
Palmowski 2004, Sánchez-Cuenca 2000).  
 
Like Hass (1958) and Shore (2000), other theories which explain shifts in 
expectations, political activities and loyalties either on the grounds of rationalism 
and/or socialisation, have focused on specific actors of European integration. These 
theories base their assumption on the argument that the more the EU is salient to the 
peoples’ personal lives the more the people will shift expectations, political activities 
and loyalties towards the EU (Herrmann and Brewer 2004). According to Castano 
(2004: 41) this is the concept of ‘entitativity’ which dictates that ‘for identification 
with the EU to occur, the EU must be perceived as a real entity’. In Risse’s (2005: 
297) words,  
 
An imagined community becomes real in people’s lives when they 
increasingly share cultural values, a perceived common fate, increased 
salience, and boundedness. The EU is certainly very real for Europe’s 
political, economic, and social élites. 
 
Thus, only elite actors will potentially shift their loyalties because only they ‘deal 
with it [i.e. the EU] in their daily lives’ (Risse and Grabowski 2008: 3; see also 
Hooghe and Marks 2006: 248). For most other citizens (and groups) the EU remains 
‘remote’ (Risse and Grabowski 2008: 3). Nevertheless, the OMC was intended to 
widen the opportunities for participation for non-elite actors (see section 1.1.2 
above). The following section intends to assess whether participation in the OMC 
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can promote socialisation in EU norms and/or whether such participation can be 
analysed by a rational assessment of the EU framework.  
 
1.2.5 The OMC as a socialisation agent 
 
The previous section analysed the potential of the European Commission to socialise 
its members in EU norms and therefore to promote EU loyalties. Although the OMC 
is very different from the European Commission as far as the deliberate diffusion of 
symbols and values as well as the entailment of supranational norms are concerned, 
the former also appears to have the potential to provide a framework for socialisation 
(Haahr 2004; Jacobsson 2004). The OMC’s socialisation framework can be 
explained through the method’s comparison with the Community method.  
 
The Community method can be viewed as a top down imposition of hard law which 
member states are obliged to implement. The OMC instead tries to coordinate 
member state actions under soft law techniques. This encourages member states to 
identify best practices and draw up policies which acknowledge common European 
concerns and common European objectives (Jacobsson 2004). This does not imply 
that the policies decided on and implemented, according to the Community method, 
are drawn without reference to common European concerns and objectives. 
However, in the case of the Community method, goals and objectives are translated 
into strategies and binding laws which are decided on at the highest (or elite) 
political level. In the case of the OMC, member state actors are involved in every 
stage of the process from the initial expression of their common concerns, to the 
search for ways to implement commonly agreed actions (e.g. through instruments 
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such as peer review) to the monitoring and evaluation of each other’s practices and 
policies. Member state actors are therefore very much in control of the OMC process. 
The Community method presupposes ‘agency losses’ for the member states or ‘gaps 
in control’ (Schäfer 2004: 1-2 who based his argument on Pierson’s theory21). This 
means that under the Community method, member states (and EU institutions) make 
decisions for further integration which create EU institutions (i.e. ‘political legal and 
social institutions associated with political problem solving’ – Cowles et al. 2001: 3). 
Once the new institutions have been created, they form part of the EU governance 
system which cannot easily be changed by member states which consented to 
establish them (ibid: 2). If, for example, a newly elected government in a member 
state wants to revoke the previous government’s decision which was adopted under 
the Community Method, then it will be able to do so only with ‘unanimous consent’ 
at EU level (ibid: 2). In other words, the Council and EP will have to agree to revise 
an EU law or another legally binding decision that was adopted under the 
Community method. Accordingly, the involvement of supranational institutions, 
restricted time horizons, shifts in governments’ preferences and unanticipated 
consequences that may occur in the administrative and temporal space between the 
decision-making stage and the final outcome hampers their expected continuity 
(Schäfer 2004).  
 
The OMC aims to identify first the common concerns before member states are 
asked to implement policy measures. The method encourages a policy-making 
process which consists of the following stages: setting of objectives → design of 
policies → implementation → monitoring → mutual learning. According to Zeitlin 
                                                 
21
 Pierson, P. ‘The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutional Analysis’, 2004, in 
Comparative Political Studies vol. 29, 123-163 
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(2005b: 8), the ‘OMC processes cannot be considered as truly external to national 
policy-making, since Member States actively supported their initiation and 
continuously participate in the definition of objectives, guidelines, and indicators’. 
Therefore, the OMC which has been seen as one of the ‘forms of cooperation that 
limit agency losses’ (Schäfer 2004: 3), keeps clear the continuity between the 
decision-making stage and its outcome.   
 
The member states can be seen as agents which are working together to achieve a 
common goal. This ‘working together’ is not a simple cooperation, but a 
coordination of actions at every stage of the process (Haahr 2004). Haahr (ibid: 224) 
argues that, in such a way, the OMC reinforces ‘the vision of the EU as an entity’ 
and the vision of the EU as a ‘community of destiny’. In turn, this community of 
destiny appears to have its own objectives, concepts and categories which are 
incorporated into domestic debates through the OMC (Zeitlin 2005b: 5).  
 
As said above, the context for socialisation in which shifts in expectations, political 
activities and loyalties from national to European level occur, requires the presence 
of EU norms, institutions and discourse that run throughout the processes. For Haahr 
(2004), the OMC facilitates this requirement by involving peer reviews, guidelines, 
common European indicators, tables and graphs, and by authorising supranational 
norms to influence the policies and their outcomes (see also section 1.1.1 above). 
Concerning for example one of the above features of the OMC (i.e. guidelines), 
Trubek and Mosher (2003: 77) note: 
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The guidelines and the underlying strategy they reflect do, to varying 
degrees, challenge national policies in many countries and thus should 
destabilize prior understandings. 
 
It must be noted that for Trubek and Mosher (2003) guidelines is one of the OMC’s 
mechanisms which can potentially promote policy learning. Learning, in the context 
of the OMC-related policy-making processes, means the diffusion of ideas of 
problem solving across the EU and its member states (ibid.). Section 1.1.5 above has 
shown how in the context of Europeanisation the exposure of domestic actors to a 
wider forum of ideas is expected to help them overcome domestic constraints (e.g. 
veto points and policy problems). Studying in particular the European Employment 
Strategy (EES), Trubek and Mosher (2003) have argued that mechanisms such as 
benchmarking, sharing of good practices, dialogue and involvement of actors with 
new ideas have indeed promoted policy learning. Nevertheless, the authors have 
added that the OMC has not been used according to its potential and there is yet 
unexploited space for even better results, always in terms of policy learning (ibid.).  
 
Jacobsson (2004) goes on to argue that common learning together and through other 
mechanisms (i.e. the use of common language, common indicators, benchmarking, 
evaluations and statistics) trigger shifts of loyalties from the national to the EU 
framework. These mechanisms also contribute towards the creation of a ‘common 
“Europe”’ amongst EU elites and citizens (ibid: 355). However, Jacobsson has noted 
that while the OMC on employment has been increasingly intending to mobilise 
different groups of actors, it has rather been a method which mainly involves 
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officials. The conclusion is that through the above mentioned mechanisms, national 
policy actors: 
 
have begun to rethink national policy in the light of ‘common problems’ and 
to redefine it in terms of ‘common concerns’ and something that is 
legitimately the concern of other states and nationals (ibid: 367).  
 
In other words, Jacobsson argues that through such mechanisms, actors are ‘hedged 
in’ an emerging system of governance (ibid: 359). This is similar to Shore’s (2000) 
concept engrenage as has been explained above. Both authors appear to use these 
concepts to describe an EU-related socialisation process. However, in the case of the 
above cited studies on the OMC (i.e. carried out from Haahr (2004), Jacobsson 
(2004) and Trubek and Mosher (2003)), such evidence for socialisation appears to 
concern only the elite actors. This is inevitable since these studies focus on policy 
fields such as labour market and employment where the application of the OMC has 
in practice not managed to mobilise wider groups of stakeholders (in particular, 
primary and secondary stakeholders).22 Contrary to these policy fields, the OMC in 
social inclusion has managed to mobilise groups of secondary and primary 
stakeholders, as has been shown earlier in this chapter.  
 
De la Porte and Pochet (2005: 371) have shown that new actors, to whom the 
national framework does not provide the necessary ‘institutional means’, are eager to 
participate in the social inclusion OMC to pursue their interests. The social inclusion 
OMC therefore seems to be a particularly useful policy field to test Haas’s (1958) 
                                                 
22
 In fact, while Haahr and Jacobsson refer mainly to elite actors, Trubek and Mosher (2003) refer also 
to the social partners.   
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argument that actors shift their loyalties from the national to the European level 
because the latter appears able to realise their interests better than the former. The 
participation of primary and secondary stakeholders through the social inclusion 
OMC cannot only be seen as participation within a framework for socialisation in EU 
common concerns and objectives. Instead it should also be seen as a reason for a 
positive rational assessment due to which the emergence of expectations, political 
activities and loyalties towards the EU can emerge. 
 
Because the OMC can either provide the framework for socialisation to participants 
or because stakeholders participate in OMC initiatives for rational reasons, one can 
expect to find an impact on the expectations, political activities and loyalties of the 
involved stakeholders. As Zeitlin (2005: 37) has argued,  
 
[t]here is even evidence that participation in OMC process can contribute not 
merely to advancing domestic actors’ pre-existing interests and goals, but 
also to subtle shifts in their preferences and identities.  
 
This thesis intends to assess whether this claim can be supported with new empirical 
evidence on the participation of primary and secondary stakeholders in the social 
inclusion OMC. Before being able to put forward the main research question and 
hypotheses it is important to clarify how participation of primary and secondary 
stakeholders’ is assessed in the chapters that follow. 
 
 
 
 67 
 
 
1.3 Methodology and country selection 
 
1.3.1 Stages, degree and level of participation 
 
In the context of the social inclusion OMC, participation of stakeholders started in 
2000 as a broad, overarching objective. No further specification was provided 
regarding which stages of the policy-making process and which level of governance 
(EU level or domestic level) participation was referring to. The Nice conclusions 
(European Council 2000c: 9) indicated that participation of primary and secondary 
stakeholders in the fight against the various forms of exclusion should be intended 
‘according to national practice’. This was clearly referring to participation in the 
domestic policy-making process but it was leaving ample room to the member states 
to decide where (i.e. which stage of the policy-making cycle) the stakeholders would 
contribute to. The streamlining of the social inclusion OMC in 2005 underlined the 
need for participation in specific stages of the policy-making process. As shown in 
section 1.1.2 above, the European Commission (2005a: 5) has set the objective of 
stakeholders’ participation in the ‘design, implementation and monitoring of policy’. 
Particularly by referring to the stages of implementation and monitoring, the 
Commission seems to follow core public policy textbooks which differentiate 
between stages of the policy-making cycle. For example, in his model of the policy 
cycle, Heywood (2007, 2000) also refers to the stages of policy implementation and 
monitoring, among others. Yet, the Commission’s reference to the design of policy 
seems to be imprecise. In fact, instead of the three stages policy cycle being used by 
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the Commission, Heywood’s (2007: 430; 2000: 32) policy cycle model is consisted 
of four stages. Apart from implementation and monitoring, Heywood also assesses 
the stages of policy initiation (bringing an issue to the concern of the administration) 
and policy formulation (specification of targets and decision-making regarding the 
policies to pursue commonly recognised objectives). For Heywood these are the first 
and the second stages of the policy cycle respectively, with policy implementation 
being the third and evaluation the fourth stage. The Commission does not explain 
further whether the design stage involves the initiation of policies and/or the 
decision-making.  
 
Approaches to different stages of the policy cycle are not beyond criticism. For 
example, Corkery and colleagues (1995: 7) argue that such ‘linear models’ of the 
policy-making process fail to account for the interrelation of the different stages. 
They tend to approach the policy-making process as a ‘sequence of steps’ (ibid.). 
However, in the context of the OMC, research has indeed used linear models in order 
to analyse the policy cycle. The increasing interest in the mobilisation of 
stakeholders in the context of the OMC has been reflected on developments in 
studies of participation in the different stages of the policy-making cycle. According 
to a study carried out for the European Commission, the participation of stakeholders 
in the OMC must be analysed in respect to the different stages of the policy-making 
process, namely preparation and design (including agenda-setting), decision-making, 
implementation, monitoring and assessment (Inbas and Engender 2010). Independent 
experts who contributed to the Inbas and Engender study appear to consider 
preparation and design as one stage (they mostly focus on the agenda-setting) and 
they separately refer to the stage of decision-making (e.g. Delistathis et al. 2009). 
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Since, as said earlier, design has a rather convoluted meaning, the present thesis 
follows a linear model focusing however in the following stages of the policy-
making process: agenda-setting, decision-making, implementation and monitoring.  
 
As has been explained earlier, the member states’ response to the OMC overarching 
objectives is drafted and reflected in the NAPs/NSRs. Various scholars have 
indicated that primary and secondary stakeholders’ participation refers to 
participation in the NAP process (e.g. Armstrong 2006; de la Porte and Pochet 2005). 
Therefore, the focus of the present thesis is on the different stages of the NAP/NSR 
process i.e. agenda-setting, decision-making, implementation and monitoring.      
 
For the present thesis the degree of participation is another important variable. 
Research on the participation of stakeholders in the social OMC gained momentum 
while the present thesis was being written. Thus, an EU wide study has been 
conducted by Inbas and Engender (2010; regarding the UK and Greece also see 
Delistathis et al. 2009 and Johnson 2009). This study showed that the OMC has 
triggered domestic participation of stakeholders at different degrees of involvement. 
According to the study (ibid: 3 –emphasis added), the degrees of involvement23 are 
the following: 
 
to inform: one-way dissemination of information [by the government] to 
stakeholders on a specific issue; to consult: to inform and get feedback from 
stakeholders, a two-way information channel; to involve: gathering 
stakeholders’ views and ensuring that their concerns and views are 
                                                 
23
 Based on the framework developed by the International Association for Public Participation 
 70 
understood and considered; to collaborate: to work with stakeholders as 
partners throughout a process, including in analyses, development and 
decision-making; to empower: to place final decision-making in the hands of 
stakeholders.  
 
Secondary stakeholders participate in all member states’ OMC led social inclusion 
processes although in different degrees of involvement and in different stages of the 
policy cycle. Moreover, the OMC has triggered the participation of primary 
stakeholders in about half of the currently 27 member states (ibid.). Particularly the 
British government appears to be successful in promoting the participation of people 
in poverty in the domestic social inclusion policies (Johnson 2009). In fact, Johnson 
(2009) identified the participation of primary stakeholders in the UK as good 
practice which (in the context of the OMC) should be shared by other EU member 
states. A similar study in Greece showed that the OMC triggered the participation of 
only secondary stakeholders in the social inclusion policy-making process 
(Delistathis et al. 2009). According to Delistathis’ and colleagues’ (2009) study, 
Greek primary stakeholders have not been mobilised by the OMC to participate in 
the domestic policy-making process. This seems to question a 2005 study by de la 
Porte and Pochet (2005). According to this last study (ibid: 379):  
 
There is a relatively high level of correspondence between the level of 
participation of NGOs and people experiencing poverty. In nine out of ten 
cases, where participation is good for NGOs [such as in the UK and in 
Greece], it is medium for people experiencing poverty.  
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Despite reaching at different conclusions (partly explained by the different periods 
the research conducted), the contribution of these studies to the understanding of the 
nature of domestic participation is notable. Instead of degrees of participation, de la 
Porte and Pochet (2005: 378) approach the issue by mentioning ‘medium’ and 
‘good’ participation. Good participation means that ‘there is genuine consultation by 
the government’ with these stakeholders during the drafting of the NAPs on social 
inclusion. Medium participation means that ‘there is only information by the 
government’ for the stakeholders (ibid.). 
 
However, the studies of Inbas and Engender (2010) and de la Porte and Pochet 
(2005) do not produce evidence regarding the assessment of the participation by 
stakeholders who either participate or are willing to participate in OMC processes at 
the domestic level. As will be shown below such assessment is vital for the 
understanding of potential shifts in expectations, political activities and loyalties.  
 
Regarding participation at EU level through the OMC, up to now the Impact study on 
the European meetings of people experiencing poverty (Dierckx and Van Herck 
2010) is the only study which refers to its impact on primary stakeholders. Dierckx 
and Van Herck concluded that these meetings ‘provide a kind of European identity’ 
(ibid: 20) to the participants in the sense of belonging to a wider community of 
people with shared problems. However, their study does not appear to assess 
adequately the impact of such participation in the EU instigated OMC activities on 
the expectations, political activities and loyalties of the participants. This thesis aims 
to make a contribution in helping to close this gap in the existing literature on the 
(social inclusion) OMC. 
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1.3.2 Research question and hypotheses 
 
This thesis draws upon new empirical data findings in addressing the following main 
research question: To what extent will primary and secondary stakeholders who 
participate in the social inclusion OMC shift their expectations, political activities 
and loyalties from the domestic to the EU level?  
 
In order to be able to answer the research question, this thesis puts forward two 
hypotheses. First, the participation of primary and secondary stakeholders in the 
domestic social inclusion OMC process leads to shifts in their expectations, political 
activities and loyalties from the national to the EU level. In order to test this 
hypothesis, a two-step research process is carried out. The first step seeks to analyse 
domestic participation of the concerned stakeholders through the social inclusion 
OMC. For reasons explained in the previous section, this first step assesses whether 
primary and secondary stakeholders have been involved in the agenda-setting, 
decision-making, implementation and monitoring of the NAPs  and what the degree 
of their involvement has been. The second step analyses the impact of participation 
on participants’ expectations, political activities and loyalties in relation to the EU. 
Importantly, the main focus of the analysis is on the views which the participants 
hold on their own participation and on the EU participatory framework which is 
provided by the OMC. It is hypothesised that possible satisfaction from their 
participation could lead to a positive rational assessment of the EU. 
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The second hypothesis put forward focuses specifically on EU-level participation. It 
hypothesises that the participation of stakeholders in OMC-sponsored EU 
conferences of people who experience poverty, will lead to shifts in their 
expectations, political activities and loyalties to the EU level. Primary stakeholders 
from every member state meet in Brussels for a two-day annual event, with the main 
purpose of this event being to enable EU policy-makers to consult the participants 
about their views and experiences concerning issues of poverty and social exclusion. 
Again the opinions of individuals who participate in these meetings are central for a 
better understanding of the potential for the emergence of a shift in expectations, 
political activities and loyalties towards the EU.  
 
It is ironic that the existing studies have largely ignored primary and secondary 
stakeholders’ opinions on their participation in social inclusion OMC. As was 
mentioned above, most scholars have exclusively focused on elite actors in their 
studies on participation through the OMC.  In order to overcome this deficiency in 
the existing literature, this thesis makes wide use of interviews with primary and 
secondary stakeholders who were involved in the social inclusion OMC. 
 
1.3.3 Qualitative research 
 
In order to answer the main research question, this thesis uses qualitative research 
methods. However, ‘the use of such a broad label [i.e. qualitative research] masks a 
great variety of approaches, which perhaps should not be taken together as some sort 
of coherent whole’ (Symon and Cassell 2004: 2). Therefore, the methodological 
approach adopted for this thesis relies heavily on semi-structured interviews with 
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primary and secondary stakeholders in Greece and the UK as well as with some 
stakeholders on the EU level.  
 
Many of the empirical findings put forward in this thesis concern the context in 
which the shifts in expectations, political activities and loyalties are expected to take 
place. The researched context may contain variables which could not have been 
expected when formulating the original hypotheses. This richness therefore, ‘means 
that the study cannot rely on a single data collection method but will likely need to 
use multiple sources of evidence’ (Yin 2003: 4). This thesis relies on different 
sources of information to extract new empirical evidence related to the hypotheses 
and for answering the research question. A more thorough understanding can be 
derived when different sources are analysed which produce relevant data (Olsen 
2004). The present thesis intends to answer these and related issues by making use of 
semi-structured interviews, an analysis of primary documents issued by the 
Commission and member states (e.g. communications, Joint Reports, and NAPs) and 
reports from projects and workshops on the application of the OMC. This thesis 
therefore draws on a range of unpublished primary sources in addition to an analysis 
of the existing secondary literature.  
 
1.3.3.1 Interviews 
 
Conducting interviews is a widely used method for collecting new empirical data. It 
can be defined as a method with the objective ‘to see the research topic from the 
perspective of the interviewee, and to understand how and why they come to have 
this particular perspective’ (King 2004: 11). One major advantage of interviews is 
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the interaction between the interviewee and the interviewer. This does not mean that 
the procedure is limited to a question and answer session and that the interviewees 
should be treated simply as vessels of information (Marvasti 2004). Thus,  
 
[f]or a growing number of sociologists and other social scientists the 
interview process in no longer limited to the simple give-and-take of asking 
and answering questions. While gathering information about people remains 
a central purpose of interviewing, exceedingly, qualitative researchers are 
moving beyond technical and procedural matters and into the realm of 
meaning, interaction, and social context (ibid: 29).  
 
The interviewees were not only seen as people who have the information about 
participation, but also as people who can discuss the meaning of such participation 
for secondary and primary stakeholders. The advantage of the interview is that it can 
help towards the understanding of participation and its impact on three different 
levels of participants’ attitudes towards the EU, namely expectations, political 
activities and loyalties. According to King (2004: 21), ‘[t]he qualitative research 
interview is ideally suited to examining topics in which different levels of meaning 
need to be explored’.  
 
The above remarks do not intend to obscure the major disadvantage of the 
interviews. This thesis acknowledges that the information which is gathered with the 
help of semi-structured interviews (that can be carried out only with a relatively 
small number of interviewees) cannot provide statistically relevant data (Read and 
Marsh 2002). However, the earlier mentioned advantages advocate for the scientific 
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utility of the interviews by answering the particular research question. Additionally, 
the impact of these weaknesses has been intended to be mellowed with the extensive 
use of primary documents such as reports from projects and workshops on the 
application of the OMC, as section 1.3.3.2 shows.  
  
King (2004) sees the interviews as a process which starts long before the interviewer 
and interviewee meet. This method’s preparatory phase starts already from the time 
the research question is shaped. The form that the questions will have is of decisive 
importance for the interviews. All topics discussed during semi-structured interviews 
are closely related with each other to enable the collection of new empirical data 
which will help to answer the main research question. The next step in this research 
approach is the creation of specific interview questions. For this thesis the interviews 
were not conducted according to a rigid standardised questionnaire. Instead the 
interviews were structured in such a way as to allow in depth conversations about 
issues of participation as well as the loyalties and interests of the participants. In this 
sense, the questions have been grouped in different sets according to the groups of 
interviewees (i.e. primary or secondary stakeholders). Before these sets of questions 
are explained, it must be said that the theorising of the OMC as a tool which fosters 
participation requires purposive sampling instead of statistically relevant random 
sampling for both secondary and primary stakeholders. In the case of secondary 
stakeholders, the reasons for the purposive sampling include the awareness of the 
OMC, knowledge of the interviewees of the EU and domestic policy-making process 
in the field of social inclusion, and their knowledge of issues which are related to 
secondary and primary stakeholders’ participation. Most of these stakeholders are 
members of the EAPN networks in Greece and the UK. As shown earlier in the 
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present chapter, the EAPN-EU (with its national delegations, e.g. EAPN-Greece and 
EAPN-UK) is the most active anti-poverty network in the social inclusion OMC 
process. However, interviews were conducted with representatives from 
organisations which do not belong to the EAPN network. For example the Klimaka 
NGO in Greece and the Off the Streets into Work NGO in the UK are both members 
of the European Federation of National Organisations Working with the Homeless 
(Fédération Européenne des Associations Nationales Travaillant avec les Sans-Abri 
– FEANTSA). The reason for these interviews was that the FEANTSA network is 
also very active in the field of the social inclusion OMC mainly in issues of mental 
health and homelessness. Interviewees from these associations were approached with 
an email or with a telephone call.    
 
People who participated and/or have facilitated the participation of primary 
stakeholders have also been interviewed (i.e. key actors in the Get Heard and 
Bridging the Policy Gap projects; see chapter 4). Representatives from anti-poverty 
associations are (due to their activity in the field) able to provide an overview of 
primary stakeholders’ participation and potential shifts in expectations, political 
activities and loyalties. However, because the account of a third person cannot be 
treated as totally accurate (as in some cases interviewees themselves admitted), 
primary stakeholders’ views have been vital for the present thesis. Thus, primary 
stakeholders from Greece and the UK who have participated in OMC-led domestic 
and/or EU level projects have been interviewed. For example, a person from Crete 
has been interviewed due to her participation in the Brussels European Meeting of 
People Experiencing Poverty. Another interview was conducted in Wales due to the 
fact that the person was a member of the Anti-Poverty Network Cymru (the 
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grassroots anti-poverty network in Wales) and also a participant in the above 
mentioned European meetings. In these cases the technique of ‘snowball sampling’ 
was used (Atkinson and Flint 2004: 1043). The contact details of participants in the 
OMC process who live in poverty and/or experience social exclusion were in 
principle not easy to find. Therefore, already identified interviewees were asked to 
provide the contact details of primary stakeholders which they had at their disposal. 
In total, sixteen interviews were carried out between November 2009 and January 
2012. Seven of them took place in Greece, eight in the UK and one in Brussels. The 
list of interviewees consists of twelve secondary and four primary stakeholders (see 
Appendix III).  
 
The semi-structured interview questions are not ‘based on a formal schedule of 
questions to be asked word-for-word in a set order’ (King 2004: 15). Instead, they 
changed somewhat depending on the interview context and the interviewees (see 
Appendixes I and II24). In the case of secondary stakeholders, the first set of 
questions inquired about the interviewee and his/her organisation’s involvement in 
the field of social inclusion. The second group of questions focused on the 
participation of secondary stakeholders before asking the same questions about 
primary stakeholders. The third group of questions asked about whether participation 
is redirecting primary and secondary participants’ expectations, political activities 
and loyalties towards the EU as well as about the evidence for it. In the case of 
primary stakeholders, the groups of questions centered on the following three main 
issues. First, their own participation domestically or/and at EU level. Second, 
whether participation has had an impact on their expectations, political activities and 
                                                 
24
 Appendixes I and II provide a simplified example of interview questions in the context of the 
present thesis. They do not intend to draw up a full list of questions asked during all interviews.  
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loyalties towards the EU. Third, in cases where there was an impact, the extent of the 
apparent shift in expectations, political activities and loyalties was enquired; in cases 
where there was no impact, the questions focused on the reasons why the hypothesis 
was wrong.  
 
1.3.3.2 EU, national and third sector documents 
 
As has been stated above, there are assessments of the OMC based on state/ sub-state 
and EU actors. Ironically, the views of primary and secondary stakeholders have 
been largely ignored by the OMC literature (see introduction). This thesis has sought 
to study participation in the social inclusion OMC and the (potential) changes it 
induces in participants’ expectations, political activities and loyalties. In order to fill 
the gap in the literature, this thesis focuses on primary and secondary stakeholders in 
the OMC process. For this reasons, interviews have been conducted exclusively with 
these stakeholders. Where the official stance on the social inclusion OMC has been 
necessary, official documents have been analysed. As said earlier in this chapter, the 
OMC has been developed as a new form of governance to increase accountability 
and transparency, among others. Independent experts (e.g. PPMI 2011) argue that the 
OMC has not yet managed to meet these objectives in full. Nevertheless, a vast 
amount of official documents (NAPs, NSRs, Joint Reports, Council conclusions, 
Commission communications, government gazettes etc) which provide the official 
assessment of the issues concerned is available to researchers. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 
rely also on such documents to draw conclusions about the OMC process.     
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Therefore, important evidence for this thesis has been provided by OMC-related 
documents. Official national and European reports (such as NAPs and Joint Reports 
and Commission Communications) have been used to assess the Greek and British 
adaptation to the OMC (for the latter see section 1.1.5 above). Official documents’ 
evidence on participation of primary and secondary stakeholders is also compared 
with the views which NGOs, anti-poverty networks and primary stakeholders hold 
about this participation. The aim is to assess whether the same type and extent of 
participation of secondary and primary stakeholders is perceived differently by 
decision-makers and (primary and secondary) stakeholders. Another category of 
documents that has been analysed are the reports of domestic and European 
participatory projects (e.g. reports of the annual European meetings of people who 
experience poverty and the UK-based Get Heard and Bridging the Policy Gap 
projects). These reports, which are produced by secondary stakeholders, can be seen 
as important sources of data for the participation of primary stakeholders and the 
impacts it has on the participants. Finally, during the interviews many respondents 
provided the interviewer with unpublished documents which were of great value as 
primary data for this thesis.  
 
1.3.4 Research timeframe 
 
The timeframe of the study includes the first ten years of the application of the social 
inclusion OMC in Greece and the UK. It therefore focuses on the period which starts 
with the application of the social inclusion OMC in the member states in 2001. It 
ends with renewal of the Lisbon strategy (and therefore the social inclusion OMC) in 
2010 with the setting up of the new strategy Europe 2020.  A part of this strategy, the 
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European platform against poverty and social exclusion, has now become the new 
framework for the social inclusion policy-making process (e.g. Copeland and Daly 
2012). According to de la Porte and Pochet (2012), poverty and social inclusion 
issues will, in the context of the strategy Europe 2020, be coordinated not by an 
OMC but by the above mentioned platform. In fact they note that ‘the OMC label is 
no longer used in the EU’s newest medium-term political project, Europe 2020…’ 
(ibid: 339).   
 
Key stakeholders also appear to be critical to Europe 2020, particularly in regards to 
the participation of stakeholders in the European platform against poverty. As the 
director of the EAPN-EU has put it during an interview (telephone interview 
09.01.2012), ‘since the new agenda [Europe 2020] it is very hard to know what 
exactly it is meant by the OMC and even harder to know what the process is about’.   
 
The lack of clarity of the type of coordination promoted in the context of the Europe 
2020 strategy is the second reason why the timeframe of the research ends in 2010. 
De la Porte and Pochet (2012: 338) hold that the implications of the European 
platform against poverty and social exclusion on the coordination of the member 
states’ relevant policies ‘are still [in June 2012] unclear’. In particular to 
participation of stakeholders, the first years after the launch of the Europe 2020 have 
been hard to be followed by empirical evidence that show either intensified, stable or 
reduced participation.  
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1.3.5 Country selection: Greece and the UK. 
 
1.3.5.1 Europeanisation through the Lisbon strategy 
 
According to Börzel (2002: 199), countries which seek to influence European policy 
outcomes for their own benefit need to have both ‘established domestic policies’ and 
‘the capacity to push them through the European negotiation process’. The UK has 
been a leading member state in the shaping of the Lisbon agenda and especially 
issues of competitiveness and economic reform (Bulmer 2008). Issues that had 
emerged in the British political discourse before the Lisbon summit in 2000 seemed 
to have had an impact on the EU’s strategy for social cohesion. Particularly in the 
social inclusion field, the 1997 Labour Party manifesto was heavily based on the 
need for social inclusion (Atkins 2008). Their 2001 Labour manifesto also argued 
that developments at EU level had followed British expectations. According to this 
manifesto (Labour Party 2001: 38):  
 
Britain has secured a shift in economic policy in Europe –away from 
harmonisations of rules and towards a system based on dynamic markets 
allied to comparison and promotion of best practices.  
 
The 2001 Labour Party manifesto appeared to be in line with the social inclusion 
OMC’s provisions for wide mobilisation of actors. Thus, a few months after the Nice 
European Council in December 2000, the Labour Party manifesto underlined the 
need for the involvement of voluntary organisations and grassroots actors in the 
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policy-making process on issues concerning social inclusion (Labour Party 2001: 
29). 
 
In contrast to the UK, Greece was from the beginning of the Lisbon strategy 
expected to be the ‘“least likely” case in relation to structural reform’ (Featherstone 
and Papadimitriou 2008: 5). In the words of Featherstone (2005b: 223),  
 
[p]olitics and policy-making in contemporary Greece display the tension 
between pressures for reform, on the one hand, and the structural 
impediments to their realisation, on the other.  
 
In the context of Europeanisation, Greece has been described as a ‘foot-dragger’ in 
uploading and downloading policies (Börzel 2002: 203). In fact, the PASOK 
government had from 1996 its own aspirations for the modernisation of the economic 
and social policy which actually matched those of the Lisbon strategy (Featherstone 
2005b). However, these aspirations did not meet their objective and the intensions 
for positive responses to the EU pressures for reforms have been proven largely 
unsuccessful as can be seen from pensions, health and labour market policies (Tinios 
2005; Mossialos and Allin 2005; Papadimitriou 2005). As a result, Greece has been 
attributed only a poor ‘reform capacity’ (Featherstone 2008: 3).  
 
1.3.5.2 Loyalties to the EU 
 
Greece and the UK have the most peculiar attitudes as far as their citizens’ attitudes 
towards the EU are concerned. They appear to be in the last places regarding the 
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loyalties towards the EU. According to a study carried out by Jiménez, only 27.8% 
of the respondents in Greece felt close or very close to the rest of the EU citizens, 
while in the UK the figure is even lower with only 19.4% (Jimenez 2003: 12). For 
the sake of comparison, in the same study 45.8% of the respondents in Hungary, 
43.5% of the respondents in Italy, 40.5% of the respondents in Spain and around 
30% of the respondents in Germany felt close or very close to the rest of the EU 
citizens. 
 
Finally, due to the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008, first Greece and then the 
UK adopted major budget cuts which have been expected to ‘hit the poorest harder 
than the better off’ (The Guardian 21.10.2010). Consequently, the social inclusion 
OMC has arguably become more relevant than ever before. However, the crisis had a 
(negative) impact on citizens’ attitudes towards the EU (Fraile and Di Mauro 2010). 
While this thesis was being written, the 2011 Eurobarometer survey showed that in 
Greece 50% and in the UK 54% of the population did not believe that membership 
has benefited the country (Eurobarometer 2011a: 34). While in the UK this trend is 
not new, in Greece there has been an important decrease in citizens’ positive 
attitudes towards the EU in the years after 2008. This of course cannot be seen 
independently from the economic crisis which has fundamentally changed the 
citizens’ attitudes towards the EU. In 2008, before the economic crisis hit the EU, 
73% of the population in Greece believed that the EU membership had benefited 
Greece (Eurobarometer 2008). Yet, the economic crisis influenced negatively these 
stances, as table 1 shows. 
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Table 1 (author’s compilation): The financial crisis and citizens’ attitudes. 
  
        Membership is a good thing 
(is a bad thing) 
 
Tend to trust the EU 
(tend not to trust the EU) 
 
EU UK Greece EU UK Greece 
2008 54(31) 36(50) 73(27) 50(36) 29(56) 59(41) 
2011 52(37) 35(54) 47(50) 41(47) 24(63) 32(67) 
Source: Eurobarometer (2011a), Eurobarometer (2008). 
 
Additionally, the trust in the EU in Greece was in 2011 reduced to only 32% from 
59% in 2008. At the same period, trust of the EU in the UK declined to 24% from 
29% in 2008. In terms of the total EU population, the 2011 Eurobarometer (three 
years after the outbreak of the crisis) concluded that ‘fewer people tend to trust the 
European Institutions than tend to distrust them’ (ibid: 21). Thus, comparing the 
Eurobarometer in 2011 with this of 2008, EU citizens’ trust to the EU declined from 
50% to 41% (see table 1).     
 
The impact of the above mentioned issues on the participation and expectations, 
political activities and loyalties will concern chapters 3 and 4. For now, the following 
chapter will show how participation in the OMC social inclusion emerged as a 
counter-weight to the focus on growth and jobs in the EU’s Lisbon strategy. In this 
context, special care will be given to the issue of the participation of primary 
stakeholders in the Brussels European Meetings of People who Experience Poverty. 
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Chapter 2: The European Union, poverty and social exclusion 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Poverty and social exclusion are difficult to define in a generally accepted and 
unambiguous manner (Barr 2004; Deleeck et al. 1992). And it is even more difficult 
to take public policy actions which will alleviate or eradicate poverty and social 
exclusion based upon these ill-defined terms. Short or long term public policies can 
either reduce or increase poverty or fail to make any difference (Barr 2004). It is 
often very difficult to measure the efficiency of public policy measures and their 
impact on poverty. Things get even more complicated when the EU adopts anti-
poverty and social inclusion measures because they have to be implemented at the 
national level by member governments (Townsend and Gordon 2002: xii).  
 
For all these reasons, this chapter intends to explain what poverty and social 
exclusion are, to see how the EU has approached these issues and to understand the 
context in which participation of stakeholders in public policy emerged. Section 2.2 
is concerned with the concepts of poverty and social exclusion. Section 2.3 discusses 
how the EU has approached these forms of social deprivation. Section 2.4 shows 
why the EU’s focus on growth and jobs to combat poverty and social exclusion has 
been criticised by academics and anti-poverty associations. It also shows why 
participation of stakeholders has been considered as a counter-weight to the growth 
and jobs strategy. Section 2.5 analyses the European Meetings of People 
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Experiencing Poverty (EMPEP) in the period 2001-2010 (i.e. the timeframe of the 
present thesis). Finally, the last part of this chapter discusses the conclusion.     
 
 
2.2 The concepts of poverty and social exclusion 
 
2.2.1 The concept of poverty  
 
An early effort to approach the nature of poverty was made by Benjamin S. 
Rowntree (1908: x) who proposed the term ‘primary poverty’ for families with 
income ‘insufficient to obtain the minimum necessaries for the maintenance of 
merely physical efficiency.’ Physical efficiency, at the time when Rowntree carried 
out his research, was referring to the satisfaction of basic needs such as food, shelter, 
and household sundries (e.g. light, fuel, clothing and water). This term was replaced 
by the term ‘absolute poverty’ which amounted to an individual ‘being without the 
minimum necessary requirements for life or subsistence within life’ (Alcock 1987: 
3).  
 
Another effort to approach the nature of poverty was the concept of a ‘poverty line’ 
which was developed in the late 1880s (Booth 1887). The term poverty line was used 
to distinguish those in poverty from those in comfort in terms of sufficient income to 
meet basic needs (ibid.). In the US, a ‘basket of goods’ is used to distinguish those 
who are able to satisfy basic needs from those who are not (Borgeraas and Dahl 
2010: 74, 76). However, Spicker and colleagues (2007) argue that by linking poverty 
to basic goods, the blame for poverty is put on the individual who cannot keep up 
with social and economic changes. Thus, the social dimension of the problem of 
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poverty is not being taken into consideration (ibid.). Other researchers have argued 
that by measuring poverty in absolute terms (i.e. by focusing exclusively on specific 
subsistence needs) other needs such as social and psychological needs are 
underestimated (Borgeraas and Dahl  2010; Boltvinik 2009).  
 
An additional reason why approaching poverty through the inability to satisfy basic 
needs has been criticised is that goods for basic needs vary among people in different 
societies and time periods. As Townsend (1979: 50) has put it: ‘Needs arise by virtue 
of the kind of society to which individuals belong’. Such concepts are static and fail 
to take into consideration the ‘style of living’ of individuals and their families (ibid: 
59). For example, while basic needs in the past were limited to food, shelter, clothing 
and water, basic needs today include education, cultural facilities and transport 
(Spicker et al. 2007). Therefore, approaching poverty through its relation with 
minimum standards of living cannot provide a dynamic concept which is needed in 
order to understand a social problem in different societies and across time. As a 
result, ‘if poverty cannot be measured accurately, it cannot easily be eradicated’25. 
The concept of absolute poverty has therefore been discarded as too vague.  
 
In the place of absolute poverty, a new approach to poverty was introduced by 
Townsend (1979: 31) who argued that  
 
[i]ndividuals, families and groups in the population can be said to be in 
poverty when they lack the resources to obtain the types of diet, participate in 
the activities and have the living conditions and amenities which are 
                                                 
25
 Web-site of the Townsend Centre for International Poverty Research 2011, 
http://www.bris.ac.uk/poverty/defining%20and%20measuring%20poverty.html, accessed on 
24.03.2011 
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customary, or are at least widely encouraged or approved, in the societies to 
which they belong. Their resources are so seriously below those commanded 
by the average individual or family that they are, in effect, excluded from 
ordinary living patterns, customs and activities. 
 
Therefore, the concept of ‘relative poverty’ no longer links poverty to individualism. 
Instead, it incorporates a social dimension, since an individual’s poverty is seen in 
the context of the standards of living in a set society. As Alcock (1987: 5) has 
argued, ‘the numbers of people deemed to be living in poverty, can only be 
determined in relation to the standard of living of all members of any particular 
society’. This approach is used by the EU in order to measure and act against 
poverty. Thus, in 2004 the Joint report by the EU Commission and the Council of the 
EU on social inclusion concluded that 
 
[p]eople are said to be living in poverty if their income and resources are so 
inadequate as to preclude them from having a standard of living considered 
acceptable in the society in which they live.  Because of their poverty they 
may experience multiple disadvantages through unemployment, low income, 
poor housing, inadequate health care and barriers to lifelong learning, culture, 
sport and recreation.  They are often excluded and marginalised from 
participating in activities (economic, social and cultural) that are the norm for 
other people and their access to fundamental rights may be restricted (Council 
of the EU 2004: 8). 
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The EU has also adopted the ‘at-risk-of-poverty’ concept (e.g. Eurostat 2010a: 1). 
This concept means that the EU has set the threshold of poverty at the 60% of the 
median income in each member state (ibid.). In such a way the EU has made it 
possible to make comparisons between countries since the 60% index reflects 
poverty rates across the member states on the basis of proportionality. This definition 
also shares similarities with Townsend’s definition. While Townsend (1979) has put 
poverty into a social context by arguing that insufficient resources excluded people 
from the average living patterns, customs and activities, the EU argues that poverty 
often leads to social exclusion and marginalisation.  
 
These approaches to relative poverty appear to focus primarily on the lack of an 
adequate income as the reason for poverty. Admittedly low income is indeed a 
crucial indicator of poverty. However, adequacy of income does not necessarily 
mean the elimination of poverty. Poverty is a multidimensional phenomenon and it 
has to be approached as such. Section 2.2.2 will explain these remarks. For now, it 
has been argued that the approach to relative poverty, which dominates the public 
policy agenda of countries and international institutions (such as the OECD and EU), 
can be criticised as having exaggerated poverty. As will be shown in chapters 3 and 4 
respectively, both British and Greek governments have in the past defended their 
ineffective policies for social security with such arguments. While Greece has 
pointed out high rates of house ownership to downplay the issue of homelessness, the 
UK has insisted that domestic economic growth has not left many, if any, people in 
poverty. 
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2.2.2 The concept of social exclusion 
 
Social exclusion is a political discourse which appeared first in France in the early 
1970s and from there it was uploaded to the EU (Armstrong 2005; Levitas 1998). In 
fact, in the 1980s and 1990s, social exclusion was ‘inextricably’ linked with poverty. 
At that time it was claimed that only a ‘substantial redistribution of resources’ could 
solve the problem of poverty and therefore of social exclusion (Levitas 2004: 44). 
The core of social exclusion was therefore purely redistributive or, according to 
Levitas, who is one of the pioneers in the studies of social exclusion, social exclusion 
was explicitly referred to a redistributive discourse (RED) (Levitas 2004; Levitas 
1998). However, soon the debate on social exclusion was enriched with the social 
integrationist discourse (SID) whose main argument is that the solution to social 
exclusion is paid work (ibid.). This discourse has also been criticised because it has 
overestimated the benefits of paid work without taking into consideration problems 
such as in-work poverty, low wages, and insecurity in the labour market (Forrester 
1999, in Levitas 2004). Additionally, in cases such as lone parenting the SID 
approach overlooks the value of unpaid work for society while it also neglects the 
gender participation in forms of non-employment (Levitas 2004, 2001).26 Finally, the 
third discourse about social inclusion which has been put forward is the social 
underclass discourse (SUD). This discourse has focused on the lack of values from 
those who are excluded, or the different social values that they have in comparison 
with the values of the society to which they belong (Levitas 2004).  
 
                                                 
26
 For example, women are six times more likely to be involved in caring unpaid activities than men 
(Levitas et al. 2000: 55). 
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The inextricable linking of social exclusion with poverty leads to a one-
dimensional description of social exclusion. Conversely, all one-dimensional 
approaches to exclusion are based on its one-way relationship with poverty; they 
are therefore urging for paid employment as a treatment for poverty and the 
eradication of social exclusion through income (Bradshaw et al. 1998: 13). 
Despite public perceptions that poverty and social exclusion are indeed static and 
a one-dimensional (i.e. the result of inadequate income) phenomena, they do not 
refer only to the lack of an adequate income (Whelan et al. 2001: 1). In fact, 
there is little evidence to show that low income is the only factor for social 
deprivation (ibid: 2). A similar line of argument holds that poverty should not be 
measured according to the income which people have, but according to the kind 
of life they wanted to live (Sen 2006). Thus, ‘[w]hereas income is merely one of 
the means of good living, we have reason enough to look directly at the quality 
of life that people are able to lead, and the freedom they enjoy to live the way 
they would like’ (ibid: 34).  
 
Studies in the UK have shown that income poverty is not the only dimension of 
social exclusion. Instead, ‘labour market exclusion’, ‘service exclusion’, and 
‘exclusion from social relations’ are equally important factors which can result in 
social exclusion (Levitas et al. 2000: 54). Starting with the labour market exclusion 
approach, paid employment is not only important because it can provide an adequate 
income, it is also important because it promotes social ‘contact’ and ‘interaction’ 
(ibid.). The concept of ‘employability’ has also been added as an analytical tool to 
assess the barriers to work for short and long term unemployed and the resulting 
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danger in terms of social exclusion and poverty (Lindsay 2009: 13-4). It has been 
argued that  
 
since the late 1990s, employability has emerged as one of the intellectual 
pillars of social, and labour market policies in the UK; and for some time it 
was (and less explicitly remains) the key element in the European 
Employment Strategy (Lindsay 2010: 124 –emphasis in the original) 
 
Nevertheless, the barriers to employment have been narrowly seen by the member 
states and the EU as a lack of personal skills (ibid.). For this reason, domestic and 
European public policies are still falling short of providing a remedy against social 
exclusion (ibid.). Tackling social exclusion takes more than attempting to remove 
barriers to paid employment (Grover 2006). Studies of British rural areas have shown 
that young people who are employed in these areas are more likely to face social 
exclusion compared to young employees in cities (Pavis et al. 2000; Cartmel and 
Furlong 2000). This disadvantage of the rural areas derives from the fact that paid 
employment cannot guarantee sufficient income while factors such as transport 
problems and shortage of housing make the situation even worse (Pavis et al. 2000; 
Cartmel and Furlong 2000). 
 
Regarding the above mentioned indicator ‘exclusion from services’ (Levitas et al. 
2000: 54) within a household (e.g. water, electricity and telecommunications) or 
from public services (e.g. hospitals, libraries, transportation, shopping and banking) 
it has been argued that ‘[f]or both publicly and privately provided services, lack of 
availability rather than lack of affordability is the main barrier to use’ (Levitas et al. 
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2000). This follows from the fact that only 54% of those who participated in Levitas 
and colleagues’ study could access the whole range of public and private services 
while for the rest the biggest problem was that such services were unavailable (e.g. 
train and bus services) or unsuitable (e.g. for the disabled) (ibid: 56). Another study 
has shown that the complexity of some services (e.g. benefits, tax allowances, 
employment services and banking) has prevented people from taking advantage of 
them and this is obviously something which is irrelevant to the affordability of these 
services (Finn et al. 2008). In this context one should also include publicly funded 
services which are provided by the third sector. These services (e.g. services for 
asylum seekers and refugees) are targeting social exclusion. However, the 
complexity of such services makes it difficult for people to use them (Perry and El-
Hassan 2008). 
 
Finally, ‘exclusion from social relations’ (Levitas et al. 2000: 54) has to do with non-
participation in social activities, isolation, lack of support, disengagement and 
confinement (Levitas et al. 2000 in JRF 2000) Participation in certain social 
activities (e.g. eating in restaurants, going to cinemas and going on holidays) is 
prevented by the lack of income. However factors such as lack of interest, lack of 
time, illness, disabilities, and caring responsibilities are very important as well. All 
these factors contribute towards isolation, disengagement and confinement (Hole 
2011, Levitas et al. 2000: 62-5).     
 
Overall, apart from the economic side of social exclusion, there are also social and 
political aspects such as social relations, isolation, availability of public services and 
political rights (e.g. Laparra and Begoña 2010). Furthermore, the debate about social 
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exclusion is also a debate about housing, health, public services, education and 
whatever relates to individuals’ ‘non-participation in the important values of society’ 
(Deleeck et al. 1992: 3).  
 
In order to provide a definition which takes into consideration some of the issues 
mentioned above, the EU Commission and Council of the EU issued a Joint Report 
on social inclusion in 2004 which defined social exclusion as follows: 
 
Social exclusion is a process whereby certain individuals are pushed to the 
edge of society and prevented from participating fully by virtue of their 
poverty, or lack of basic competencies and lifelong learning opportunities, or 
as a result of discrimination. This distances them from job, income and 
education opportunities as well as social and community networks and 
activities. They have little access to power and decision-making bodies and 
thus often feel powerless and unable to take control over the decisions that 
affect their day to day lives (Council of the EU 2004: 8).    
 
However, the EU’s response to poverty and social exclusion has been belated and 
largely based on employment and growth. Therefore, the next section of this chapter 
offers a brief assessment of how poverty and social exclusion arrived on the EU 
level, how the EU intended to tackle these forms of social deprivation, and what the 
main criticism has been about the EU’s  strategy. 
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2.3 The EU, poverty and social exclusion 
 
2.3.1 The early steps of the EU and limited social provisions  
 
The Treaties which established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
(1951) and the European Atomic Energy Community (1957) did not stipulate any 
provisions for a European policy against poverty (Falkner 1998). They called for 
growth in employment and the improvement of living standards, but only within the 
context of the sectors on which the Treaties focused (i.e. coal, steel and atomic 
energy) (ibid.). The Commission was ascribed the task to promote member states’ 
cooperation in employment issues such as ‘vocational training’, ‘prevention of 
occupational accidents’, ‘working conditions’, and ‘collective bargaining’ among 
others (ibid: 57). According to Falkner, these provisions were not creating an 
independent social policy; instead they were aimed to benefit the creation and 
functioning of the common market. The provisions were limited to the free 
movement of people who should enjoy a basic level of social rights in the member 
states (ibid.). Attempts for a European social policy were hindered by ‘a protectionist 
stance towards their own social policy territory on the part of member states’ (Daly 
2007: 2). In 1970 the Werner Report on the prerequisites for a future Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) claimed that such a union would improve the welfare in the 
EU, and called for the ‘cooperation of the various economic and social groups’ for 
the benefit of growth, employment, stability and the prevention of ‘regional and 
social disparities’ (Werner 1970: 9).  
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Therefore, the first serious considerations for EU actions on common social policy 
measures can be traced to the early 1970s. These attempts were made by social 
partners, members of the European Commission and governments at the national 
level (Daly 2007). The developments were reflected in the declarations of the Paris 
summit by the Heads of State and Government (Bulleting of the European 
Communities 1972) of the then nine member states. These states started to admit that 
a European intervention in the social field was part of the European integration 
project (Falkner 1998). The declaration of the Paris summit emphasised that social 
policy was as important as the planned establishment of the EMU (Bulletin of the 
European Communities 1972: point 6). For this reason, ‘the increasing involvement 
of labour and management in the economic and social decisions of the Community’ 
was described as ‘essential’ (ibid.). However, these statements were related only to 
employment issues and did not address provisions for social inclusion or social 
protection for wider groups of the European populations (Herman and Lorenz 1997).  
 
The political will for the promotion of a European social policy, which was reflected 
in the declarations of the Paris summit, led to the Community’s first Social Action 
Programme which, once again, equated the importance of action in the social field 
with actions to establish an economic union (Hantrais 1995: 5). The programme 
increased the Community’s efforts in the social field in areas ‘of education and 
training, health and safety at work, workers’ and women’s rights and poverty’ and 
intensified the monitoring of the developments (Hantrais 1995: 6). 
 
However, the level of poverty recorded across Europe in the 1970s was different 
from the levels of poverty which emerged in later decades. During years of economic 
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expansion in western economies the paid employment earnings could guarantee a 
decent standard of living (Hantrais 1995). Additionally, the young working 
population had access to employment, and the welfare states were not under pressure 
because ‘the life expectancy was shorter’ and the ‘earnings-related pensions’ were 
less generous (ibid: 146). Thus, the member states’ non-contributory benefits were 
sufficient to cover certain groups of people who were living below average standards 
of living (mostly older people) (Hantrais 1995). However, the ‘faith in the power of 
economic growth to enhance the life chances of all the citizens … started to be 
shaken during the eighties’ (Ferrera et al. 2002: 228). Poverty started to threaten a 
‘wider range of socio-economic groups’ such as the long term unemployed, single 
parent households, and young people (Hantrais 1995: 147). This led to social and 
regional inequalities (Commins 1995). According to Commins, it was in the late 
1980s when poverty started to pose threats which could not be explained with 
existing theories let alone solved with existing policies. First, the number of poor 
people within the EU had increased sharply from forty to fifty-five million people. 
Second, the fact that poverty was a multi-dimensional problem (as discussed in 
section 2.2 above) became clear and it was acknowledged that poverty was not only 
about insufficient income but there was ‘a wide range of poverty conditions’ (ibid: 
138). Third, ‘agricultural reforms’, ‘industrial restructuring’, and an intensified 
‘international competition’ affected new groups of people who were now facing ‘new 
forms of disadvantages’ (ibid.).  
 
 
 
 100 
2.3.2 The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
 
The Hanover summit (1988) achieved agreement on the implementation of the single 
European market. A few days before the summit, Commission President Jacques 
Delors, who considered a common social policy as a counter-weight to the emerging 
competition, stated:  
 
We hope and desire that the European Council will give a political signal to 
workers and trade union organizations to indicate that what we wish to create is 
a common economic and social area rather than just one big market (Delors 23 
June 1988: 2).  
 
Nevertheless, in the same press conference, Delors acknowledged the difficulties in 
deciding on common action for an EU social policy because of the diversity of 
member states’ social systems. He stated:  
 
Even if we were able to overcome this diversity –which would not be easy– we 
are clearly far from being able to conclude European collective bargaining 
agreements –and in any case does everyone want that? (ibid.)  
 
For Delors, concrete and common guidelines on growth and job creation were 
absolutely needed throughout the EU. In fact, the 1988 Hanover summit concluded 
that by eliminating the barriers to growth, job creation would be favoured, and this 
would increase ‘the general prosperity of the Community to the advantage of all its 
citizens’ (European Council 1988b: point 3). This statement reflected the EU’s main 
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objective, which was growth and jobs. Employment and prosperity were expected to 
be achieved through unhindered economic growth.  
 
The late 1980 and the 1990s were characterised by member states’ willingness to 
increase employment and promote social inclusion (Hemerijck 2002; Ferrera et al. 
2002). At the EU level, the intention to tackle the increasing inequalities which the 
single European market was now creating were expressed by the Council in a 
resolution which noted that the reasons for social exclusion ‘lie in structural changes 
in our societies’ (Council 1989: point 3). Moreover, the Council urged to tackle 
social exclusion by stating that ‘combating social exclusion may be regarded as an 
important part of the social dimension of the internal market’ (Council 1989, as cited 
in Ferrera et al. 2002: 228). This was a new approach for the EU in its efforts to 
tackle forms of social deprivation. The concept of social exclusion was given extra 
attention when it was acknowledged that ‘social exclusion is spreading in a number 
of fields, resulting in many different types of situation affecting various individuals 
and groups of people in both rural and urban areas’ (Council 1989: point 2). The 
preoccupation of the EU in this period with social exclusion becomes evident by 
focusing on the Observatory on National Policies to Combat Social Exclusion (1990-
1994) and the Poverty 3 programme (1989-1994). The following sections briefly 
explain these two initiatives and show why they can be regarded as pioneering 
initiatives for the social inclusion OMC. 
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2.3.3 An OMC on poverty and social exclusion before the Lisbon strategy? 
 
The Observatory on National Policies to Combat Social Exclusion reaffirmed the 
need for social cohesion ‘in the context of the development of the Single Market’ 
(Observatory on National Policies 1992: 13). It referred explicitly to groups ‘at risk 
of marginalisation’ such as people with disabilities, young people, long term 
unemployed, one parent families, migrants and so on (Observatory on National 
Policies 1992: 13). Social exclusion was defined ‘first and foremost in relation to the 
social rights of citizens’ which in turn referred ‘to a certain basic standard of living’ 
and to the participation in the ‘major social and occupational institutions of the 
society’ (ibid: 14).  
 
At the same time, another EU programme was launched, namely the Medium-term 
Community action programme to foster the social and economic integration of the 
Least Privileged Groups. The novelty of this programme, which is also known as 
Poverty 3 programme 1989-1994, in comparison with the two previous programmes 
(Poverty 1, 1975-1980 and Poverty 2, 1985-1989) was that it was not relating social 
exclusion only to the shortage of goods. Instead, ‘deprivation was no longer to be 
seen simply as the lack of material goods but as exclusion from the opportunities, 
benefits and rights commonly available in contemporary society’ (Commins 1995: 
137). However, the concepts ‘poverty’ and ‘social exclusion’ were used 
synonymously and only during the implementation of the projects were their 
differences understood (ibid: 142).   
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Apart from their importance in terms of mainstreaming the concept of social 
exclusion within the EU political discourse, the above mentioned EU initiatives can 
be interpreted as the first intentions to coordinate member states’ actions on issues of 
poverty and social exclusion. Thus, the Observatory on National Policies made it 
clear that it was not intending to harmonise national policies but to combat social 
exclusion by transferring ‘know-how between the member states’ and by intending 
to improve ‘the effectiveness of their interventions’ (Armstrong 2006: 81). The same 
intentions can be found in the Poverty 3 programme, which was according to 
Commins (1995: 138 –emphasis added) aiming to:  
 
serve as a catalyst for mainstream actions in Member States by creating a 
programme of innovative and exemplary measures to formulate new models 
of local administration and to demonstrate the relevance of the lessons 
learned from mainline policies and administrative practices. It aimed to 
identify good practice, to encourage policy development and public debate 
on poverty, social exclusion and processes of social integration. 
 
Based on sharing of good practices and mutual learning, this new form of 
coordination called on the member states to mainstream actions for social inclusion. 
Eventually, in the context of the Poverty 3 programme, forty-one projects throughout 
the Community were created. Twenty-nine of them were labelled as ‘model actions’, 
which focused on ‘geographical areas’, while twelve of them constituted ‘innovatory 
initiatives’ which focused on ‘categories of [socially deprived] people’ (Commins 
1995: 140). The Commission had the task to monitor the whole process. A central 
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unit was established to monitor the presence of the basic principles27. Additionally, 
research and development units were created at member states level which organised 
domestic actions and promoted mutual contacts between member states. Finally, the 
Poverty 3 programme established the Advisory Committee which facilitated the 
contact between the national and the EU level. With these actions the programme 
sought to establish its ‘animation and management strategy’ (ibid: 141) which bears 
similarities with a method of coordination. Like the OMC, the Poverty 3 programme 
made use of a ‘soft method’ of governance which left a ‘considerable legacy on 
policy-making’ in member states (Walsh et al. 1998: 32) 
 
In terms of participation, local and regional authorities together with public and anti-
poverty organisations were involved in the management of anti-poverty projects. In 
this context, the European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN-EU) was created by the 
Commission with Community funding (Commins 1995). The programme’s principle 
to build ‘partnership models of organisation’ and to involve ‘all economic and social 
actors’ as well as its intention to promote ‘the participation of target groups’ in the 
policy-making (ibid: 137, 143) shows that the OMC cannot be entirely considered as 
a new method as Hatzopoulos (2007) has noted (also see chapter 1 section 1.1). 
Overall, 
 
[t]he EU Poverty 3 programme was unique in its nature … Its design had to 
reflect the delicate –and evolving– balances inherent in the authority and 
decision-making relationships between local and national interests on the one 
hand and those of the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament and the 
                                                 
27
 Partnership, multi-dimensionality and participation (European Commission 1993: 5)  
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Commission on the other. This context called for constant consultation and 
negotiation instead of simple top-down process of planning and 
implementation. Its projects were located in very differentiated settings in 
terms of socio-economic environments, social welfare regimes, 
administrative systems and political cultures (Commins 1995: 145) 
 
Commins’ comments on the EU Poverty 3 programme resemble core features of the 
OMC which ‘has its own logic’ and ‘recognizes the interrelation between different 
spheres, promoting interaction between different levels of power and spheres of 
action’ (de la Porte et al. 2001: 294). As has been shown in chapter 1, in the context 
of the OMC bodies (such as the Social Protection Committee) were activated in order 
to help with the coordination of member states’ actions. Besides, the OMC is called 
open but ‘[i]f the actors of civil society are not concerned, consulted, implied as 
partners and negotiators, one of the characteristics of the openness of the new 
method will be denied (Telò 2002: 265). Finally, as a new mode of governance, the 
OMC ‘preserve[s] the diversity of national and even local experiences’ (Bruno et al. 
2006 :520 
 
2.3.4 The Community Charter on Fundamental Social Rights of Workers  
 
Apart from the above mentioned programmes which targeted poverty and social 
exclusion, the so-called Social Charter was presented by Vasso Papandreou, the 
European Commissioner for Social Affairs and Employment, at a summit in Madrid 
in June 1989. At that time, it was adopted by eleven member states at the European 
Council meeting in Strasbourg in December 1989. Although the UK failed to sign up 
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to the Social Charter, its adoption by the other member states confirmed once again 
the intention of the Community to focus on the social dimension and as well as the 
economic dimension which had dominated the earlier years of European integration 
(European Commission 1990). In the words of the Charter,  
 
in the context of the establishment of the single European market, the same 
importance must be attached to the social aspects as to the economic aspects 
… therefore, they must be developed in a balanced manner (ibid: 1).  
 
The priorities set were ‘job creation’, ‘social consensus as a factor of economic 
development’ and the ‘rejection of all forms of discrimination’ (ibid: 2). In particular 
under the part entitled ‘social protection’ it referred to people who were excluded 
from the labour market and called for ‘an adequate level of social security benefits’ 
and for ‘sufficient resources and social assistance’ (ibid: 5). The provisions for the 
elderly, young persons and women were provisions against their exclusion from the 
labour market. Finally, the Charter aimed at the participation and consultation of 
workers and was intended to monitor progress of its implementation through member 
states’ annual reports.     
 
However, despite the efforts which were put into a social inclusion strategy, the 
primary concern of member states remained employment. This was the main reason 
why specific actions towards combating poverty and social exclusion were not 
prioritised at the Community level. Thus, in its Green Paper Options for the Union 
the Commission acknowledged that ‘a new look at the link between economic and 
social policies, both at national and Community level’ was required (European 
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Commission 1993b: 6). According to this norm the EU seemed to question whether 
the objective of pursuing economic progress as a necessary and sufficient condition 
for achieving social progress (e.g. social inclusion and poverty elimination) was still 
up to date. This document showed that prior to the Lisbon strategy the EU was in 
‘search for a model of sustainable development which combines economic 
dynamism with social progress’ (ibid: 32).  
 
 
2.4. Criticisms of the focus on growth and jobs 
 
The focus on the fight against poverty and social exclusion at the 2000 Nice 
European Council was incorporated into the Lisbon strategy and an OMC with its 
own specific common objectives. These objectives called for unhindered access to 
employment, actions against the risks of exclusion, help to the most vulnerable and 
mobilisation of ‘all the relevant bodies’ (Ferrera et al. 2002: 231, European Council 
2000b). Importantly, the Nice Presidency conclusions also underlined that ‘[t]he 
return to sustained economic growth and the prospect of full employment in the near 
future do not mean that poverty and exclusion in the European Union will 
automatically decrease’ (European Council 2000b: Annex I, point III). Moreover, the 
same EU document (i.e. the part that referred to the social agenda which was 
annexed to the Nice Presidency conclusions) stated that ‘[m]ore and better jobs are 
the key to social inclusion.’ (European Council 2000b: Annex I, point 2.10). 
Consequently, despite being considered as the ‘turning point’ for common policies 
against social exclusion (Ferrera et al. 2002: 230), the Lisbon process reintroduced 
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the ‘active inclusion’ strategy as a strategy towards participation in the labour market 
(Daly 2008: 7).  
 
The communication of the EU Commission for a reformed Lisbon strategy 
(European Commission 2005b) repeated, once again, the Union’s belief that growth 
and jobs are necessary and sufficient conditions for social (as well as wider economic 
and environmental) improvements. In the words of the document:  
 
The Commission proposes a new start for the Lisbon strategy, focusing on 
efforts around two principal tasks – delivering stronger, lasting growth and 
creating more and better jobs. Meeting Europe’s growth and jobs challenge is 
the key to unlocking the resources needed to meet our wider economic, social 
and environmental ambitions (European Commission 2005b: 7).  
 
Despite the fact that the same communication acknowledged that ‘partnership’ with 
‘full involvement’ of social partners and civil society are essential to help the EU 
meet its goals (ibid: 12), the whole approach to social cohesion has received 
criticism. This criticism is applied to both the means (growth and jobs) which have 
been proposed in order to eradicate poverty and the interpretation that the EU has 
given to the terms ‘partnership’ and ‘full involvement’.  
 
2.4.1 Criticising growth and jobs 
 
Concerning ‘growth and jobs’ which have been seen as a panacea for the treatment 
of most social problems, several researchers have shown that growth and jobs do not 
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always help people to overcome poverty. On the one hand, it has been argued that the 
EU faces the consequences of a ‘jobless growth’ according to which ‘high 
employment is no longer necessary for economic development’ (Rumford 2002: 
127). Moreover, productivity means that fewer people can produce more or that 
‘[e]conomic growth … presupposes a reduction in the number of jobs…’ (Beck 
2000: 62). On the other hand, research on grassroots communities has shown that 
even in periods of high(er) employment rates and economic growth, poverty and 
social exclusion are persistent in society (Green 2007). A central explanation for the 
persistence of these forms of poverty is the unequal distribution of the produced 
wealth (see also the RED discourse in section 2.2.2 above). Thus, one of the central 
statements of the sixth European Meeting of People Experiencing Poverty (EMPEP) 
in Brussels was that prosperity in the EU grows but the gap between the rich and 
poor is growing as well (Sixth EMPEP 2007). Growth has not been considered a 
sufficient condition if it is not followed by a fair societal distribution. However, 
according to the workshops of the meeting, the need for such fair distribution ‘plays 
a marginal role on the political agenda’ (ibid: 10) despite the centrality of the 
distribution of growth to achieve a more inclusive society.  
 
The approach to social inclusion through growth and jobs has been fiercely criticised 
by NGOs. This happened primarily because these organisations have in the past 
promoted ‘innovative approaches, democratic values, user empowerment and social 
transformation…’ and they consider market prioritisation through growth and jobs as 
a threat to these principles (Herman and Lorenz 1997: 19). For example, the EAPN-
EU, which is a specialised NGO in the field of poverty and social inclusion, has 
criticised the growth and jobs policy. The network believes that growth and jobs is 
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based on a neo-liberal model which has increased poverty and social exclusion and 
has led the EU to face economic and social crises (EAPN-EU 2009). In the words of 
the EAPN-EU:  
 
Too often this model has exacerbated the position of the poor and 
undermined social commitments by prioritising ‘growth and jobs’ at any 
price. It has failed to put the ‘public good’ at the heart of EU actions. The EU 
has prioritised liberation and defence of largely unregulated markets, at the 
expense of strategies that promote equity, social justice and the reduction of 
poverty and inequality within the EU and globally (ibid: 1).  
 
The reformed Lisbon strategy and the Spring European Councils (2007 and 2008 
respectively) appeared to take these criticisms into account when they launched the 
concepts of ‘feeding in’ and ‘feeding out’ as a new approach to the links between 
growth and jobs and social cohesion (e.g. Frazer and Marlier 2009). According to the 
feeding out concept, ‘renewed growth is vital to prosperity, can bring back full 
employment and is the foundation of social justice and opportunity for all’ (European 
Commission 2005b: 4 –emphasis in the original). According to the feeding in 
concept, ‘by strengthening the human capital…’ the member states will manage to 
raise ‘the long-term growth potential of the economy’ (Council of the EU 2007: 3). 
However, this normative reciprocal relationship between growth policies and 
inclusion policies has not been proportionally reflected in practice where the feeding 
in and feeding out strategy ‘is only true for some Member States and in most cases 
the progress made is quite modest’ (Frazer and Marlier 2009: 8). In general, the 
feeding in and feeding out strategy ‘has achieved less than might have been 
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expected…’ while it ‘is exacerbated by governments which prepare relevant 
documents as reports on what they are already doing, rather than statements of 
strategy that build on the ideas and energy of the actors responsible’ (Begg and 
Marlier 2007: 44). Overall, the growth and jobs policies have been prioritising 
competiveness and job creation, viewing social inclusion as a matter of secondary 
importance (ibid.). 
 
2.4.2 Criticising the approach to participation 
 
Although the terms ‘involvement’ and ‘partnership’ are used interchangeably 
throughout the EU Commission’s communication (European Commission 2005b), 
they should not be confused, since partnership does not automatically emerge from 
the participation of primary stakeholders or organisations in the field of social 
inclusion. In other words,  
 
[t]he notion of participation is broad and varied and is often used in the same 
context as partnership. It may help to see that participation strives to achieve 
many of the same objectives as partnership, but focuses on local people: 
users, residents, citizens. (Pierson (2005[2002]: 56).  
 
However, the EU seems –once again– to avoid obligating the member states to 
include in their policy-making processes the primary stakeholders (i.e. people 
experiencing poverty) and secondary stakeholders (e.g. anti-poverty NGOs and 
networks). In fact, the Nice Presidency conclusions paid extra attention to the 
involvement of NGOs by stating: 
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[t]hat political will [to eradicate poverty] has been affirmed at the highest 
level in each of the Member States and must be transmitted to the grass roots 
by mobilising all the local actors, in particular NGOs and the social services 
(European Council 2000b: Annex 1, point III).  
 
Yet, unlike the area of employment, in the field of social inclusion there are no 
specific treaty provisions for the fight against social exclusion, which would force 
the member states to create inclusive partnerships with non-state actors (de la Porte 
and Pochet 2005). However, there are some signs of political will as quoted above or 
‘political commitment’ from the member states for actions to combat poverty and 
social exclusion, and more specifically for wider actors’ participation (ibid: 372). 
This last remark –combined with the fact that the NGOs have ‘weak institutional 
means for setting issues on the national policy agenda’– has made the NGOs more 
willing to take advantage of the participatory provisions of the Lisbon strategy (ibid: 
371). Through the OMC, NGOs and primary stakeholders are intending to be 
included in the national policy-making process. However, political commitment for 
actors’ participation varies among the member states. In general, anti-poverty NGOs 
have criticised the fact that the participation opportunities in the context of the OMC 
in social inclusion are, in reality, limited to the consultation of the public policy 
(ATD Fourth World 2000). They insist that the fight against exclusion cannot be 
efficient without primary stakeholders’ widened participation. Therefore, they call 
for wider participation not only in terms of the numbers of people who participate 
and are represented as participants but also in terms of the different stages of the 
policy-making process (ibid.).  
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Besides, one of the ‘demands’ of the EAPN-EU from the EU refers to the upgrading 
of the governance and the decision-making process by: 
 
ensuring the participation of anti-poverty NGOs including people 
experiencing poverty in the development, implementation and evaluation of 
all policies that impact on poverty and social exclusion (EAPN-EU 2009: 
point 3).   
 
While the EAPN-EU asks from the EU to implement its participatory provisions as 
these have been set by the Nice Council in 2000, the above mentioned demand 
resembles the remarks stated in chapter 1 (section 1.1.2) on the reasons why the EU 
stressed the need for wide actors’ participation (i.e. efficiency and legitimacy). 
According to the people who are working to combat social exclusion in collaboration 
with people in poverty, participation of primary stakeholders can serve not only to 
improve public policy in terms of efficiency and legitimacy but also to promote 
stakeholders’ empowerment, as will be discussed in more detail in the next section. 
 
2.4.3 Participation and empowerment as equilibrium to growth and jobs 
 
The above paragraphs have shown that for many academics and most (primary and 
secondary) stakeholders, the growth and jobs dogma is far from being a sufficient 
strategy for tackling poverty and multiple disadvantages. Growth does not 
necessarily mean improvement of living conditions for everyone. Apart from the 
objective difficulties for a just redistribution of growth, it has been shown that 
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opportunities for better living conditions as a result of growth or through the supply 
of jobs, do not always produce advantages for primary stakeholders. This is so 
because these stakeholders find it difficult to access the offered services. For 
example, they may find the ways to access the services complicated, they may be 
unaware of their rights and they may feel uncomfortable and undermined when they 
come into contact with the service providers (Green 2007). In the case of 
employment, many individuals (who are, for example, homeless), ‘want to work but 
have multiple barriers to tackle before being able to gain –or sustain– employment’ 
(OSW 2008: 4) This results in a situation in which entitlements that are provided for 
certain groups are not claimed or used (Green 2007). For organisations which 
specialise on issues of poverty, ‘the solution to poverty lies not so much in 
enrichment as in the empowerment of people’ (The Guardian 17.10.2009). Thus, 
‘[m]aterial benefits alone do not guarantee an end to discrimination, or improve 
security, or give voice to those living in poverty’ (ibid.).  
 
Therefore, ‘there is a need for a more fundamental review of the ways in which 
services are provided to people experiencing poverty’ (ibid.). This does not only 
highlight the need for improved services but also the need for people to be ‘able to 
take advantage of the improvements’ (ibid.). In terms of participation, this review in 
services should not be limited to the participation of grassroots (or secondary 
stakeholders) for the better planning and implementation of user-friendly policies in 
order to make target groups better off. On the contrary, the review should equally 
refer to the participation of the mentioned groups in the policy-making process as a 
means for empowerment. In this way it enables the service users to make the most 
out of the available services.  
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Other NGOs pay more attention to participation of stakeholders in the policy-making 
process, while they argue that poverty cannot be eradicated without the ‘expertise’ of 
people who live in it (ATD Fourth World 2000: 5). Accordingly, ‘[o]nly when there 
are consistent, on-going opportunities for people with direct experience of poverty to 
be involved in the formulation, monitoring and evaluation of public policy will 
policies be devised that work’ (ibid.). This brings forward the argument that 
‘political inclusion is an aspect of social inclusion’ (Levitas 1998: 173) or, in other 
words, that ‘[f]or citizens not to be involved [in the policy-making process] is itself 
exclusionary’ (Pierson 2005[2002]: 56). However the exclusion from the policy-
making process does not only mean that ‘users’ views [are] not taken into account…’ 
but also that those users’ ‘sense of powerlessness is also reinforced’ (ibid: 56). What 
follows from those statements is that participation leads to empowerment and vice 
versa. Empowerment is also a means for membership in society. And when this 
membership is reduced to participation in the policy-making process and is seen as 
‘an end in itself’ (Braye 2000: 9), then empowerment is a means for participation. 
Empowering people through support from the organisations has been often seen as a 
prerequisite for a constructive and fruitful participation. Participation without 
empowerment tells only half the story. In the words of a primary stakeholder 
involved in the social inclusion policy-making process (Interview in London, 
16.02.2010b): 
 
Even in the UK now, where the governments offer lots of opportunities, the 
background support to give people confidence and motivation and stamina to 
carry on and take those opportunities is often not in place. And I find out that 
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this happens in conferences, where people are brought along to say ‘this is 
what happens where I am, this is what happens with my family, life, area…’ 
This is not enough. They have to know why they are saying that and not just 
to try to satisfy a group [of policy-makers] that goes there and from which 
they try to get help and support … We have to understand this collectively, if 
we want to change things, we have to continuously work on things, and 
develop things and have a dialogue –not just a one-off conference. 
 
However, there is a second perspective which views participation as a means for 
empowerment. Empowerment of people in this case occurs when there are on-going 
opportunities which aim to put people experiencing poverty ‘at the heart of all efforts 
to eradicate poverty’ (The Guardian 17.10.2009). This is the perspective that is 
commonly shared and defended among different NGOs. Thus, ‘[p]articipation 
encourages individuals to take control of their own lives rather than have things done 
for them. For the individuals who take the opportunity to participate, they can gain 
new skills and develop self-confidence’ (OSW 2007: 7). It also makes them take 
control and gives them a ‘sense of ownership’ of the services that are directed at 
them (ibid: 8-9). All this strengthens the argument that participation can promote 
empowerment while the latter can be viewed not only as the way to get people heard 
and involved in the policy-making process, but as also as a way to get people to 
reclaim their membership to society (Leister 1990).  
 
One of the initiatives of the European Social Fund was the Equal initiative which ran 
between 2000-2006. This was built around the principle of empowerment, among 
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other principles28. According to this principle, the aim was the ‘prioritising [of] the 
“bottom-up” approach by involving and engaging the beneficiaries and partners 
(government, employers and trade union representatives) in the DP [a project called 
Equal Development Partnership] activities from the very outset’29. The involvement 
of the people facing multiple disadvantages was promoted by NGOs. The leading 
organisation of the Tackling Multiple Disadvantage partnership (TMD London –a 
project under Equal) took advantage of the Equal initiative’s focus on the ‘four 
pillars of the EES’, namely employability, entrepreneurship, adaptability and equal 
opportunities (ibid.). In fact, the OSW organisation helped, through the TMD project, 
homeless ‘clients’ to set up their own businesses, and to run programmes and 
conferences (interview in London 15.12.2009). According to the OSW (2007: 4): 
 
The TMD London partnership, led by OSW, strongly supports a service user 
empowerment and participative approach in service provision, as a key 
element in overcoming exclusion and building on employability. OSW 
believes that the basic principle of participation is to consult with and actively 
include service users in the decision-making process. It is a process of 
involvement which empowers individuals and creates projects and services 
based on need rather than assumptions.  
 
Instead of a definition, ‘[e]mpowerment denotes a kind of social and political 
process and a pattern of structure and organization that provides citizens with a 
growing range of arenas for access to the public sphere, reduces barriers to action, 
                                                 
28
 Along with partnership, innovation, transnational cooperation, and mainstreaming (Equal Official 
Web-site, http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/equal_consolidated/, accessed on 18.12.2009) 
29
 Ibid. 
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and creates conditions that enhance a sense of self-worth and recognized personal as 
well as collective identity’ (Oxhorn 2002 in Levine and Romero 2006: 9-10). 
 
2.4.4 Barriers to participation 
 
The empowerment of the socially excluded has a twofold relationship with the 
participation in the policy-making process. First, participation is the cure to the 
feeling of powerlessness and second, powerlessness is a barrier to participation. 
Barriers to participation can be such things as poor physical health, problems in 
‘moving on’ from one issue to another, time and money resources for the NGOs, and 
resources for the participants (OSW 2010: 15-16), or ignorance regarding the ways 
through which stakeholders could participate. In the words of a participant (Interview 
in London 16.02.1010b): 
 
Some people don’t have the money to buy the bus fare to go from the one 
place to the other for the meeting and some people –we have many Polish 
with us– don’t know whether there is a Polish organisation in Hackney. You 
know, people have to know what is out there before they contribute. And they 
have to be able to be given time and space to put their lives in perspective and 
their thoughts in perspective and think. It only works when organisations 
prepare people and support people. But who is going to give them the money 
to do that?  
 
The above remarks show that people in poverty and social exclusion are ‘far from a 
homogenous group’ (Beresford and Hoban 2005: 3). Instead, they face different 
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barriers or the same barriers but with different gravity, depending upon the group or 
the community to which they belong, or on their individual situation. Research on 
various participatory schemes has shown that the barriers to participation can be 
classified into four main categories, namely ‘personal; political and institutional; 
economic and cultural; and technical’ (ibid: 1). People may be hindered to participate 
because of the following reasons (Beresford and Hoban 2005):  
 
a. They are reluctant to identify themselves as poor; 
b. They may be overloaded with other responsibilities and difficulties; 
c. They believe their opinions will not count and no positive experience or outcome 
will be extracted; 
d. Policies are complex and top-down; 
e. Lack of time, preparation and support; and, 
f. Lack of funding.  
 
However, one interviewee from London, who experienced poverty and participated 
in roundtables across the EU, offered a different perspective on the obstacles to 
widen participation (Interview in London, 16.02.2010b). Even when people 
participate, this does not necessarily mean that they express their views and concerns 
easily or that these views and concerns are taken into consideration by the policy-
makers. As the interviewee stated: 
 
When we first went to Denmark, I thought I would be the talking poor person 
from England. I was very worried. And if I had not had the preparation here 
before I went there, I probably would not have gone. I would not have the 
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confidence … It is okay to say you want to involve all actors, but at that 
conference there were homeless people who were feeling uncomfortable. 
They were quite shabby. They had had a drink. Some of them were a bit high 
with various substances and some of them were just desperate to be heard. 
But you could see the very fight of the people in the suits sitting with people 
that normally sit in front of the building asking for money. Both sides were 
uncomfortable. The difference was, the people who came from the streets 
desperately wanted to be heard. They really wanted something to be done. 
And the other people wanted something to be done, but it would not change 
their lives. They came prepared to hear but not necessarily to decide actions 
according to what they heard (ibid.).     
 
What the interviewee wanted to say, in the last sentences of the above quotation, is 
often described as ‘self-actualisation’ (Lister 2002: 42). It is about building the 
capacity of the socially excluded to participate in the public policy process and 
raising their confidence. However, this self-actualisation and therefore the 
empowerment of the participants should not be limited to individuals. It is the 
‘importance of collective empowerment’ that will be able to ‘achieve social change 
and to alter the distribution of power’ (Lister 2002: 42). For this reason, the 
organisations acknowledged that grassroots communities should be supported in 
order to ‘enable involvement on both an individual and collective basis’ (Beresford 
and Hoban 2005: 3)  
 
Yet, the interviewee highlighted another issue: the participation as a multilevel 
process. In many member states people in poverty, and NGOs who try to help those 
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people, are struggling to get heard even in early consultation stages. However, there 
is a common belief that participation limited to consultation is far from being 
efficient and inclusive participation. In other words, ‘consultation is not the same as 
participation’ the latter of which means ‘on-going dialogue, with the involvement of 
people from the planning of a project to its implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation’ (ATD Fourth World 2000: 5). Thus, involving people only in the 
consultation phase bears the risk to use participation in order to ‘achieve outcomes 
which had largely been decided already’ (Beresford and Hoban 2005: 1). 
Additionally, consultation can be promoted by the policy makers as a tool ‘to obtain 
feedback on services and to win support from users when options are limited and the 
overall aim is already in place’ (Pierson 2005[2002]: 59). In this way, participation is 
not offering added value to the efficiency of the policy-making process and it does 
not promote the empowerment of the participants. It can be said, that it is used by the 
member states’ administration to claim legitimacy for the decision-making process, 
and to show to the Commission that the member states are respecting the 
participation objectives of the OMC on social inclusion.  
 
The chapters 3 and 4 focus on whether the OMC in social inclusion has promoted 
participation of primary and secondary stakeholders in the domestic policy-making 
process in the UK and Greece. In chapter 1 it was also shown that the social 
inclusion OMC has promoted the participation of people who experience poverty at 
the EU level. The next section intends to provide evidence about the participation of 
primary stakeholders in the annual European meetings of people who experience 
poverty. Whether this level of participation (i.e. EU level) has triggered shifts in 
participants’ expectations, political activities and loyalties will be analysed in 
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chapters 3 and 4 which provide national case studies on the UK and Greece 
respectively.    
 
 
2.5 The European meetings of people experiencing poverty 
  
The assessment by the Commission of the second round of the NAPs on social 
inclusion (NAPs 2003-2005) showed again that the EU was acknowledging the 
importance of people in poverty sharing their experiences concerning the policies 
that affect them. According to the Commission, only when these people’s views are 
taken on board are the policies able of being ‘better focused and more relevant’ 
(European Commission 2003: 111). The Commission’s assessment also criticised the 
fact that there were certain groups (e.g. children and young people) which were 
excluded from the consultation of the policy-making process (ibid.). Pierson 
(2005[2002]: 59) has urged that ‘[t]he nature of social exclusion requires complex 
programmes with new ways of involving diverse groups of people dealing with 
difficult and conflicting issues’. It seems that the EU has indeed intended to involve 
diverse groups of people in combating social exclusion. Within the context of the 
OMC’s provisions for participation of all relevant stakeholders and particularly 
people who experience poverty, the European Meetings of People Experiencing 
Poverty (EMPEP) was launched in 2001. As was acknowledged by the German 
European Presidency in 2007 (Sixth EMPEP 2007: 38): 
 
It has been confirmed that the open dialogue between those affected by 
poverty and government representatives on the occasion of the European 
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Meetings of People Experiencing Poverty is important for shaping the Open 
Method of Coordination at the European level. 
 
Therefore, in 2001 responding to the social inclusion OMC’s calls for the self-
expression of people in poverty, the Belgian Minister for Budget, Social Integration 
and Social Economy, Mr. Vande Lanotte, proposed a meeting which for the first time 
would bring together primary stakeholders from the fifteeen member states to discuss 
the European social inclusion policy (Interview in London, 16.02.2010a). People 
without permanent housing, people living in hostels and family centres were only 
some of those who attended in the first meeting in Brussels on 1 and 2 December 
2001. Representatives from the Commission, members of the EP and NGOs were 
also attending the meeting. The text which the citizens in poverty adopted at the end 
of this meeting flagged up the importance of participation as a means of democratic 
legitimacy and decision-making efficiency. According to the text:  
 
Participation is a key element in the fight against poverty and social 
exclusion. Everybody has the right to express his or her opinion. We consider 
this to be a vital complement to representation in our democratic society … In 
addition, participation also provides us with leverage to take our lives into our 
own hands, to get a grip on our circumstances … Participation improves the 
standards of the decision making process itself. Decisions and measures are 
more appropriate to their goals. This is better for all groups in our society, but 
particularly for those facing social exclusion and poverty … The contribution 
of citizens who are themselves excluded is thus vital if fundamental 
improvements are to be made (First EMPEP 2001: 19-20).  
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However, at the same meeting the participants admitted that participation was not a 
panacea for democracy and efficiency. Therefore they demanded financial, 
educational and legal provisions which would create the preconditions for 
empowerment towards an active participation. Furthermore, they argued that their 
participation should be extended to all stages (i.e. from agenda-setting to monitoring) 
of the national and European social inclusion policies (ibid.).   
 
On 10 and 11 May 2003 a second meeting took place in Brussels under the auspices 
of the Greek Presidency. The meeting was named ‘We Also Participate in Europe’. 
After the first meeting’s focus on the importance of participation, the second meeting 
referred to the obstacles people in poverty face to participate in domestic and EU 
level. The participating citizens acknowledged that a possible legal framework, even 
though important, would not be enough for efficient public policy; if the policy-
makers were reluctant to listen to those citizens then their participation would be in 
vain. Therefore ‘a good strategy of persuasion is to show policy makers where their 
measures have fallen down through not listening to us’ (Second EMPEP 2003: 14). 
Additionally, participants warned that if the policy-makers would not recognise that 
the people experiencing poverty are not all the same, in terms of needs, targets and 
opportunities, the participation through representation would be weak. (ibid: 18) 
They thus questioned the efficiency of NGOs and other large organisations to 
represent them. Instead they highlighted the need for small coherent groups and for 
strong solidarity among these groups.  
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What was important during this meeting was the way in which people in poverty 
criticised the NAPs procedures. They described their participation in the first NAPs 
as ‘negligible’ and claimed that it was hindered by policy-makers. For the second 
NAPs, ‘attempts were made to consult, but unfortunately at too short notice to enable 
a proper process to be run’ (ibid: 19). The conclusion was that the NAPs were 
drafted at a higher level and therefore remained distant from the reality of people in 
poverty. Efforts for participation were eventually limited to the involvement of large 
organisations at the expense of small ‘grassroots’ groups.  
 
Importantly, for the first time an official reaction at European level was noted. It 
showed that member states had started to take the need or the pressure for 
participation into consideration. Following the second Meeting of people in poverty, 
the Greek Presidency proposed to the Council of Ministers in June 2003 that the 
member states should ‘intensify their efforts to foster participation at all levels of the 
people experiencing poverty (ibid: 9)  
 
The next meeting was called in Brussels on the 28 and 29 May 2004 under the Irish 
Presidency. Its aim was ‘to develop further ways of promoting the participation at all 
levels of people experiencing poverty and exclusion and to strengthen or develop the 
structural networks to facilitate this involvement’ (Third EMPEP 2004: 7). In this 
meeting it was discussed that more opportunities for widened participation should be 
offered by European and national policy-makers since there was still unequal 
communication of the needs and targets of the people in poverty and exclusion: 
asylum seekers, refugees and minority ethnic groups were not represented at all.30 
                                                 
30
 The Romas were mentioned as the most accurate example 
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However, the common position was that the governments were now recognising 
participation as unavoidable even if progress in improving participation was not yet 
noteworthy. The social inclusion OMC was criticised for being too weak to make 
governments promote participation adequately. More actors had to be mobilised at 
local, regional and national level. Direct contact with policy-makers was once more 
demanded by the participants. Nevertheless, this time participants acknowledged that 
the presence of NGOs should also be strengthened. (ibid: 31)   
 
During the May 2004 meeting, a survey was presented which had measured the 
participation at national level of all the actors relevant to social exclusion. The results 
of this survey rather discouragingly reflected the differences in the participation 
among member states. For example, the survey showed that in countries like Greece 
‘there are no organisations working explicitly for the participation and involvement 
of people experiencing poverty and exclusion in policy making and implementation’ 
(ibid: 37). The same applied for Spain. On the contrary, in the UK there was 
participation through an umbrella group of civil society organisations (see chapter 3). 
France was also intending to promote NGOs’ involvement. The best form of 
representation was reported from Ireland where a network of NGOs had started 
working officially with the government in the implementation of the anti-poverty 
strategy. 
 
The situation described above reflected an improvement compared to previous years 
(with even more potential for improvements for the future). Yet participants 
appeared to demand more opportunities for participation at national and European 
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level. Under the Luxemburg Presidency a fourth meeting took place in Brussels on 
10 and 11 June 2005. It focused again on the issue of participation. The novelty was 
that the meeting introduced direct dialogue between people in poverty and policy-
makers. This was perceived by participants as reflecting governments’ desire to take 
more progressive steps towards broader participation (Fourth EMPEP 2005).  
 
At that time the common perception of the participants was that, even though 
participation in the meetings did not have the desired impact on the European and 
domestic policy-making process, at least the meetings were not in vain. As Mr. 
Bruno Gonzales, who had been a participant also in the previous meetings, pointed 
out: ‘for two days we are the voice of groups who have never believed or dared to 
believe that their voices would be heard in their country, still less reach Brussels’ 
(ibid: 9) 
 
A fifth meeting was organised under the Austrian Presidency on 12 and 13 May 
2006. Mrs Lenia Samuel, a Commission representative, made a review of what had 
been achieved by that time and what still needed to be done. According to this 
review, the voices of the poor and excluded had been heard, dialogue was advancing, 
and member states had at last accepted civil society and local and regional 
stakeholders in various stages of public policy. Countries such as Greece, which in 
previous meeting had been accused of excluding stakeholders, were now praised 
(ibid: 27). However, what was still missing was the direct involvement of people in 
poverty in the decision-making processes across the EU. It was acknowledged that a 
maximum level of participation should not yet be expected at the national level.  
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The sixth European meeting took place in Brussels on 4 and 5 May 2007 under the 
German EU Presidency. This time participants argued that wealth inequalities were 
increasing in member states. They described as an ‘illusion’ the possibility that the 
Lisbon strategy would have ‘a decisive impact on the eradication of poverty’ (Sixth 
EMPEP: 10). In terms of participation, participants appeared to complain that 
member states only formally acknowledge the importance of participation, while in 
practice they do not facilitate it. However, there were also some signs of 
improvement. For example, participants from the French delegation argued that a 
‘direct consequence’ of people’s participation in these EU meetings was that 
participants had created domestic associations which were bringing together people 
experiencing poverty and social workers (ibid: 19). Participants from the UK argued 
that the ‘National Action Plans against poverty and social exclusion in the 
framework of the Lisbon strategy have certainly led to greater participation on the 
part of those concerned’ (ibid: 21). However, all participants underlined that the 
social inclusion OMC was not adequate since it did not oblige member states to take 
‘concrete’ actions (ibid: 32).     
 
On 16 and 17 May 2008, the seventh European meeting of people experiencing 
poverty took place under the Slovenian Presidency. In the introductory note, the 
Presidency was calling the member states to foster their efforts to promote domestic 
participation of primary stakeholders (Seventh EMPEP 2008). It also stressed the 
importance for the member states and the EU Commission to take participants’ 
concerns as expressed in the EU meetings into serious consideration when deciding 
on policies. Participants were divided into four workshops to discuss minimum 
income, housing, social services and services of general interest which were 
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according to the title of the conference the 4 Pillars in the Fight Against Poverty 
(ibid.). The novelty of the seventh meeting was that the workshops were structured 
around two questions in terms of social inclusion policies: what is working and what 
is not working? The discussions of these two questions were followed by proposals 
of the participants about what should be done. As will be shown in chapter 3, this has 
been the structure of Get Heard in the UK which took place in between December 
2004 and December 2005. It seems that this practice, which facilitates a feedback 
from the participants regarding the implementation and monitoring of policies, was 
uploaded from the UK to the EU level.     
 
The next meeting was organised on 15 and 16 May 2009 in Brussels under the 
auspices of the Czech EU Presidency. This time participation in the domestic and 
European policy-making process did not seem to be the primary topic for the 
discussion. The participants only referred to the need for more participation of 
stakeholders in the domestic social inclusion policy-making process. In the face of 
the financial crisis the focus of the meeting shifted to housing, financial inclusion 
and accessibility of basic services. Across the EU, loans, individual bankruptcies and 
unemployment were on the rise and the Deputy Minister for Social Policy in Czech 
Republic, Mr Marian Hošek, was expecting the growing importance of these and 
similar problems (Eight EMPEP 2009).   
 
The last European meeting of people in poverty within the timeframe of the present 
thesis was organised by the Spanish Presidency. It took place in Brussels on 25 and 
26 June 2010. Referring to participation, participants stressed once again the need for 
involvement in every stage of the policy-making process. It seems that the ninth 
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European meeting did not change the rhetoric concerning participation. Participants 
noted that participation in the member states had improved compared to the years 
before the Lisbon strategy and the launch of the European meetings of people 
experiencing poverty. However, there was still a lot of work to be done in order for 
participation to be considered satisfactory by the Commission and the primary and 
secondary stakeholders. In the words of Lenia Samuel who was the Deputy Director 
General for DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, ‘progress has 
been made but a lot remains to be done (Ninth EMPEP 2010: 5).   
 
Despite the quasi-institutionalisation of the European meetings of people who 
experience poverty, these events and their impact seem to have been largely 
neglected by academic studies. It was only in September 2010 when the first 
evaluation of the impact of these conferences on the policy-making process, civil 
society and the people who experience poverty was published on behalf of the 
EAPN-EU (Dierckx and Van Herck 2010). According to this study, personal merits 
(e.g. self-respect and psychological support), solidarity, learning, and new 
relationships, skills and experiences were among the positive results that 
participation in these meetings produced for the primary stakeholders who 
participated between 2001 and 2010 (Dierckx and Van Herck 2010). Importantly, 
Dierckx and Van Herck referred to a ‘kind of European identity…’ based on ‘a sense 
of affiliation or membership of a broader community facing shared problems’ (ibid: 
20). However, as was mentioned already in chapter 1, a deeper analysis of this sense 
of European identity and its links to the possibility of participants’ redirection of 
expectations, political activities and loyalties was not provided.    
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Nevertheless, a key finding of the study was that the vast majority of people who 
experience poverty and who participated in these meetings believed that they did not 
have any impact at all on policy-makers. Both primary and secondary stakeholders, 
who were interviewed for the Dierckx and Van Herck’s study, believed that the only 
impact on the policy-making process was that ‘policies concerning participation have 
been influenced in a positive way’ (ibid: 35). According to this statement, the 
EMPEP have led to an increased participation of primary stakeholders in member 
states across the EU. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter discussed concepts such as ‘primary poverty’, ‘absolute poverty’, 
‘relative poverty’ and ‘at-risk-of-poverty’ to show how poverty has been perceived 
across countries throughout different time periods. Thus, section 2.2 showed that 
while poverty was previously linked to the lack of certain goods to satisfy basic 
needs, it is today considered as the result of the lack ‘income and resources’ (Council 
of the EU 2004: 8). This lack prevents people from living to the standards of the 
society they belong to.  
 
Section 2.2 also focused on the concept of ‘social exclusion’ which was borne in 
France, uploaded to the EU and diffused among the member states. The purpose was 
to show that people are excluded from the society not only due to the lack of income 
or the lack of paid job. Other obstacles such as service exclusion, exclusion from 
social networks, exclusion from education and exclusion from the policy-making 
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process also prevent them from participating in the society. In fact, due to these 
obstacles neither income nor employment can be seen as panacea against social 
exclusion.  
 
This chapter has provided a brief historical background of the EU’s responses (or the 
lack of them) to the issues of poverty and social exclusion. Especially after the 1970s 
when poverty started threatening wider socio-economic groups and the welfare-states 
started being under pressure, the EU started focusing on the combating of poverty. 
While it acknowledged that the single market would aggravate poverty and social 
exclusion the EU prioritised growth and jobs. The growth and jobs strategy has been 
fiercely criticised by academics and NGOs and networks which aim at social 
inclusion (e.g. EAPN-EU and ATD Fourth World). In this context, participation of 
relevant stakeholders in the social inclusion policy-making process has been 
proposed (e.g. by the EAPN-EU) as a counter-weight to growth and jobs. 
 
In this context participation of primary and secondary stakeholders has been 
perceived by the Commission, various academics and anti-poverty associations 
(NGOs and networks) as a means to counterbalance the ‘neoliberal’ policies of the 
EU. These intentions for participation in the policy-making process have been 
intended to be put in practice through the OMC. Apart from the promoted 
participation in the domestic level policy-making process as the previous chapter 
showed, the annual European meetings of people experiencing poverty were 
launched and quasi-institutionalised in the context of the social inclusion OMC. This 
chapter discussed the most important developments regarding these meetings and the 
views of participants regarding their own participation. It emerged that until the mid-
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2000s participants in the EMPEP were satisfied with the fact that their participation 
at domestic and EU level was steadily increasing. However, after 2005, primary 
stakeholders participating in the EMPEP started realising that, despite the fact that 
participation had increased this had no impact in terms of policy outcomes. 
Particularly after the 2008 outbreak of the financial crisis, participants acknowledged 
that the Lisbon strategy’s objective to eradicate poverty was an ‘illusion’. The impact 
of these developments and of the EU level participation on participants’ 
expectations, political activities and loyalties will be discussed in the following 
chapters.    
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Chapter 3: The Open Method of Coordination in the United 
Kingdom 
 
 
3.1 Introduction: the Open Method of Coordination in the UK 
 
The analysis put forward in this chapter has three main aims: First, it analyses the 
participation of new stakeholders that the social inclusion OMC has triggered in the 
British social inclusion policy-making process. Second, it examines the possible 
impact of participation on participants’ expectations, political activities and loyalties 
towards the EU. Third, it examines the impact of the participation at the European 
conferences of people experiencing poverty on the participants’ expectations, 
political activities and loyalties towards the EU. The main purpose of chapter 3 is to 
analyse the potential redirection of stakeholders’ expectations, political activities and 
loyalties from the national to the EU level through their participation in the OMC 
domestic, and EU processes and projects. 
 
The fieldwork for chapter 3 took primarily the form of six interviews with anti-
poverty NGOs and networks as well as two individuals in poverty and/or social 
exclusion in the UK. There was an effort to conduct interviews across the UK. 
Interviews took place with representatives from England, Scotland and Wales. 
Additionally, empirical evidence has been gathered by analysing documents from 
anti-poverty NGOs and networks across the four British nations (i.e. such in the case 
of Get Heard and Bridging the Policy Gap [BTPG] projects; see section 3.4 below).  
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Section 3.2 provides important statistics on poverty and social exclusion. These 
statistics are used for two reasons. First, to provide an overview of the scale of social 
deprivation in the UK which is the field where the social inclusion OMC is applied. 
Second, and more importantly, to show that significant deficiencies exist if 
conclusions are drawn merely on the basis of quantitative data. Thus, section 3.3 
shows why a qualitative approach to the OMC is necessary and discusses 
participation as forming part of the domestic response to the OMC pressures. In 
section 3.4 the participation of anti-poverty organisations and networks (i.e. 
secondary stakeholders) and people in poverty (i.e. primary stakeholders) is analysed 
with the help of a bottom-up approach. Additionally, section 3.4 shows that despite 
the fact that the OMC triggered the launch of two major participatory projects (i.e. 
Get Heard and BTPG) the method itself remained invisible. Section 3.5 seeks to 
understand shortcomings in the Europeanisation of the British social inclusion 
policy-making process in terms of participation of primary and secondary 
stakeholders. Section 3.6 assesses potential redirections of expectations, political 
activities and loyalties from the national to the EU level. Therefore, it is focused on 
the impact of both domestic participation and EU level participation on such 
attitudes. The final part of chapter 3 draws conclusion from the research carried out 
in the UK.    
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3.2 Indices of poverty and exclusion in the UK. 
 
3.2.1 People at risk of poverty 
 
The Department for Work and Pensions’ (DWP) Households Below Average Income 
(HBAI) series provides a quantitative overview of the social situation in the UK. 
According to the latest data (within the timeframe of this thesis), the main indicators 
of the HBAI series for 2009-2010 are listed in table 3.1. However, for reasons of 
comparison, data in parentheses refer to the period 2001-2002 which is the first year 
of the application of the social inclusion OMC in the UK. 
  
The risk of poverty refers to a household income below 60% of the 2009-2010 
median disposable (after taxes and mandatory contributions) household income, 
usually Before Housing Costs (BHC). The DWP report mentions however indices of 
deprivation After Housing Costs (AHC). It refers to ‘median’, in contrast to 
‘average’ or ‘mean’ income because it is adjusted to avoid extreme values which 
arise from the few families who earn the highest incomes (DWP 2001: 222)31. 
However, since household income depends on the size and composition of the 
family, it is also adjusted through the process of ‘equivalisation’ which takes these 
two variables into consideration for the benefit of more accurate comparisons (DWP 
2011: 235). For 2010, the UK median household income for a family with two 
parents and two children was estimated to be €24,426 (Atkinson et al. 2010: 105)  
  
                                                 
31
 The mean or average income is calculated by the sum of the all incomes divided by the number of 
the people who earn these incomes. The median income is the estimation of the income less than 
which 50% of the population is earning.   
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Another indicator of poverty which is commonly used in the UK is the number of 
school children who qualify for free school meals. Free school meals are offered to 
children with a household income less than £16,000 a year. Compared to 2008, this 
number increased by 21,000 to the total of 1,095,430 pupils in January 2009 (The 
Guardian, 11.08.2009). In fact, child poverty has been a major problem for Britain 
where the indices show that children who live in poverty, or at risk of poverty, are in 
higher percentages than the rest of the population (Noël and Larocque 2009: 7). 
 
Table 3.1: The social situation in the UK in 2009-2010 (in parentheses data from 
2001-2002) 
Source: DWP 2011 
*Living at risk of poverty in at least 3 out of four years (2005-2008). In parenthesis data for the period 
2000-2003 
 
People at Risk of Poverty 
 
           % 
 
Absolute 
Numbers 
 
Total population BHC 17 (18) 10.4 (10.7) million  
Total population AHC 22 (23) 13.5 (13.2) million  
Children BHC 20 (23) 2.6 (3.0) million 
Children AHC 29 (31) 3.8 (4.0) million 
Working-age adults BHC 16 (15) 5.7 (5.1) million 
Working-age adults AHC 22 (19) 7.9 (6.5) million 
Pensioners BHC 18 (25) 2.1 (2.6) million 
Pensioners AHC 16 (26) 1.8 (2.7) million 
Living in persistent poverty* BHC 9 (10) N/A 
Living in persistent poverty* AHC 10 (12) N/A 
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Another database can be found at poverty.org.uk website which is a website that 
publishes statistics from the New Policy Institute with the support of the Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation. A close look at the figures published in December 2010 (for 
data between 2007-2009) for the ages 18 to 64 (working ages) reveals that among 
those who are employed almost 8% live at risk of poverty (EU-27 8%) while the 
same applies for almost 55% of those who are unemployed (EU-27 45%).32 More to 
the point, 12.5% of the people (around 4.7 million) who want a paid job are actually 
unemployed and 25% of the people with work-limiting disabilities who want to work 
are unemployed.33 Additionally, surveys have shown that nine out of ten Human 
Resources professionals ‘agreed that employers would choose a non-disabled 
candidate over an equally qualified disabled candidate.’ (The Guardian 14.10.2009a) 
According to this source, ‘[d]isabled people are also twice as likely as non-disabled 
people to have no qualifications, and twice as likely to live in poverty … The extent 
of disability poverty in the UK should be a national scandal’ (ibid.).  
 
Moreover, ‘[o]ne in seven adults aged 25 to retirement age from ethnic minorities are 
not working but want to’34 while ‘[a]round two-fifths of people from ethnic 
minorities live in low-income households, twice the rate for White people’35. At the 
same time, 40% of the people who do not possess a car find it hard to access certain 
services such as hospitals while 18-20% of them have difficulties in accessing 
doctors, post offices and supermarkets.36 Concerning education, it has been found 
that poverty can determine GCSE performance since children on free school meals 
                                                 
32
 http://www.poverty.org.uk/e01b/index.shtml (accessed on 22.10.2011 – graph 1) 
33
 http://www.poverty.org.uk/44/index.shtml (accessed on 22.10.2011 – note that this number includes 
both officially registered unemployed and economically inactive people who want to work) 
34
 http://www.poverty.org.uk/47/index.shtml (accessed on 22.10.2011) 
35
 http://www.poverty.org.uk/summary/ethnic.htm (accessed on 22.10.2011) 
36
 http://www.poverty.org.uk/75/index.shtml?2 (accessed on 22.10.2011 – graph 2) 
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are less likely to achieve A-B-C grades (The Guardian 15.12.2009). Furthermore, 
‘[t]en million adults who are neither in paid work nor in full-time education do not 
participate in any social, political, cultural or community organisations’.37 Moreover, 
‘[d]ebt problems shot up by 27% and queries about welfare benefits soared by 22% 
in the three months to the end of June [2009], compared with the same period the 
previous year’ (Guardian 04.09.2009). Last but not least, ‘61,000 households 
(excluding the intentionally homeless) in England were officially recognised as 
newly homeless by their local authorities in 2010’38. Street counts and estimates in 
the autumn of 2010 were showing that, only in England, there were 1,768 rough 
sleepers (DCLG 2011). Another ‘4 million households in England were classified as 
being in fuel poverty in 2009 (18% of all households)’ which is the highest figure in 
the period 2001-200039.   
 
3.2.2 Evaluation of indices 
 
The snapshot data has been presented in order to show a general overview of poverty 
and social exclusion in the UK and serves to illustrate the context in which the OMC 
has been applied. There are certain limitations with the existing statistical data. For 
example, different official sources and organisations produce different indices. A 
study carried out for Eurostat highlighted this fact by comparing data from the World 
Bank, the Luxemburg Income Study, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
                                                 
37
 http://www.poverty.org.uk/88/index.shtml?2 (accessed on 22.10.2010 – graph 1 see explanation 
regarding the relation unemployment and education with social networking) 
38
 http://www.poverty.org.uk/81/index.shtml?2 (accessed on 22.10.2010) 
39
 http://www.poverty.org.uk/80/index.shtml?2 (accessed on 22.10.2010) Fuel poverty definition from 
the same source: ‘Households are considered by the Government to be in 'fuel poverty' if they would 
have to spend more than 10% of their household income on fuel to keep their home in a 'satisfactory' 
condition.  It is thus a measure which compares income with what the fuel costs 'should be' rather than 
what they actually are.’  
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and Development (OECD), and Eurostat itself. While there has been a relative 
coherence between the OECD and Eurostat this has not always been achieved among 
the other sources (Atkinson et al. 2010: part 5.2.3). The problem of the compatibility 
of data on the social situation in member states has of course been dealt with, inside 
the EU, through the harmonisation of the member states’ statistics according to 
Eurostat methodology. This may facilitate comparative studies and a numerical 
overview of different areas in the EU but it does not provide the full picture. 
 
This is not to argue that a quantitative approach is superfluous. Nonetheless, until 
now, every comment on the efficiency of the OMC which is based merely on 
numerical outcomes has produced rather unclear results (Buchs 2008, Zeitlin 2005b). 
Table 3.1 may reflect improvements of the social situation among certain groups of 
the population (i.e. children and pensioners) for the period 2001-2010. However it is 
not clear whether such improvement should be attributed to the OMC. It is not only 
that these figures were declining even before the application of the OMC and the first 
NAP in social inclusion in 2001 (DWP 2011). In its assessment of the five years of 
the European Employment Strategy (EES) the Commission acknowledged that, 
 
the technical difficulties of a precise impact evaluation should not be under-
estimated, considering the interaction between different policies, the 
simultaneous improvement of the economic situation and the relatively short 
period under review as compared to the long term nature of certain structural 
reforms (European Commission 2002: 7) 
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According to the fieldwork undertaken for this thesis, in many cases there is actually 
a manipulation of the statistics. One interviewee from an NGO specialised in issues 
of homelessness, explained how such manipulation takes place by commenting on 
the (Labour) government’s enthusiastic claims on the minimisation of the homeless 
in the UK:  
 
It is debatable how many rough sleepers there are in the UK. In 1997 the 
government that came in, the Labour, made a commitment to reduce rough 
sleeping by two thirds. They have now made another commitment to 
extinguish it completely by 2012 … There are now –well the government 
statistics say there are– actually less than 500 [rough sleepers], around about 
300, but other statistics and people who go out and do street counts show 
they are actually more (Interview in London, 15.01.2010). 
 
In fact, according to the above cited statistics, the Department for Communities and 
Local Government (DCLG) street counts and estimations referred to almost 1,800 
rough sleepers in England during autumn 2010. Even if this estimate can be 
disputed, it does not really change the point that the interviewee was trying to make 
(ibid.): 
 
 In each borough around the country, every three months they have a 
government organised count. So people are able to count how many people, 
actually they can see, are sleeping rough on the streets. They [people who 
carry out those street-counts] are not allowed to go anywhere that it could be 
dangerous to them, the can’t go down to dark places, shops, dirty buildings 
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all that kind of stuff where homeless people hide themselves because they do 
not want to be found. So they cannot count them because they are well 
hidden. In certain areas such as Westminster, the night before [the counting] 
you get lots of police coming out and threatening people to move on and this 
sort of people may not appear in the counts … That, kind of, reduces the 
figure, but when you come out and do it separately you find out that the 
amount of those sleeping rough is three times bigger around the country.  
 
The same interviewee (ibid.) also revealed a fact that is not widely known:    
 
What also happens is, when you do the street count, if you have less than ten 
people sleeping rough in your borough, that doesn’t count. If they are less 
than ten, it’s nothing; it will be reflected as zero and if you count all the zeros 
reported, there is actually a lot of them and that could actually hide a lot of 
people from the statistics … How many people are sleeping rough, who 
knows?  
 
This statement clearly casts doubt on official government statistics on homelessness. 
However, in 2011 the DCLG corrected its method by including rough sleepers even 
when they were less than ten in the area of the relevant street counts (DCLG 2011). 
 
What is more, it is not only NGOs such as the above mentioned which challenge 
official figures but also the political parties which interpret in different ways the 
same data, making the evaluation of the OMC a challenging task. Examples of 
different interpretations of figures have played a role in the debate about poverty 
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between the Labour and Conservative Parties, in particular, only a few months before 
the British elections in 2010. The Blair and Brown governments claimed that 
progress had been made on issues of poverty and social inclusion. The Conservative 
Party rejected these claims by stating that even if some progress had been made, it 
was not sufficient. They also argued that the actions by the Labour government for 
over a decade did not reduce the gap between rich and poor; but instead widened it. 
In the words of the then leader of the opposition, David Cameron, ‘[i]n the past 
decade, the gap between the richest and the poorest got wider. Indeed, inequality is 
now at a record high. The very poorest in our society got poorer – and there are more 
of them’ (Cameron 2009). However, Cameron’s conclusion was in turn challenged. 
According to The Guardian (14.10.2009b), after the Labour government took office 
in 1997, the rich indeed became richer but there was some progress for the poor too.  
 
From these figures it seems that one cannot draw a definite conclusion regarding the 
success or failure of the fight against poverty and exclusion in Britain. The widening 
of the gap between poor and rich was also apparent during the Conservative 
administrations of Thatcher and Major from 1979 to 1997 (Pantazis and Gordon 
2010: 1, Noël and Larocque 2009: 7) It was John Moore, a former Tory Secretary of 
State for Social Security (1988-1989), who said that the word ‘poverty’ was used for 
reasons of impression by those who reject capitalism to enforce their arguments. 
‘Poverty’ was for Moore an unfair term which was used instead of ‘simple’ 
inequality (Moore as cited in Pantazis and Gordon 2000: 4). Regarding the critique to 
Labours’ thirteen years in government, the gap between the rich and poor widened 
despite the rise in the overall growth of incomes, a fact that shows growing unequal 
distribution (Pantazis and Gordon 2010: 1, Cameron 2009).  
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In any case, a numerical presentation cannot reflect the actual experience of living in 
conditions of poverty and social exclusion. In other words, ‘[s]tatistics give us a 
consistent picture of how poverty changes over time. What they cannot give us is a 
fuller picture of what day-to-day life is like for people experiencing poverty, and 
how people’s experiences change over time’. (Green 2007: vii). For all these 
reasons, the evaluation of the OMC cannot be exclusively based on quantitative 
analysis. Instead, there is consensus in the literature on the need for qualitative 
analysis. 
 
 
3.3 The need for a qualitative assessment of the Open Method of Coordination  
 
The above numerical presentation aimed to give an overview of the social situation 
in the UK in the field of the social inclusion OMC. The evaluation of the OMC’s 
application in the member states concerns the changes that it has caused at national 
level in the policies and policy-making processes (PPMI 2011: 8). As shown above, 
one of the impacts of the OMC is that it has launched debates around poverty and 
social exclusion on the political agendas of the member states in general, and the UK 
in particular. This view has been supported not only by academics (e.g. Armstrong 
2006) but also in interviews by representatives from voluntary organisations and 
networks involved in the UK’s OMC processes (e.g. Interview in Glasgow 
02.12.2010).  
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However, the evaluation of the impact of the OMC in the UK on the debate about 
social inclusion is not an easy task. Whether the OMC/EU or domestic developments 
triggered the British campaign against social exclusion, is unclear. For example, 
various scholars underline the role of partisan domestic politics in the launch of 
campaigns against social exclusion in Britain (e.g. Armstrong 2006; Levitas 1998). 
According to these scholars, the Conservative administrations had ‘forgotten’ the 
poor while the New Labour government ‘rediscovered’ them (e.g. Armstrong 2006: 
79). As the ATD-Fourth World, a very active anti-poverty NGO in the UK was 
noticing in 2000 (i.e. before the OMC):   
 
The debate on poverty has developed considerably in the past three years. 
The Labour Government has recognised the existence of poverty in the 
United Kingdom and the scale of the problem - facts which the previous 
Conservative Government sought to deny. We have moved from a position 
where Peter Lilley, the Secretary of State for Social Security could write to 
the UK Coalition Against Poverty in 1996, ‘Poverty eradication plans are not 
needed in nations such as the UK which already have social protection 
systems to prevent poverty’, to a situation where Alistair Darling, current 
Secretary of State for Social Security, declared at Wester Hailes, Edinburgh, 
in 1999, ‘We are moving the fight against poverty back to the centre stage of 
British politics’ (ATD Fourth World 2000: 5).  
 
Importantly, the introduction of the social inclusion OMC in Britain and its first ten 
years of application refer to periods when the same political party was in office. This 
is one additional reason why is difficult to assess whether the domestic social 
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inclusion process in the period 2001-2010 was driven by the OMC or the New 
Labour government. Additionally, the election of New Labour in 1997 which moved 
the fight against poverty to the centre stage of British politics, took place when 
important developments about social exclusion were taking place at EU level (see 
chapter 2). Was the New Labour government’s ‘rediscovery’ of the poor based on its 
own aspirations or did it follow an EU pre-existing campaign? Armstrong (2006) 
argues that it is the New Labour’s commitment to the EU that is the factor behind the 
British anti-poverty/social inclusion campaign. Armstrong (2006: 79) also claims 
that ‘[d]espite the wealth of analysis of poverty and social exclusion in the UK, 
remarkably little is said about the European framework within which member states 
are elaborating their policies’. While for Armstrong (2006) the influence of the EU is 
indisputable, he does not seem to disagree that a strategy of social inclusion had 
started in the UK prior to the OMC. In this context, he compares the British with the 
OMC indicators and objectives to show that the domestic government used the 
former since they were much more relevant and precise than the latter.  
 
For other scholars it was actually New Labour’s aspirations which influenced 
economic and social reforms at EU level (e.g. Bulmer 2008). According to Bulmer, 
the New Labour government may have failed to play a central role in the EU 
developments such as EMU but it strongly influenced the Lisbon strategy especially 
its competitiveness and economic reform dimensions. One of the most notable 
initiatives of the social inclusion OMC is the combating of child poverty. It was first 
developed in the UK as there has been an anti-child poverty focus group since the 
1970s (Schönheinz forthcoming). It could therefore be argued that the British anti-
exclusion policy was uploaded to the EU. The social inclusion OMC and the 2001 
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Lisbon strategy made the inclusion of children one of its objectives and called for the 
elimination of child poverty by 2006 (ibid.; Paraskevas 2007).  
 
The coordinator of the UK Coalition Against Poverty (UKCAP) generally assessed 
as positive, the domestic social inclusion policies between 1997 to 2010 (Interview 
in Liverpool 24.03.2010). She compared favourably the positive role of New 
Labour’s political aspirations for social inclusion with the lower efforts of previous 
Conservative governments. Differences in the engagement between different British 
(Labour and Conservative) governments and the EU played a central role for the 
more positive evaluation of the New Labour government by the UKCAP 
representative. She also argued that the EU seemed to be an efficient agent (ibid.):  
 
We were really, really battered by the policies of the Tory government … 
[which] would not welcome Europe, and also by globalisation; this is from 
Margaret Thatcher from 1979 [onwards]. But when the Labour party took 
office in 1997, they were always a more outward looking political party. 
They became engaged to Europe and we were able to take the advantage the 
EU membership had to offer. So when the Labour party came in there were a 
lot of differences … Targets were set to address poverty; you didn’t talk 
about poverty beforehand. 
 
Therefore, there are different perspectives on how to assess the impact of the OMC 
in the UK. The favourable environment which existed during the launch of the OMC 
in the UK does not allow for an independent evaluation of the OMC’s overall impact 
in the UK. For this reason, the next part of the present chapter will assess the 
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domestic response to the OMC provisions for participation of primary and secondary 
stakeholders.  
 
 
 
3.4 Participation of primary and secondary stakeholders  
 
 As was pointed out in chapter 1, the social inclusion OMC requires member 
governments to produce National Action Plans (NAPs) or National Strategy Reports 
(NSRs). The NAPs/NSRs are the documents in which member states outline their 
policies to tackle social exclusion and serve as national government reports to the EU 
on the domestic application of the OMC. The UK’s NAPs/NSRs will be taken as a 
baseline for the assessment provided in this chapter. Already in the first British NAP 
(2001-2003) the New Labour government tried to show that participation by 
stakeholders is important for the implementation of the strategy:  
 
[P]romoting inclusion is not a matter for central Government alone. The 
success of the UK’s inclusion strategy will depend crucially on the 
contributions of local authorities, the voluntary sector, the social partners and 
individuals working in their own communities (UK NAP 2001-2003: 1). 
 
In the same perspective, the first British NAP explained the way in which the UK 
government intended to meet the fourth objective of the 2000 Nice European 
Council which refers to the mobilisation of all relevant bodies. The first British NAP 
therefore reflected the UK government’s commitment to ‘a more open policy-
making process, that includes those who are affected by social exclusion, and those 
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on whose efforts policy will depend for its success’ (ibid: 2). Taking seriously the 
reference to ‘open’ in the name of the OMC, the NAP referred explicitly to the 
‘openness’ of the policy-making process to voluntary and community organisations 
as well as other grassroots groups, among other stakeholders (ibid.). How the 
‘openness’ worked in practice is assessed in the next parts of this chapter which will 
also explain how secondary stakeholders promoted the participation of the primary 
stakeholders. 
 
3.4.1 Participation in the NAP process 
 
The UKCAP and the British European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN-UK) have 
been the anti-poverty networks which championed the participation of primary and 
secondary stakeholders in the NAPs process (see also Armstrong 2010: 166). The 
EAPN-UK represents the European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN-EU), which is the 
leading EU level umbrella network that lobbies for the participation of NGOs 
through the social inclusion OMC (de la Porte and Pochet 2005). The EAPN-UK 
consists of the EAPN-England, the Poverty Alliance in Scotland, the Anti-Poverty 
Network Cymru (APNC) and the Northern Ireland Anti-Poverty Network (NIAPN). 
These four-nation networks are also members of the UKCAP. In contrast to the 
EAPN networks, which focus on the links between EU and domestic policies, the 
UKCAP is an association that has been established to focus on the domestic social 
inclusion framework (Interview in Liverpool, 24.03.2010). The trustee board of the 
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UKCAP promotes the participation of people experiencing poverty. Out of the ten 
members of the board of UKCAP, five have direct experience in poverty.40  
 
The involvement of primary and secondary stakeholders through the OMC in the 
domestic arena started with the setting up of a Social Policy Task Force (SPTF). The 
SPTF was set up by EAPN-UK and UKCAP in 2001 with the support of the DWP 
(Armstrong 2010). The main reason for its creation was ‘for the DWP to consult an 
input into the NAP’ (Interview in Liverpool, 24.03.2010). The former Deputy 
Director of the EAPN-UK offered extra evidence for the SPTF in an interview in 
London: 
 
We brought all stakeholders, every organisation which is interested in this 
work, working on anti-poverty issues and want to have direct dialogue with 
the government. It [the SPTF] has been a platform for dialogue with the 
government (Interview in London, 05.02.2010). 
 
The generally positive feedback regarding the SPTF must however be seen in 
context: 
 
But this [SPTF] is very informal actually, it was never formalised. There is 
no budget for it and some members need to come from all over the UK. 
Some organisations which could fund these travel expenses have now 
stopped that funding [reference to the UKCAP] (Interview in London, 
05.02.2010). 
                                                 
40
 Four are from England, two from Scotland, two from Wales and two from Northern Ireland. The 
total number of the Trustee Board is 11 people as there are ten representatives from the ‘four-nations’ 
structure and one chairperson. (UKCAP’s official web-site: 
http://www.ukcap.org/blogs/aboutus/whoweare.html, accessed on 02.03.2010) 
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Even unofficially, the British government recognised the SPTF as a partner in the 
NAP process. The SPTF represented a list of organisations and networks in the UK 
which have been dedicated to combating social exclusion. In the case of the SPTF’s 
last contribution to the preparation of the NAP 2008-2010, eight networks and eleven 
organisations contributed. Table 3.2 shows which these networks and NGOs were. 
 
UKCAP and the EAPN-UK can be regarded as particularly active in the social 
inclusion OMC. They are indeed representative of a wider list of associations active 
at local, regional, national and through ‘umbrella’ networks at the European level.41 
In order to understand how these associations operate within the OMC and within 
the guidelines of EU level networks, the case of the Off the Streets into Work 
(OSW) organisation in London can be brought forward. As shown in table 3.2 the 
OSW is a member of the SPTF. A representative from the organisation interviewed 
for this thesis argued that the SPTF was ‘fundamentally shaping the NAPs’ 
(Interview in London 15.12.2009).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41
 EAPN-UK official web-site, http://www.eapn.eu/content/view/72/21, accessed on 02.03.2010 
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Table 3.2: British anti-poverty NGOs and networks mobilised in the social inclusion 
OMC policy-making process. 
Networks 
• British Black Anti-Poverty Network 
• UK European Anti-Poverty Networks: Anti-Poverty network Cymru, 
European Anti-Poverty Network England, Northern Ireland Anti-
Poverty Network, Poverty Alliance 
• Migrants’ Resource Centre 
• Single Parent Action Network 
• UK Coalition Against Poverty 
• UK Race and Europe Network 
Organisations 
• Age Concern 
• ATD Fourth World 
• Child Poverty Action Group 
• Fawcett Society; Irish Travellers in Britain 
• Leonard Cheshire Disability 
• National Group on Homeworking 
• Off the Streets and into Work 
• Oxfam UK Poverty Programme 
• Royal National Institute for the Blind 
• Runnymede Trust 
Source: Social Policy Task Force (2008: 6) 
 
 
The OSW is a member of the EU umbrella network European Federation of National 
Organisations Working with the Homeless (Fédération Européenne des Associations 
Nationales Travaillant avec les Sans-Abri –FEANTSA). FEANTSA is the ‘only 
major’ network at EU level which focuses exclusively on homelessness and receives 
funding from the EU Commission (FEANTSA and OSW 2005: 5). The FEANTSA 
and OSW published jointly a participation audit which highlighted the best 
participatory practices among the member states’ NGOs (ibid.). The audit did not 
only show the efforts for participation which were undertaken in different member 
states. It also showed the barriers which exist to mobilise individuals who experience 
poverty for the participation in public policy, and outlined what participation should 
ideally look like. Thus, the joint audit argued that the ‘active participation of 
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homeless people in the design and implementation of their care and reintegration 
plan is absolutely fundamental to its success’ (FEANTSA and OSW 2005: 1).  
 
Apart from secondary stakeholders such as the OSW, important actors in the SPTF 
have been primary stakeholders themselves. Apart from the case of the UKCAP 
where primary stakeholders are members of its board, other networks of primary 
stakeholders play a stronger role in bringing poor and socially excluded people’s 
interests forward. In fact, one important research finding is that the involvement of 
the NGOs in the tackling of poverty is not always welcomed by primary 
stakeholders. A member of the board of the grassroots’ anti-poverty network in 
Wales (the APNC), which participated in the SPTF, explained that the members of 
the APNC rejected the idea of the continuous working together with NGOs 
(Interview in Rhyl 24.02.1010). In fact, the APNC was made up by NGOs but since 
grassroots communities joined the network in 2004 they did not want ‘NGOs in 
charge anymore’ (ibid.). They thus formed an executive committee which was ‘all 
grassroots led’ and even adopted a ‘clause that no NGO can join’ (ibid.). Today the 
APNC has only grassroots individuals in its board.42 Therefore, the participation of 
the APNC in the social inclusion OMC through the SPTF meant simultaneously the 
participation of only primary stakeholders –without the involvement of secondary 
stakeholders.  
 
Drawing on the Europeanisation literature, a mediating factor which has been 
expected to facilitate Europeanisation (see chapter 1 section 1.1.5) has been in place 
in the UK. Secondary stakeholders’ organisational culture to work with and not only 
                                                 
42
 This development is not mentioned let alone analysed in the NGOs’ reports on participation. 
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for primary stakeholders has led to the inclusion of the latter in the policy-making 
process. For example, the inclusion of the UKCAP in the SPTF meant 
simultaneously the inclusion of primary stakeholders. This happened because 
primary stakeholders were members of the board of the UKCAP. Additionally, the 
inclusion of the EAPN-UK in the SPTF meant simultaneously the inclusion of anti-
poverty networks (e.g. the APNC, a member of the EAPN-UK) which were run 
exclusively by primary stakeholders. Since the organisational culture of the anti-
poverty associations has been favourable to the participation of primary stakeholders, 
a positive response to Europeanisation pressures has been made possible. 
 
Most of the stakeholders interviewed perceived the SPTF as a forum which has 
managed to promote participation. For those respondents, the EU provisions for 
participation have been indeed put into action with the SPTF. The former Deputy 
Director of the EAPN-UK described how the SPTF works in an interview in London 
(05.02.2010):  
 
We express our views and we tell them [the DWP representatives] what is 
happening on the ground, how their policies are affecting the people. It is just 
a place for dialogue with the government … we chair the meeting and they 
support us sometimes, because they sometimes come to meet us and many 
times we had meetings in the DWP! This is us, invading in the dialogue of 
the policy-makers, if you want.  
 
This can be seen as a positive evaluation of the developments after the launch of the 
social inclusion OMC in 2001. The use of the word ‘invading’ in the above interview 
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can be interpreted in such a way as to show that there was not participation before 
the OMC. However, this last remark needs further analysis because different actors 
have given different standpoints on that. The director of the Poverty Alliance argued 
that projects for participation ‘predated’ the application of the social inclusion OMC 
(Interview in Glasgow 02.10.2010). Armstrong (2005) has shown that the Scottish 
government was consulting anti-poverty associations after the delegation of powers 
to Scotland in 1997 but prior to the launch of the OMC in 2001. At that period the 
Scottish government was funding organisations to help ‘grassroots to take part in 
policy-making process’ (Interview in Glasgow 02.10.2010). For example, the 
Poverty Alliance established the Tackling Poverty Stakeholder Forum (TPSF) before 
the OMC was implemented. The TPSF managed to bring together people from 
different backgrounds in the fight against poverty so as to have ‘direct and regular 
dialogue’ (ibid.). In 2010 there were forty members in the Forum which were 
‘evenly’ chosen from the following three groups: policy-makers from central and 
local government, senior officers from the third sector, and people who are 
experiencing poverty (TPSF 2010: 1). This project has not been under the auspices of 
the OMC (or the European Social Fund –ESF), but has been supported by the 
Scottish parliament and the Big Lottery Fund.43  
 
However, according to the same interviewee, the OMC has helped the anti-poverty 
organisations to acquire a stronger role at local and at national level. It has also 
helped to build a ‘culture’ of primary stakeholders’ participation (Interview in 
Glasgow 02.10.2010). For the director of the Poverty Alliance, ‘it is difficult to say, 
if you compare the participation in 2001 with 2010, whether it is now better’ (ibid.). 
                                                 
43
 The Poverty Alliance official portal: 
http://www.povertyalliance.org.uk/projects_detail.asp?proj_id=1, accessed on 28.09.2010 
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There have been periods (i.e. 2006-2007) when, due to the launch of Get Heard and 
BTPG, the participation of primary stakeholders was remarkable and periods when 
participation was lower than expected (ibid.). Nevertheless, even before participation 
had reached its peak, the Poverty Alliance (2005: 1) had published a paper which 
expressed a very positive stance towards the OMC:  
 
[T]he four objectives [of the social inclusion OMC] have been a very useful 
way of ‘organising’ policy. UK and devolved administration have had to 
show how they contribute to meeting these objectives, giving a better 
understanding of the ‘approach’ behind the adoption of certain policies. As 
such the OMC provides something of a framework around which it is 
possible to develop a more ‘joined up’ approach to policy-making between 
different actors at the UK level. 
 
Overall, the Poverty Alliance thinks that the OMC was applied in an already 
favourable environment in Scotland. Yet, the OMC added value to participation 
efforts and created an on-going dialogue between relevant stakeholders and the 
government. Importantly, the Poverty Alliance mentioned that the fourth objective 
mentioned above was not interpreted as ‘an ordinary consultation but as an on-going 
dialogue that wouldn’t step forward without the OMC’ (Interview in Glasgow 
02.10.2010). Thus, this kind of on-going dialogue was seen as ‘opposed to 
consultation’ (Poverty Alliance 2005: 2) and was, as will be seen shortly, referring to 
participation in different stages of the NAP process. The Poverty Alliance’s 2005 
evaluation report and the interview with its representative, which was conducted in 
2010, allow for a better understanding of the pre-existing patterns of participation. 
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These not fully developed patterns have been strengthened by the efforts for 
application of the OMC in general, and of the method’s fourth objective in particular 
(i.e. to mobilise all relevant bodies). A study on the impact of the OMC in the UK 
comes to the same conclusion (Schönheinz forthcoming). According to this study, a 
process of involving non-state stakeholders in the social policy-making process had 
started to be established by New Labour before the launch of the OMC. According to 
Schönheinz (ibid.), the OMC must be seen as a contributor to the strengthening of 
this process.  
 
However, other key stakeholders (i.e. representatives from the ATD-Fourth World, 
the EAPN-England and the UKCAP) denied the existence of a pre-OMC process of 
participation. As one representative from the ATD-Fourth World argued before the 
method was applied, there was no participation at all (Interview in London 
16.02.2010). In the respondent’s own words:  
 
The thing about the OMC and the UK is that you have to understand before 
there was this Open Method of Coordination there was no speaking to the 
government about poverty in the UK. There was no dialogue. There was no 
participation. We were the opposite from Belgium and France where 
dialogue, consultation, participation were already established. There was 
nothing here. And it is only because of this slight opening, coming down 
from the EU, as part of this Open Method of Coordination where you have to 
include all stakeholders; that involves people in poverty’ (ibid.). 
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Therefore, even if a process of participation of primary and secondary stakeholders 
had started before the OMC, it was too weak to involve such stakeholders 
satisfactorily. Interviews with key stakeholders showed that the biggest change 
which the OMC has brought about in the UK is the participation of primary and 
secondary stakeholders rather than the strengthening of a pre-existing domestic 
process. Regarding the Europeanisation of the British public policy, the fact that the 
social inclusion OMC provided opportunities for participation to primary and 
secondary stakeholders, created a misfit between the EU public policy and the 
domestic public policy. For domestic change to occur the misfit between the EU 
promoted public policy and the domestic public policy is only a necessary but not 
sufficient condition (Börzel and Risse 2003). Domestic change eventually depends 
on whether the EU pressures are facilitated by different mediating factors. As shown 
earlier in this chapter, the EU pressures for domestic adaptation were responded by 
domestic actors with the establishment of the SPTF. Thus, as the following quote 
from an interview shows, the OMC’s pressures for participation were accommodated 
by secondary stakeholders. In the interview the importance of the OMC in producing 
a positive image for the EU is also highlighted: 
 
There is the UK process which was started by some of the people who started 
the EAPN actually here in the UK. They took advantage of the OMC process 
by saying: ‘Right, let’s do something’. And that’s an important part of 
European structures, if you like, that no matter what government there is in a 
member state country, if you have got something at European level which 
says that all parties need to be involved in the process of creating and 
delivering activities to overcome poverty then that gives a really good lever 
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for organisations to talk to their governments about getting the process going. 
Without that you would be battling for years to get them to do it. … But 
because it is a process expected by Europe it gives you a recognised position, 
within a process, making policy. So that’s fantastic! And when people realise 
this, that’s the case, that gets them excited about Europe’ (Interview in 
Nottingham 24.11.2009). 
 
In the case of the UK, secondary stakeholders perceived the OMC’s pressures for 
participation as an opportunity to participate in the domestic policy-making process. 
It seems that, using the words of Cowles and colleagues (2001: 11), these domestic 
actors used ‘Europeanization as an opportunity to further their goals’. Since their 
goal was participation in the domestic policy-making process, secondary 
stakeholders saw the EU pressures for participation as an opportunity to circumvent 
domestic obstacles (e.g. representative democracy) which were excluding them from 
participating.44 By doing so, they promoted the Europeanisation of the British social 
inclusion policy-making process since they intended (and managed) to widen the 
participation.  
 
Additionally, the fact that Europeanisation through the OMC has helped anti-poverty 
organisations such as the EAPN-UK to get involved in the policy-making process 
has also triggered the redirection of their expectations towards the EU. The 
enthusiasm used by the previously mentioned interviewee to describe the promoted 
participation shows that participation is seen as a benefit from the OMC since the 
method offers to the stakeholders a ‘recognised position’ in this process. Therefore, 
                                                 
44
 Regarding the viewing of representative democracy as an obstacle, this has built on Johnson (2009). 
Johnson (ibid: 3) argues that one of the reasons why the British government did not formalise the 
SPTF was that it did not want such process to ‘override representative democracy’.  
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the interviewee’s opinion reflects arguably the existence of a positive rational 
assessment of the EU framework. According to the analytical framework put forward 
in chapter 1, such an assessment leads to the redirection not only of expectations, but 
under certain circumstances of political activities and loyalties towards the EU if the 
EU satisfies interests which cannot be satisfied on the domestic level. Whether the 
redirection of expectations among the British participants in the OMC process led to 
redirections of political activities and loyalties will be analysed in the following 
sections of this chapter. Prior to this, the stages of primary and secondary 
stakeholders’ participation in the NAP process will be discussed in detail. 
 
Inside the DWP, the team which has been responsible for the composition of the 
NAPs and for the talks with the social organisations has been called the Social 
Inclusion Team:  
 
The whole UK social inclusion work is designated to one team and that team 
is based in the DWP. They are basically responsible for all this sort of 
logistics and possible arrangements and reporting and… as you know the 
NAP is supposed to be cross-departmental work. But they are the ones to 
involve all the different departments. It’s their responsibility to produce this 
document [i.e. the NAP]. They are civil servants… (Interview in London 
16.02.2010a) 
 
In fact, the DWP is the government’s centre for the entire social inclusion and 
employment strategy in the UK. It is responsible for the production of the NAPs and 
NSRs but has delegates in European level committees such as the Social Protection 
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Committee (SPC) and Employment Committee (EMCO); see Schönheinz 
forthcoming). However, the above cited statement by the interviewee not only 
provides information about the Social Inclusion Team and the DWP but also shows 
that the production of NAPs has stimulated a cross-departmental link. Accordingly, 
in the UK the relevant departments (i.e. Department for Children, Schools and 
Families, Department for Communities and Local Government, Department for 
Health, DWP etc.) are informed about the composition of the documents (Armstrong 
2006).  
 
The interviews presented this far show that from 2001 to 2010 the SPTF was 
engaged with the DWP’s Social Inclusion Team in a dialogue first at the agenda-
setting stage of the NAPs/NSRs process. What was seen by the SPTF members as 
more important than participation in the agenda-setting stage however, was that 
examples of the dialogue with the DWP were listed in the NAPs as ‘challenges 
identified by UK stakeholders’ (UK NAP 2008-2010: 2-3). As one participant in the 
SPTF stated: ‘We worked together in the NAPs in Social Inclusion; that was one of 
the most important activities. We worked together!’ (Interview in London 
05.02.2010). Another, even more positive assessment was provided earlier in this 
chapter when the representative from the OSW stated that the SPTF shaped the 
NAPs ‘fundamentally’ (Interview in London 15.12.2009). This enthusiasm actually 
emerged from the fact that, as will be shown below, the SPTF members were also 
participating in the stages of implementation (e.g. by organising the Get Heard and 
BTPG) and monitoring (as the term ‘on-going dialogue reveals) of the NAP/NSR 
process.  
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Thus, some interviewees were even more enthusiastic while praising the OMC as the 
main factor behind the mobilisation and participation of primary and secondary 
stakeholders in the British policy-making process. An interview held with a 
representative from EAPN-England (Interview in Nottingham 24.01.2009) revealed 
the following: 
 
Owing to the OMC process we, as SPTF, have meetings at national level 
between people in poverty and the team responsible for writing the NAPs on 
social inclusion. We meet every six weeks together with civil servants who 
write the NAPs. The reason is to fulfil the OMC’s provision on participation 
on writing the NAP and then evaluating and monitoring the effect of it.  
 
This quote seems to clarify what the on-going dialogue means by referring to the 
frequency of the meetings. It also gives further evidence of participation in the 
different stages of the NAPs process. In addition to the participation in the agenda-
setting stage, empirical evidence collected for the present thesis show that the on-
going dialogue (which the OMC had quasi-institutionalised in the period between 
2001-2010) between the government and primary and secondary stakeholders was 
also taking place at the stage of monitoring. Additionally, anti-poverty networks and 
organisations took part in the implementation of the NAPs. They did so by helping 
towards the implementation of one of the social inclusion OMC core objectives, 
namely the mobilisation of people in poverty and social exclusion. Section 3.4.2 
below analyses two major (in terms of participation of primary stakeholders) projects 
which were organised in the UK by the SPTF. Importantly, the next part also shows 
that the participants in the Get Heard and Bridging the Policy Gap projects remained 
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unaware of the fact that the reason behind their mobilisation was the EU involvement 
in the field of social inclusion and the OMC provisions for participation. 
 
3.4.2 Participatory projects undertaken by the Social Policy Task Force 
 
3.4.2.1 The Get Heard project 
 
In the OMC context, the DWP and the SPTF have been behind by far the biggest 
participation project in the field of social inclusion in the UK –to date– which is the 
Get Heard Project. The project was intended to feed the primary participants’ views 
and experiences into the NAP 2006-2008. Get Heard’s importance and size was 
flagged up by the UKCAP (2006: 4):  
  
Get Heard was one of the largest projects undertaken in the UK to involve 
people with first-hand experience of poverty to give their views on 
government policies designed to combat poverty … With funding supplied 
principally by the EU and with some match-funding from the Department for 
Work and Pensions, the project ran a total of 146 workshops around the UK 
between December 2004 and December 2005: 81 in England; 45 in Scotland; 
14 in Northern Ireland; and 6 in Wales.  
 
The overall objective of the project was the participation of people in poverty 
through a series of workshops to enable their views to have an impact on the national 
policy-making process. Their views would be reflected in the NAP 2006-2008. In 
other words, the Get Heard project was ‘designed to enable people living in poverty 
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to have a say in national policy making –and especially the next [2006-2008] 
National Action Plan on Social Inclusion’ (UKCAP 2004a). 
 
The EU was not the passive recipient of people’s views through their participation in 
the Get Heard and its impact on the British NAP. The participating organisations 
officially acknowledged the role of the OMC behind the Get Heard project. The anti-
poverty networks were describing the OMC as the ‘NAPs process’ (NIAPN 2004: 
point 3). The Commission supported the project by being its main funding source. 
Additionally, it can be argued that without the OMC’s call for participation of 
grassroots individuals, without the existence of the SPTF (launched in response to 
the OMC) and without the OMC’s crucial role in the fight against social exclusion in 
Britain, the Get Heard project would not have taken place. As the then Deputy 
Director of the EAPN-UK admitted (Interview in London 05.02.2010):  
 
I think that Europe definitely played a role. If it was not for the EU I don’t 
think that we would have done it. So, this was, if you want, a one hundred 
percent European initiative, European activity. Because it started in Europe, 
it took shape and it was promoted there … So yes, Europe was important 
essentially.  
 
In the same vein, the director of the Poverty Alliance, has also been praising the 
OMC for the mobilisation of people in poverty. Recognising the value that the OMC 
offered for the participation in the UK, the interviewee stated:  
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I think that the main periods [of participation] were around the preparation of 
the 2006 NAP when NGOs in the UK were involved in the Get Heard 
project. The OMC was responded to by the NGOs who supported the 
involvement of grassroots organisations through projects like the Get Heard 
(Interview in Glasgow 02.12.2010). 
 
In terms of the OMC/EU’s role behind the project, the official document which 
explained the Get Heard project clarified that the project ‘aims to have two 
outcomes: improved national and European policies on social inclusion, and 
increased capacity of excluded people to be involved in policy-making processes on 
the part of excluded people’ (UKCAP 2004a). Furthermore, the whole project was 
facilitated by the Get Heard Toolkit which was steering the workshops around the 
following three main questions: ‘What’s working?’ ‘What’s not working?’ ‘How 
should things be done differently?’ (UKCAP 2004b: Section 2.1).  
 
The toolkit referred explicitly to the NAPs as a process which would help to 
‘understand complexities and differences in poverty across the EU’ and would direct 
action according to the ‘agreed objectives for tackling poverty across the EU’ (ibid: 
section 1.2). In this sense the toolkit offered a clear account of the European 
framework in which the project was taking place. Importantly, by referring to 
common EU objectives it was also providing the framework for redirection of 
expectations, political activities and loyalties through learning (see chapter 1 section 
1.1.5). Some networks, which ran the workshops on behalf of Get Heard, offered 
even more extensive details on this EU framework. For example, the NIAPN, which 
was behind the setting up of Get Heard in Northern Ireland, called for participation 
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of primary stakeholders as a response to the EU’s democratic deficit. Participation 
was seen as a political activity which had the potential to influence the European 
level that had increasingly become involved in the daily lives of citizens (NIAPN 
2004). According the NIAPN (2004: point 2):  
 
We need to put pressure on governments at national and at European level 
and to do this we need to link the two levels to promote our approach to 
welfare and social protection. Participation in the NAPsincl [NAPs on Social 
Inclusion] is one way of linking the national and European level. 
 
However, an analysis of the reports of the Get Heard workshops shows that 
participants did not seem to acknowledge the EU’s presence in the fight against 
poverty and social exclusion. This became evident despite the EU and OMC’s 
indispensable role in the launch of the project, the expertise of the steering 
organisations in EU and OMC issues and the project’s intentions to help primary 
stakeholders to understand and contribute to the EU social inclusion policy. What is 
more, while Get Heard was one of the tools of the OMC in the UK which had the 
objective to approach local concerns as European concerns and to call for actions 
towards EU common objectives, there was no reference to the method in the 
workshops nor did grassroots participants appear to be aware of an antipoverty 
process across the EU. Key actors confirmed that ‘a lot of people in the UK did not 
know [the EU/OMC’s role]. We knew it because we are activists and we are working 
in Europe’ (Interview in London 05.02.2010). Interviews with other participants, 
such as the member of the APNC presented in earlier sections of this chapter, 
produced similar empirical evidence (e.g. Interview in Rhyl 24.02.2010):  
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Maybe the EU was behind the project but I did not recognise it. I have never 
heard any mentioning of the EU … I am aware of the NAPs and the Get 
Heard but I did not know that these were coming from Europe. 
 
Concerning the Get Heard process, five workshops took place at the Migrants 
Resource Centre (MRC) in London. As part of Get Heard, the workshops focused on 
raising awareness among people in poverty about the NAPs and on enabling them ‘to 
give their views and to inform the National Action Plan on Social Inclusion 2006’ 
(MRC 2006: 6). The participants discussed both external barriers (injustice, racism) 
and internal barriers (lack of money, difficulties to find jobs) to inclusion. They 
criticised the British government on issues such as low benefits, tolerance of the 
mass media’s denigrating portrayal of migrants. At the same time they praised the 
project for facilitating access to health, legal aid and education facilities. However, 
despite the detailed analysis of social exclusion, the report (MRC 2006) did not make 
reference to the perspectives that the EU offers on combating poverty, exclusion and 
discrimination. 
 
One of the most detailed reports on Get Heard has been published by the Merseyside 
Social Inclusion Observatory (MSIO). This 103 page-long report showed the 
experiences, findings and recommendations of ‘more than 320 participants with 
direct experience of social exclusion or poverty in a number of workshops across 
Merseyside’ (MSIO 2005: 7). It also contained detailed information on the 
methodology and the organisations, networks and authorities which participated as 
well as the steering group. The major part of the report was dedicated to the 
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workshops. It put forwards the views of groups of primary stakeholders45 and was 
structured around the above mentioned three main questions which had been set by 
the Get Heard toolkit. Moreover, the report offered a more extensive background of 
the NAP process than the Get Heard toolkit and additionally referred to the Laeken 
indicators (Appendix 2) and the SPTF. The role of the EU was briefly mentioned by 
the report and reference was made to the OMC as the tool which would help to 
achieve the Lisbon strategy’s objective ‘to make a decisive impact on the eradication 
of poverty and social exclusion by 2010’ (MSIO 2005: 22).  
 
Regarding the expertise of organisations which facilitated the project in Merseyside, 
information events took place before the workshops and conferences. The events 
were delivered by the Merseyside Network for Europe (MNE) (ibid: 25). According 
to the official website of the MNE, one of its core objectives is to provide 
‘information services to the Voluntary and Community sector covering a wider field 
of European affairs’46. Despite all these, throughout the rest of the MSIO report, the 
EU was mentioned only four times47 mainly because of Merseyside’s classification 
as an Objective 1 region under the Structural Funds. The report made no other 
reference to the EU or the OMC.  
 
The analysis of the final report of the Get Heard project (annexed to the NSR 2006-
2008), which summarised the issues raised in all workshops around the UK, 
confirmed the fact that there were no discussions of the EU’s involvement (UKCAP 
                                                 
45
 Children and families, young people, working age adults, people in unemployment or/ and on 
benefits, older people, Black and Racial Minority ethnic communities (BRM), Irish community and 
Irish Travellers, gender and social exclusion, refugees and asylum seekers, disability, Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual and Trans groups (LGBT), mental health and social exclusion, homelessness (MSIO 2005) 
46
 http://www.merseynetwork.com/, section: ‘What we do’. Accessed December 17, 2011 
47
 These references to the EU were not made by the participants but by the author of the report for 
reasons of providing information to the reader. 
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2006). Participants lacked any awareness of the OMC and/or the role which the EU 
had played in the fight against poverty. The lack of awareness had been clearer in 
part 3 of the report which provided ‘an opportunity to see what unique or particular 
issues were raised by groups of participants with experience of particular types of 
exclusion’ (UKCAP 2006). This part did not make any reference either to the OMC 
or EU.  
 
3.4.2.2 Bridging The Policy Gap 
 
Get Heard has been the major project in terms of participation of people with direct 
experience of social deprivation. However, other important participatory projects 
have also been funded under the Community Action Programme to Combat Social 
Exclusion 2002 – 2006 and initiated by the EU in the context of the OMC. A notable 
example has been the Bridging the Policy Gap (BTPG). Similar to the Get Heard, 
one of the objectives of BTPG was aiming ‘to raise awareness of European Union 
social inclusion processes (and their relevance to the UK) among a range of key 
stakeholders’ (Poverty Alliance web-portal)48.  
 
Prior to the launch of the BTPG project, the low visibility of the EU process on 
social inclusion issues was the driving force behind the European Commission’s 
(2006) call for proposals regarding National Awareness Raising Actions on Social 
                                                 
48
 (http://www.povertyalliance.org/btpg/html/project/objectives.asp, according to the other three 
objectives the BTPG was also aiming to ‘shift the culture and attitude within statutory agencies 
towards stakeholder dialogue on issues of policy formation and implementation; to address the 
“implementation gap” of social exclusion policies by improving communication between different 
levels of government, and within a wider range of stakeholders, including people with experience of 
poverty; and to contribute to the development and evaluation of participatory mechanisms for 
mainstreaming, monitoring and evaluation of practical anti-poverty strategies within the framework of 
the National Action Plan on social inclusion (NAP)’. Accessed 17.12.2011 
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Inclusion. Thus the Commission was allocating funding in order to highlight the need 
for stakeholders’ involvement as a means to achieve its objective of  
 
improving information and raising awareness among concerned stakeholders 
and the wider public about the relevance of the European Union's social 
inclusion and the social protection processes with regard to the efforts 
undertaken at national level to prevent and reduce poverty and social 
exclusion (European Commission 2006).   
 
In the context of this programme, the proposal which was selected from the UK was 
the BTPG which had been submitted by the Scottish anti-poverty network Poverty 
Alliance. Compliant with the source of funding, the project’s overall target was ‘to 
increase awareness of European action in the field of social inclusion and social 
protection’ (BTPG 2008: 2). According to the final report of the BTPG project, the 
attempted awareness raising of EU action had been achieved though participation of 
people and organisations: 
 
The project put participation at the heart of the awareness raising work; 
achieving increased awareness through actively engaging a cross-section of 
people and organisations in the development and evaluation of policies 
designed to tackle poverty and social exclusion at the local level (ibid.). 
 
Moreover, the project adopted the ‘European concept of a “Peer Review” as a basic 
structure that allowed for thoughtful and reflective discussion amongst participants’ 
(Armstrong 2010: 184; EAPN-EU 2009: 65). The Peer Reviews were organised in 
 172 
three different local authorities (Swansea, Newham, and Glasgow) with 300 
participants (ibid.). For example, in Glasgow a two-day event brought together fifty 
participants in October 2007. The participants were local, regional or central 
government officials, NGOs, academics and people who experienced poverty (BTPG 
2008d). Similar groups of representatives participated in the events in Newham and 
Swansea. Like the Get Heard reports, the BTPG also confirmed that the whole NAP 
process was applied in the context of the OMC through which the EU was intending 
‘to make a decisive impact on poverty by 2010’ (BTPG 2008d: 4).  
 
However, despite the objectives of the Commission and the project’s claims of 
awareness raising, participants who actually discussed complex OMC issues (such as 
minimum income schemes and labour market participation) did so without knowing 
that these issues were related to the OMC and without considering the EU level. 
These effects of the OMC have been defined as ‘capillary effects’ (PPMI 2011: 9). 
According to this term, ‘the actors use many concepts and themes with clear linkages 
to the OMC (flexicurity, active ageing, active inclusion, multi-dimensional of 
poverty and exclusion, at-risk-of-poverty rate, child poverty or placement rate, etc.), 
but often without recognising such linkages’ (ibid.). 
 
As in the case of Get Heard, the final report of the BTPG incorporated the findings 
of the three Peer Reviews. These finding were annexed in the NSR 2008-2010 
(annex 2.8). Once again, the focus was on the relations, lessons, and findings at the 
different levels from the ‘local experience’ to the ‘national policy’ but omitted the 
EU dimension (BTPG 2008a).  
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3.4.2.3 An open but invisible method 
 
The above mentioned reports and the new empirical findings all confirm the 
invisibility of the EU and its OMC despite the openness of the method (de la Porte 
2010; Armstrong et al. 2008: 439; Frazer and Marlier 2008b; see also chapter 1). It 
seems that both Get Heard and BTPG have failed to meet one of their core 
objectives, namely the raising of awareness of the EU processes and the NAPs in the 
social inclusion field (see also Pemberton 2008). In fact, the structure of the 
workshops has not facilitated the awareness raising of the OMC/EU. As the analysis 
of the interviews and reports’ showed, the projects were actually structured around 
questions about the local, regional and national level. This was a multi-level 
approach of poverty and social exclusion but it excluded the EU level. As 
representatives from involved organisations argued in interviews (e.g. Interview in 
Glasgow 02.12.2010) they regarded the projects as exclusively UK-driven.  
 
Anti-poverty associations, which were assigned to implement the project, were 
arguing that they are specialists in EU issues, proponents of the mobilisation of 
grassroots actors and fully aware of the OMC. However, as the field work for this 
thesis showed, only some but not all of the people who worked for anti-poverty 
associations were aware of the EU and its OMC. The majority of the participants 
were not aware of the OMC. According to one interviewee ‘actually there are not 
many people who know about the [OMC] process anyway’ (Interview in London 
16.02.2010a). 
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This lack of ‘stakeholder visibility’ (de la Porte 2010: 10; see also chapter 1) of the 
OMC was also the result of insufficient funding e.g. for the Scottish network) or no 
funding (as was the case for the English network). In those terms, the UK anti-
poverty networks are still weak whereas, ‘obviously in a country where you got a 
strong network of organisations that know about the EU issues, there will be more 
transparency, more understanding for the EU’ (Interview in London 16.02.2010a). 
All these issues are reflected in the following citation from an interview with a 
primary stakeholder in London (16.02.2010b):  
 
Often what happens is that the originators will diffuse it down to 
organisations who will then ask the people who work in these organisations 
at various locations to run workshops on a specific issue without necessarily 
giving them the background of where it’s all come from and where it’s all 
going back to. It is lack of information sharing, lack of clarity.  
 
However, even people who are fully aware of the process and work for the anti-
poverty NGOs and networks do not consider the diffusion of this awareness an easy 
task, nor do they think that this is an essential issue. Thus, on the one hand they 
argue that such a process would require ‘resources [i.e. funding] and time’ which are 
currently not available (Interview in London 05.02.2010). On the other hand, they 
perceive the feedback from the projects as ‘feedback for the UK’ and not for the EU 
(ibid.).  
 
This statement confirms the previously mentioned issue according to which even 
members of EU oriented organisations (in this case, the EAPN-EU) do not prioritise 
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the EU dimension. This happens either in order to avoid complexity or because of 
time and funding resources. It also seems to dissociate efforts at EU level from 
efforts at national level. A similar statement was made in another interview by the 
representative of another notable NGO (i.e. the ATD-Fourth World) involved in the 
Get Heard:  
 
The thing is to break it down. That’s the main difficulty because the NAP is 
supposed to be presenting action taken in the country against poverty.[…] 
The fact is that it is part of the EU process but the dialogue is not about the 
EU, it’s not about an EU process… (Interview in London 16.02.2010) 
 
Overall, the knowledge about the EU’s involvement of some of the key actors does 
not seem to have been diffused to grassroots participants. Antipoverty organisations 
and networks did not communicate the involvement of the EU/OMC to the primary 
stakeholders. This seemed to happen for reasons of time and money resources, as 
well as for the simplification of information, and the preparation provided by the 
associations to the grassroots participants before their participation (Interviews in 
London 05.02.2010, 16.02.2010a and 16.02.2010b). Apart from this, even if they 
acknowledged the role of the EU behind the launch of the project, they did not feel 
the need to return the feedback to the EU. 
 
Despite their potential, the projects did not eventually raise the participants’ 
awareness of the EU framework. The use of this framework could have been a 
framework for socialisation. One of the initial aims of these OMC projects was 
involving awareness on ‘common European concerns’ and actions according to 
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‘common European objectives’ (chapter 1 section 1.2.5). However, neither were the 
European common concerns and objectives apparent nor were the EU institutions 
perceived as relevant in the workshops.  
 
 
3.5 Shortcomings in participation. 
 
The above analysis of participation of primary and secondary stakeholders in the 
NAPs process reflects the satisfaction of the participants regarding their participation 
in the policy-making process. However, the picture would not be completed if 
drawbacks in the participation were not taken into consideration. An important issue 
which is a drawback in participation is the (unsuccessful) effort by the government to 
institutionalise the on-going dialogue with primary and secondary stakeholders. 
Another issue refers to the NGOs and networks’ criticisms to the government 
regarding whether wide numbers of primary stakeholders are really represented in 
this dialogue. These issues will be discussed in sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 respectively.   
 
3.5.1 Towards a formal participatory process. 
 
Until 2010 the SPTF was a working group that had the opportunity to work together 
with the UK government and more specifically with the DWP. Since the process of 
the dialogue between the DWP and the SPTF had not yet been formalised at that 
point, the DWP took a step towards its formalisation by planning to establish a new 
group, the Social Inclusion Advisory Group (SIAG). Interviews with secondary 
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stakeholders (e.g. Interview in London 16.02.2010a) who were invited to be 
members of the SIAG revealed further details about this initiative:  
 
The Social Inclusion Advisory Group would have different levels. So the one 
part would be the governmental level, the representatives from each 
governmental department and then an advisory group which has 
representatives from NGOs, academics and people experiencing poverty. But 
there has been this consultation, saying that ‘okay, you have an advisory 
group, you’ve got like twenty members and two of them are experiencing 
poverty. Who are they going to represent? Are they representing poor 
people? Are they representing themselves? Are they representing their 
organisations?’ So it was decided that this was not enough, not sufficient … 
There should be a third space, a forum where the people in poverty would 
come together and would be able to discuss the issues that the advisory 
groups are working on and then feed into the advisory group.  
 
The conditional tense which the respondent used to describe the SIAG’s 
establishment has probably already revealed the outcome of the DWP plans. 
According to the research carried out for this thesis, the idea for the establishment of 
the group started with the change in leadership of the Social Inclusion team in the 
DWP (Interview in Liverpool 24.03.2010). It was actually the idea of the new team 
leader. At the time, however, some secondary stakeholders appeared concerned about 
whether this new leader would be as committed as the previous one. The previous 
team leader, who was eventually replaced, was known because of:  
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his commitment and his knowledge … and his experience and also his 
empathy with the subject … he had started from a street level and worked his 
way up rather than coming to us as high-flyer (ibid.).  
 
Therefore, the commitment of one senior officer was a very important factor behind 
participation of the SPTF in the dialogue with the government. This prompts towards 
a new look at the picture of the Europeanisation of the British public policy. Apart 
from the secondary stakeholders (or actually, together with them), DWP senior 
officers also responded positively to the OMC pressures for participation. Therefore, 
as has been shown in chapter 1, the lack of sanctions does not necessarily mean that 
the OMC is ineffective. According to Vanhercke (2010: 133), the change via the 
OMC depends on the ability of the domestic actors to appropriate creatively the 
OMC’s toolkit (i.e. objectives, concepts, indicators etc.) ‘for their own purposes and 
independent policy initiatives’. It seems that due to their position in the DWP’s 
Social Inclusion Team, senior officers were able to make use of the OMC’s 
provisions for participation.     
 
Regarding the SIAG, to the disappointment of the concerned stakeholders, neither 
the ‘third space’ for the participation of primary stakeholders was introduced, nor did 
the newly established SIAG managed to replace the SPTF. The preparations for 
general elections had a negative effect on participation in particular but also on the 
whole social inclusion process in general. As the coordinator of the UKCAP 
revealed in an interview in Liverpool (10.03.2010):  
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To my knowledge the SIAG has not met. The SPTF hasn’t met either since 
last year some time. I think they had a final meeting in January of this year 
[2011] just to get together. But there has been no news since. This had been 
one of our greatest fears because this year is the EU year to combat poverty 
and all the mechanisms that we had are not happening. We are waiting for the 
general election in this country and what normally happens is when the 
general election is called it is like a shut down; nothing happens. And I think 
the civil servants have been expecting that the general election will be called 
soon and no new mechanisms have been put in place in case a new 
government comes in and changes everything. 
 
This citation flags up again the importance of issues of partisan politics. It is an 
important issue also in Greece as will be explained in chapter 4. Returning to the 
SIAG, according to Schönheinz (forthcoming), the group which met with the DWP 
twice since its establishment in June 2010, had its funding cut due to the financial 
crisis. Therefore, plans for greater and more formalised stakeholder involvement 
have been put on ice since the Conservative-Liberal coalition government has 
implemented its austerity budget.    
 
3.5.2 A non-inclusive participation 
 
When analysing participation and the possible cognitive changes that it produces, it 
is important to answer the question ‘who actually participates?’ Why do certain 
people take part in conferences, projects, consultations, round-tables and meetings 
with policymakers and not others? It has been argued that socially excluded people 
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are labelled as such because they are excluded from every practise of the society 
including the participation in the policy-making process (e.g. CEFET 2007). In other 
words, ‘excluded people – by definition – do not have an organized voice in framing 
policy or shaping programmes, articulating need or conferring’ (ibid: 3). This form 
of political exclusion has implications for active citizenship and the right of dignity 
(Bassett and Walsh 2011). The NGOs acknowledge that people in social exclusion 
rarely decide to get involved in political activities and to go to organisations with the 
intention of getting involved (Interview in Glasgow 02.12.2010).  
 
In some cases organisations have criticised the British government’s efforts as well 
its claims for wide participation, for example, in the NAP 2008-2010. Anti-poverty 
networks have accused the British government of abandoning the effort to involve 
people in combating exclusion, by substituting excluded people with ‘people already 
included but with multiple disadvantages’ (CEFET 2007: 3 –emphasis in the 
original). An issue which has been raised is that instead of facilitating the 
participation of excluded people, policy-makers are looking for disadvantaged people 
assuming that they are facing social exclusion. According to this criticism, the 
criteria that policy-makers consider as disadvantages are ‘mainly demographic 
categories (black or minority ethnic, disabled, single-parents…) [which] do not 
however in themselves constitute exclusion’ (ibid: 4, emphasis in the original). 
Contrary to policy-makers’ beliefs, organisations conceptualise social exclusion as 
something which,  
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[b]y definition … relates people or communities that are beyond their 
[statutory agencies’] grasp – if the agencies were working with them they 
would not be excluded! (ibid.).  
 
As a consequence, the organisations have urged the government to avoid 
presuppositions on who is potentially excluded and to approach the issue of 
exclusion on a case-by-case basis. In fact, this approach refers to an ideal 
representation and assumes that all forms of social exclusion should be taken 
seriously in the policy-making process. The truth is that participation through the 
OMC works differently in reality. 
 
Apart from the above arguments, the interviews with primary stakeholders carried 
out for this thesis, have also shown that not everyone has the same opportunities to 
express his/her concerns and to influence the decision-making process. The anti-
poverty associations acknowledge these issues. Nevertheless, they try to act on 
behalf of as many people as possible while attempting to represent as many forms of 
poverty and social exclusion as their limited resources allow them to do. 
Additionally, they have prioritised actions to search for the socially excluded and to 
motivate them to participate (see, for example, ATD Fourth World 2000).  
 
The fieldwork of this thesis shows that once the opportunities for participation are 
offered by policy-makers, those who often decide who will participate are NGOs, 
networks and organised grassroots communities. Their decision may depend on the 
participation project and the size and experience of the NGOs. For example, an NGO 
which has a long tradition in organising projects with the involvement of primary 
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stakeholders, people in poverty can be at the same time organisers and participants of 
conferences and round tables (Interview in London 15.12.2009). In terms of 
participation in meetings, conferences, and round tables, one of the main criteria is 
the ability of the participant to speak on behalf of a wider group of vulnerable 
people. Thus:  
 
It is more about where people are in their life. In short, for us, it’s important 
that people are in a sort of position where they are not just speaking about 
themselves, exposing themselves and their own problems. You know, it is 
people who have managed to be in a sort of position where they can reflect a 
little bit, so to speak, on behalf of other people. That, for us, would be a 
criterion. That someone is not consumed with their own situation, so 
consumed with their own troubles that they can step out of that to speak 
(Interview in London 16.02.2010a)  
 
It is not clear why people who are ‘consumed with their own situation’ are not 
offered opportunities to participate. However, other organisations do not have these 
criteria. They claim that they try to offer opportunities for participation to as many 
people as possible: 
 
This is the limit of representation; you can never represent everyone… 
People who participate are not necessarily better off because, some of them - 
we identify them, we approach them, we encourage them to participate - 
some are very shy, they don’t have confidence. And we actually search for 
the minority because other people will have the confidence, will find a way 
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to speak up, to go to consultations, to write to their MP etcetera. Actually, we 
try to find people who don’t usually come forward who would not take part, 
who have actually never taken part in their lives. (Interview in London 
05.02.2010). 
 
These shortcomings illustrate the fact that the emerged participation of primary and 
secondary stakeholders in the British policy-making process in the period between 
2001 and 2010 was far from being considered as ideal types of democratic 
governance some of which were discussed in chapter 1. Nevertheless, the fact that 
not everyone can be represented in the SPTF and the fact that the SPTF ceased its 
operations in 2010 –and was not reactivated in a similar fashion ever since– do not 
mean that within the timeframe of the present thesis participation was not 
satisfactory, at least for the primary and secondary stakeholders. Thus, the following 
section intends to see whether participation was able to redirect participants’ 
expectations, political activities and loyalties. 
 
 
3.6 Expectations, political activities and loyalties 
 
3.6.1 The domestic level  
 
Regardless of the issue of unawareness of the EU’s role in the fight against poverty 
and social exclusion, participation triggered by the OMC had indeed had an impact 
on the participants. As the report of a series of workshops for the Get Heard project 
acknowledged, ‘the atmosphere in each [workshop] was one of excitement … There 
was a sense of solidarity, a belief that together we can support each other and have a 
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stronger voice’ (MRC 2006: 4). The same report offered an overview of the 
participants’ feelings after their participation. According to the report, participants 
valued their participation as positive. They spoke about the respect they received and 
stated that this form of participation gave them confidence, information about their 
legal rights, opportunities and encouragement to speak up regarding their problems 
(ibid.). Regarding their expectations, the report showed that participants expressed 
the strong belief that they will be taken into account when the policy is planned 
(ibid.). Interviewees also argued that the participation established by the OMC 
indeed changed participants’ attitudes (e.g. Interview in London 05.02.2010): 
 
In a number of events that we took part in, at the beginning you can see that 
people are very careful and they keep the distance from you. But once they 
start taking part in the conference they come forward and they say ‘Oh! We 
did not know that. Oh! That is how things are…’ and then by the end of the 
event they become so supportive and they change their views. So this is for 
us the importance of participation. Because it raises awareness and it changes 
public attitudes. 
 
In fact, as the cases of Get Heard and BTPG have shown, awareness raising (at least 
in regards to the EU framework) has not been the main outcome of participation. 
However, both the above cited report and interview offered evidence about a type of 
loyalties to a community, a sense of solidarity and a process of empowerment for the 
participants. In order to better understand these changes, the same interviewee was 
asked to explain more explicitly their nature (ibid.):  
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So, yes, we came together and our voices got heard [by the policy-makers]. I 
think for a lot of people they had the sense of solidarity that we are not alone. 
There were other people who came with them and together they felt support. 
That’s why we called it ‘Stronger Voice’ [i.e. the name of this series of 
workshops]. Because after the conference when people were asked about it 
they said: ‘Well, it was really good. We talked together and we felt that 
together we can have a stronger voice’. 
 
Thus, loyalties to an emerging community were a very important outcome of the 
coming-together of the participants. The transformation from feeling socially 
excluded, to loyalties was followed by solidarity and empowerment. Regarding 
solidarity, this was not a form of passive solidarity in the sense of receiving attention 
from other stakeholders. On the contrary, what seems to have emerged is an active 
form of solidarity in the sense of active support for other participants. Therefore, at 
the beginning of the workshops,  
 
every participant has their own priorities; they are talking about their stories. 
But by the end of every event people become supportive, they are talking to 
us, we have been together in the event, and they put some of our priorities in 
their list of priorities. And this for us is a success; this is how we change 
public attitudes (ibid.).    
  
Once primary stakeholders saw there were opportunities for participation, once they 
felt that their voices could indeed be heard, they felt part of a community and they 
expressed loyalties to that community. They raised their expectations and started 
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being engaged in political activities which were intended to improve not only their 
own situation but also the situation of the whole community within which they were 
working. In other words,  
 
once people heard that it was possible to do something about it [social 
exclusion], they tried to raise it to the press, to the policy-makers, to the 
House of Commons, they discussed amongst the groups. So, people started to 
come forward … People who had no idea before started to come back and 
they took part in other activities, they invited us to their activities and this has 
created something new! For us it is encouraging, it is positive (ibid.).  
 
However, the emerging community and the changes in expectations, political 
activities and loyalties did not entail any ‘European’ specification. Since 
participation in OMC activities took place without any awareness of an EU 
framework (see section 3.5 in this chapter), these changes were not developed into 
shifts of expectations, political activities and loyalties from the national to the EU 
level. It seems that when domestic participation does not entail awareness of the EU 
framework then the expectations, political activities and loyalties cannot be 
identified as having shifted from national to the EU level. As the analysis of Get 
Heard and BTPG projects showed (section 3.5 above), the existence of European 
common concerns and objectives is due to the invisibility of the social inclusion 
OMC for the grassroots participants. Therefore a process of socialisation under an 
EU framework did not take place. 
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However, this is not the case among the members of the SPTF. Those who 
participated in the activities of the SPTF, were all well aware of the role of the social 
inclusion OMC in the mobilisation of stakeholders in the UK. The former Deputy 
Director of the EAPN-UK admitted that changes in expectations, political activities 
and loyalties among the participants in the Get Heard and BTPG projects were 
emerging for the first time since ‘there was no established formula [for participation] 
before’ (Interview in London 05.02.2010). For the interviewee, it was due to the 
OMC framework that people started to participate and experienced changes in their 
attitudes and awareness of the common concerns of a wider community of people. 
 
This arguably shows the impact of the OMC on the attitudes of the primary and 
secondary stakeholders who participate in the social inclusion policy-making process 
through the SPTF. Empirical evidence put forward in this thesis has shown that 
positive evaluation of the importance of the OMC’s application and, through this, of 
the role of the EU comes mainly from these stakeholders. Owing to the OMC, 
stakeholders who were participating in the SPTF appeared to evaluate the EU as an 
institution which changed government’s attitudes towards the mobilisation of people 
in poverty and anti-poverty associations (Interview in Nottingham 24.01.2009; 
Interview in London 16.02.2010a). As was shown in part 3.4.1 above, the 
establishment of participation in an on-going dialogue with policy-makers has given 
a recognised position to the members of the SPTF (i.e. primary and secondary 
stakeholders) at the domestic level. De la Porte and Pochet (2005) have argued that 
anti-poverty associations seek to be more active in the OMC framework since this is 
offering more opportunities for participation than the pre-OMC domestic framework 
(see also chapter 1). Therefore, the opportunities for participation for both the 
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secondary and primary stakeholders created enthusiasm among these people (see 
also part 3.4.1). This enthusiasm emerged after an evaluation of the benefits which 
the OMC offered to the domestic social inclusion strategy. In other words, 
participation per se has been a main reason for the positive rational assessment of the 
EU. Furthermore, the stakeholders who assessed the EU framework positively 
redirected their expectations towards the EU level. SPTF’s primary and secondary 
stakeholders saw it as a framework which they could use to put pressure on domestic 
public policy-makers to bring about improvements through the social inclusion 
strategy. In other words: 
 
because it [i.e. the OMC] is out there, it has been an objective of the way of 
designing policy. It is small steps in a long process. They [i.e. stakeholders] 
can go to EU and you can go to EU and say: Look what has happened 
(Interview in Nottingham 24.01.2009).  
 
Another interviewee explained the expectations that stakeholders had about the EU 
level as follows: 
 
I think people believe there is an increasing role for Europe. And as a 
member of the EU, the UK has to take some of the European policies. As I 
said, there are some good policies at the EU level. The governments are not 
adopting all of them. People hope that, yes, Europe will be able to add value, 
improve some of the policies and the UK cannot keep saying no to all 
European policies. There will be times when the UK will be embarrassed and 
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adopt policies, accept European policies and implement them (Interview in 
London 05.02.2010). 
 
The representative from the UKCAP argued in an interview conducted for this thesis 
in Liverpool (24.03.2010) that prior to the OMC the EU was intending to combat 
poverty mainly through allocation of funds. On the contrary, the OMC has turned out 
to be efficient in facilitating the primary and secondary stakeholders in an effort to 
influence domestic and –through the EU level umbrella networks– European policy-
making. This resulted in the redirection of their expectations and their political 
activities towards the EU level. It is not only the EAPN-UK and organisations such 
as the OSW which partner with EU level networks. This partnership with EU 
oriented organisations is a domestic process as well. As the above interviewee 
acknowledged, 
 
We are purely concerned with UK policy; although we partner with 
organisations because we know that a lot of UK policy is governed by the 
EU. Because the Social Inclusion Unit. DWP is reporting to Europe with the 
NAP. (ibid.). 
 
Stakeholders participating in the SPTF appeared to redirect their expectations and 
political activities towards the EU level due to the promotion of participation which 
the EU framework offered to them. According to the analytical framework 
introduced in chapter 1, this type of redirection emerges after the analysis of the 
benefits that the EU framework appears capable to offer. In this sense, the 
redirection of expectations, political activities and loyalties towards the EU is not 
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emerging after a process of socialisation with the EU norms. It is not related to its 
web of meanings as Shore (2000) argues when referring to attitudes (see also chapter 
1 section 1.2.4). The preference for the EU emerged after the positive evaluation of 
the benefits that the EU has provided for the purposes of the anti-poverty 
associations and for the people that these associations work for. Therefore, in the 
case of participation in the domestic application of the OMC it is safe to argue that 
there is a redirection of expectations and political activities based on rational 
reasons. 
 
Finally, as said in the analytical framework of chapter 1, loyalties to the EU have 
been expected to decrease because of the declining social progress which resulted 
from the financial crisis that started in 2008. In 2010, the British Government 
adopted an austerity budget and a Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) which, 
according to the Institute for Fiscal Studies, is expected to ‘hit the poor hardest’ (The 
Guardian 21.10.2010; IFS 21.10.2010). However, the dynamics of the OMC are 
surprising. One representative of one anti-poverty association in the UK reiterated 
his positive stance towards the OMC and the added value it generated through the 
participation of secondary and primary stakeholders. He explained as follows how 
this tool should be used in the financial crisis: 
 
I think that one of the major contributions of the EU and the OMC is that 
poverty has been on the political agenda of every member state. And we have 
the 2010 [European year of combating poverty and] the Europe 2020 
Strategy. In this context the governments have to justify the measures they 
take, how they address poverty. But in this crisis, these policy changes have 
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started going into a different direction. But we should see the OMC as one 
more front to argue on by organising international campaigns, street 
demonstrations and lobbying against the cuts and have direct talks with the 
government (Interview in Glasgow 02.12.2010).     
 
This citation serves as an indication of the changes in attitudes in the UK regarding 
the EU. Expectations and political activities appeared not only to shift to the EU 
level for long periods but they remained at that level even in the period of the 
financial crisis. This is a strong indication of loyalties towards the EU since 
expectations and political activities were redirected towards the EU for long periods 
(Haas 1958). Especially, the persistence of these redirections in times of financial 
crisis shows that British (primary and secondary) stakeholders have expressed 
loyalties towards the EU. 
 
While one of the social inclusion OMC’s primary concerns has been the promotion 
of participatory practices within the member states (domestic level), chapter 1 has 
shown that the method has brought together primary stakeholders at the EU level. 
Prominent cases are the annual European Meetings of People Experiencing Poverty 
(EMPEP). As has been argued in chapter 1, these meetings provide a good case to 
‘test’ participants’ attitudes towards the EU. Section 3.4 of this chapter showed that 
participation in domestic-level projects, which were actually driven by the EU, was 
not always followed by the visibility of the undisputable role of the OMC/EU in 
setting up particular workshops and in the field of social inclusion in general. 
Consequently, participating stakeholders were unaware of the European framework. 
In contrast to the domestic-level projects, the EMPEP provided a clearer view of the 
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EU’s role in organising conferences and combating social exclusion. They referred to 
participation at the EU level (in contrast to participation at the domestic level which 
failed to mention the EU level) and can therefore be tested regarding their impacts on 
the participants’ expectations, political activities and loyalties. The next part intends 
to assess whether participation in an EU-level project where the OMC/EU’s role is 
acknowledged will lead to the redirection of expectations, political activities and 
loyalties from the domestic towards the EU level.  
 
3.6.2 The EU level 
 
 The shifting expectations, political activities and loyalties of stakeholders who 
participated in the Get Heard and BTPG projects did not relate to changes that 
entailed the redirection from the national to EU level. In general, the participants 
were unaware of the EU framework which had promoted their participation. 
However, stakeholder participation in conferences at which the role of the EU was 
explicitly acknowledged (i.e. EMPEP), has triggered partial redirection of 
expectations and political activities from the national to the EU level. Empirical 
evidence gathered from interviews shows that:  
 
the European conference [i.e. EMPEP] is the boost to their [i.e. participants’] 
confidence and it helped them to change. I mean, some of them were 
encouraged, after that, to start other activist work. Actually, all the people 
who took part started to become more active and interested in acquiring 
skills. All of those people! Now, they enjoyed that role and they felt, well 
there is a role for them and they can do something … they thought that there 
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are other people like their selves in Europe and they are not the only ones. 
So, it created a form of solidarity and, I think, it helped their confidence in a 
way that they found out that not everyone is against them and there are a lot 
of people who are interested in listening to them (Interview in London 
05.02.2010). 
 
Like in the case of the domestic projects (i.e. Get Heard and BTPG) participation in 
these EU conferences created loyalties to a community. However, this time the 
loyalties were strongly connected to a European community. Thus, participants came 
to realise that they belonged to a community –although this time the community was 
specifically the European. Therefore, loyalties appeared to emerge towards the EU. 
These loyalties were not based on rational assessment of the EU since they were not 
the outcome of long-term redirections of expectations. Due to the fact that a process 
of participation started also domestically, participants seemed to expect more from 
the domestic level than the European (Interview in Rhyl 24.02.2010). As shown 
earlier in this chapter, participants in the Get Heard project expected domestic 
policy-makers to take into account their views and concerns (MRC 2006; see section 
3.6.1 above). Instead, participants seemed to redirect their loyalties after a process of 
socialisation under EU concerns and common EU objectives.  
   
Primary stakeholders realised through participation in projects at EU level that their 
concerns were not only the concerns of a certain group in a local, regional or national 
community. Instead they became aware that these were common European concerns 
when people came together and discussed common solutions. The issues that were 
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discussed in the EU’s Brussels conferences were common for all the participants. In 
other words:  
 
[t]here were three themes [i.e. housing, basic services, financial inclusion], 
and we had to break them down. Individually we had to go around the room, 
we had the problem, the obstacle and we discussed how to combat it (ibid.).  
 
However, the perception of an EU community was not only based on the perception 
of common concerns but it also served as the basis for the common expression of 
political actions. Thus, as the report from the ninth European meeting in Brussels 
reveals, according to the participants, issues such as child poverty, families in social 
exclusion and even participation of primary and secondary stakeholders had to be 
addressed at the European level (Ninth EMPEP 2010). For example, the participants 
demanded from the EU ‘to support families because family is the society’s driving 
force’ (ibid: 18). They also argued that ‘[t]he legacy of EU 201049 should be that the 
proposed poverty platform [i.e. European platform against poverty] involves all 
relevant stakeholders, with people experiencing poverty at the heart of this’ (ibid: 
19). Finally, one of the main priorities identified by the participants was the building 
of a ‘Europe for all’ (ibid: 19). These last remarks showed that participants were not 
only aware of the EU but they were also ready to shift their loyalties to the EU which 
was a community that could include them. 
 
In accordance with the analytical framework put forward in chapter 1 (section 1.2.5) 
these common concerns and objectives do indeed appear to have triggered the vision 
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of the EU as an ‘entity’ and as a ‘community of destiny’ (Haahr 2004: 224; 
Jacobsson 2004) in the eyes of the participants. There are important differences 
among the participants in terms of the forms of social exclusion from which they 
suffer and in terms of the different welfare provisions to which they are entitled to in 
the member states in which they live. However, it seems that people are coming 
together within a community after the realisation of the similarities that their 
situations bear. As one interviewee pointed out:  
 
They might be surprised by the actual differences in laws, differences in 
participation but then people usually have an affinity with each other in terms 
of the things they have in common. And that even happens when people from 
Europe meet people from developing nations where obviously, materially, 
things are different but the effects that poverty has on the people - people 
getting humiliated or treated without respect. These kinds of things, 
transcend the countries or the cultures (Interview in London 16.02.2010a)   
 
Participants appeared willing to strengthen the new community that emerged. This 
was the reason why participants demanded the sharing of information on good 
practices among the member states. In this way they expected that mutual learning 
would not only diffuse practices to domestic settings which lagged behind, but that it 
would also make the EU able to ‘communicate its actions properly’ (Ninth EMPEP 
2010: 15).  
 
In addition to the common concerns and common objectives, other important 
evidence of the existence of loyalties to the EU was the fact that participants realised 
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that ‘not everyone is against them and there are a lot of people who are interested in 
listing to them’ (Interview in London 05.02.2010). Through the Brussels conferences 
the participants felt that a wider EU community was including them; it listened to 
their concerns and it discussed common solutions. People saw this process as a 
European process (Interview in Nottingham 24.01.2009).  
 
However, this empirical finding should not be overestimated in terms of its outcome. 
As the reports acknowledge, policy-makers’ attendance in these meetings has always 
been disappointing for the participants. For these reasons, anti-poverty organisations 
intended in advance to moderate participants’ potential expectations about the EU as 
will be shown below.   
 
In fact, certain constraints exist which prevent a radical redirection of political 
activities and loyalties towards the EU level. For example, solidarity between 
participants was only built in the conference. It lasted only as long as the conference 
was taking place. A participant of the 2009 Brussels conference stated that she was 
still keeping in touch with some participants from Germany. However, this was more 
like an exchange of information about things that were happening at the domestic 
level rather than collective activist work to raise issues at the EU level (Interview in 
Rhyl 24.02.2010). However, forms of active solidarity emerged among the UK 
delegates who attended the events in Brussels. This again can be seen as 
empowerment which led to the creation of political activities which, however, are 
directed primarily to the domestic level. As one interviewee explained: 
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I know that one of the effects was that after the conference they became quite 
close to the other delegates that they went with, who were from other 
organisations. I know the guy from ATD. He kept on going to the MRC, on 
returning he got involved in their course. That was a positive thing; that was 
different (Interview in London 16.02.2010a).  
 
This statement shows the persistence of the domestic level for political activities and 
expectations. This was confirmed by another participant of the Brussels conferences 
who stated:  
 
I am interested in the EU but I have not pursued my interests. There is too 
much going on in my life and in my region … I would like to think European 
in the future, definitely. But because I am coping with my own life, living 
still in poverty, it is hard to think abstractly European ... I should be thinking 
as a European citizen the way I think as a British citizen, what laws and 
policies are affecting us, individually or as groups. I know that everything 
comes from Europe but… (Interview in Rhyl 24.02.2010) 
 
Importantly, this statement came from a participant who participated in EU-level 
conferences more than once. The repeated participation at EU conference in Brussels 
may generate greater loyalties towards the EU than one-off participation. Another 
participant argued that her loyalties shifted from the domestic towards the EU level 
through her repeated involvement in Europe-wide participation projects, particularly 
roundtables and conferences (Interview in London 16.02.2010b). However, her 
expectations towards the EU were moderate and followed by significant fears about 
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possible EU decisions that might have a negative impact on the fight against social 
exclusion:  
 
Before all this started, it [Europe] was a place I’d like to go on holidays, I 
would like to go abroad and discover the people and the cultures. But when 
this [i.e. her involvement] begun, I begun to realise that there were dangers 
and advantages in having a unified Europe. The danger is if it becomes really 
radical right-wing and everybody begins to follow it. And the advantage is, 
more voices more power. You know, a lot of people saying things, but they 
have to say the right thing. It’s important, when you are fighting poverty to 
have a unified voice to use because it is life changing, it is world changing. 
(Interview in London 16.02.2010b)  
 
The fact that participants have raised fears about the possible different directions of 
EU policies confirms that they have come to realise the role of the EU in their daily 
life. In this sense, the above stated citation reveals that the EU is becoming salient in 
people’s lives. As was argued in chapter 1, the more the EU is becoming salient in 
the daily life of people, the more those people are expected to develop EU-related 
community feelings. However, what emerged from the interviews about the EU 
conferences is that the involved stakeholders are disappointed that their participation 
does not result in policies (or changes of policies) whose impact can be experienced 
in their daily life. In fact, secondary stakeholders acknowledged that socially 
excluded people have a lot of expectations before and after their participation at EU 
level participatory projects. However, anti-poverty NGOs and networks appear 
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proactive when moderating such expectations. The reasons for this moderation were 
explained by one interviewee as follows:   
 
We have to manage their [i.e. participants’] expectations and say to them: 
‘This is an opportunity for you to raise your voice, your opinion, to speak up, 
to share your experiences with lots of people like yourself in Europe. And 
lots of policy-makers will listen. You may not change their [i.e. policy-
makers’] views or their policies. But at least you might influence them. And 
this is an opportunity [for you]’ ... Participants know it is a long process. I do 
not think they believe that this is going to change policy at once. They know 
that it is not an easy process, that policies are developed over time. They 
hope that they can influence policy-makers and they may bring about 
changes. But I do not think they felt, ‘Wow, my life will change’. No, we are 
not under that illusion. (Interview in London 05.02.2010) 
 
The moderation of expectations of the people in poverty who participate in EU level 
activities takes place in particular in respect to participation’s ability to affect policy 
outcomes. In some extreme cases, the lack of apparent policy outcomes has made 
anti-poverty organisations question the value of their participation in EU level 
activities. In general, there is evidence that some NGOs have advised participants to 
take advantage of the opportunity to participate but to avoid seeing it as their only 
way of action. In other words, participation in EU level activities is not seen as the 
only way for primary stakeholders to influence positively public policy. According 
to anti-poverty associations such as the Poverty Alliance, people should use 
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participation in EU level activities in addition to other tools such as lobbying, 
campaigns and even street protests.  
 
I think that the people in poverty who go there year after year, I think we 
should expect that there is going to be some disappointment. For some people 
the question of policy change over the last ten years has been a poor one. So 
they are not satisfied only because their voices are heard; they also want 
policy change. I think this ends in disappointment because poverty in Europe 
has not declined as a result of the OMC or the Lisbon strategy. So I think 
there is disappointment. And I think what we have to do in our organisations 
is to try to support participation, try to show the benefits but do not oversell 
expectations. So I think participation is as much about civil society engaging 
people in poverty in the public policy [process] as much it is about people 
lobbying directly politicians to act against poverty in communities, at 
national level… And changes will come. We emphasise not only direct 
participation but also campaigns and direct lobbying of politicians. Change 
will not only come through participation. (Interview in Glasgow 02.12.2010) 
 
The rational assessment of the EU has led to the disappointment of the British 
delegates to the EU conferences. However, as shown above, participants have 
expressed loyalties to the EU mainly as a result of their socialisation under common 
concerns and objectives. Before the case of Greece is presented, the last part of this 
chapter will draw the conclusion of the British case study. 
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter has assessed the participation of primary and secondary stakeholders in 
the UK in the social inclusion OMC and its impact on their expectations, political 
activities and loyalties. Following the analytical and methodological framework put 
forward in chapter 1, this chapter has used a qualitative approach to analyse the UK’s 
implementation of the social inclusion OMC. In terms of Europeanisation and in the 
context of New Labour Party’s commitment to tackle social exclusion, actors from 
the DWP and from anti-poverty NGOs and networks responded positively to the 
OMC’s pressures for participation. Through a Social Policy Task Force primary and 
secondary stakeholders got involved in the NAPs process and in particular in the 
stages of agenda-setting and monitoring of the NAPs. The impact of this involvement 
was reflected into the NAPs which were referring to issues raised by the SPTF. 
Additionally, anti-poverty associations organised two major participatory projects 
(i.e. Get Heard and BTPG). This shows that they were collaborating with the 
government in the stage of the implementation of the NAPs/NSRs and towards the 
objective of mobilising wide numbers of stakeholders such as people in poverty.  
 
Importantly, these developments happened in a favourable environment to social 
inclusion. According to Börzel’s (2002) theory, member states which upload 
practices and policies to the EU level find it much easier to adapt to the emanating 
Europeanisation pressures. As has been argued in chapter 1 (see part 1.3.5.1), the UK 
was expected to respond positively to the Lisbon strategy since it has been an 
influential actor in shaping the Lisbon agenda and in particular issues concerning 
economic reform and competitiveness (Bulmer 2008).  
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One important finding of chapter 3 was that primary stakeholders who participated in 
the Get Heard and BTPG projects were not aware of the fact that their participation 
was the result of EU level efforts for wide participation of stakeholders. 
Organisations and networks, which were aware of the role of the EU and OMC in 
those social inclusion activities, perceived these projects as not related to an EU-wide 
effort to combat poverty and they did not succeed in diffusing their knowledge about 
the EU framework to the primary stakeholders. As a result, despite the fact that both 
Get Heard and BTPG aimed at raising awareness of the EU, participants remained 
unaware of the EU framework and therefore they did not redirect expectations, 
political activities and loyalties towards the EU. It seems that when domestic 
participation does not entail awareness of the EU framework then the expectations, 
political activities and loyalties cannot be identified as having shifted from national 
to the EU level. 
 
The cases of Get Heard and BTPG can be seen as a result of the Europeanisation of 
the British social inclusion policy-making process at least in regards to the 
participation of stakeholders which emerged as a result of the application of the 
social inclusion OMC. Members of NGOs and networks who organised workshops 
for these two projects confirmed that these new practices had been ‘downloaded’ 
from the EU level. The Get Heard project was modelled on the Brussels meetings of 
people who experience poverty (Interviews in London, 05.12.2010 and 16.02.2010a). 
The BTPG was organised according to the European concept ‘peer review’ 
(Interview in Glasgow, 02.12.2010).       
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In the absence of features, that were according to the analytical framework, expected 
to promote socialisation (i.e. learning via the OMC’s common indicators and 
objectives –see section 3.3 above) this chapter showed that the members of the SPTF 
redirected their expectations and political activities towards the EU level after a 
rational assessment of the later. Interviews with key stakeholders (e.g. ATD Fourth 
World, EAPN-England etc.) showed that prior to the OMC there were no 
opportunities for participation in the policy-making process. Therefore, the launch of 
the OMC and its participatory provisions redirected the expectations of the members 
of the SPTF towards the EU. The latter was seen as a framework which was able to 
create a participatory process in the UK that, in turn, had an impact on the NAPs. As 
evidence of redirection of political activities, the UKCAP which was a purely 
domestically oriented network started working with EU oriented networks such as 
the EAPN-EU, in order to take advantage of the EU’s involvement in the field of 
social inclusion. Another network, the NIAPN, urged for participation in Get Heard 
as a means to address the issue of the EU democratic deficit. Empirical evidence 
brought forward showed that expectations and political activities were redirected to 
the EU for long periods (i.e. throughout the period marked by the timeframe of this 
thesis) and were persistent even during the financial crisis which has influenced 
negatively EU citizens’ stances towards the EU (see chapter 1 section 1.3.5.2). 
 
The European meetings of people in poverty, which are held annually in Brussels, 
have made apparent the EU’s involvement. Participants did not seem to redirect 
expectations to the EU mainly due to an already emerged domestic participation 
process and the efforts of anti-poverty associations to moderate potential 
expectations from the EU. Additionally, British delegates in the EMPEP appeared 
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disappointed with the fact that their participation at EU level had no impact on policy 
outcomes. However, a socialisation process emerged under what Jacobsson (2004: 
357) describes as ‘common concerns’. This led in turn to redirection of loyalties and 
political activities to the EU. Yet, it is relevant to say that these are only annual two-
day meetings and participants appear to be concerned primarily with problems they 
are faced with in their daily life. However, empirical evidence gathered from 
interviews (i.e. Interviews in Rhyl 24.02.2010 and London 16.02.2010b) showed that 
repeated participation at EU level creates stronger loyalties to the EU than one-off 
participation.      
 
A more detailed assessment of the issues discussed in these concluding remarks will 
be offered in chapter 5 which aims to compare the UK and Greece in terms of 
participation and shifts in expectations, political activities and loyalties towards the 
EU. Before this, the following chapter will discuss the Greek case study.   
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Chapter 4: The Open Method of Coordination in Greece 
 
 
4.1 Introduction: The Open Method of Coordination in Greece 
 
The structure of chapter 4 follows that of chapter 3 in order to allow for comparisons 
and to answer in a similar fashion the main research question which was put forward 
in chapter 1. The analysis in this chapter has a threefold aim. First, it intends to 
analyse the participation of (new) stakeholders that the OMC in social inclusion has 
triggered in the Greek social inclusion policy-making process. Second, it examines 
the possible impact of this participation on participants’ expectations, political 
activities and loyalties towards the EU. Third, it examines the impact of the 
participation at the European conferences of people experiencing poverty on Greek 
participants’ expectations, political activities and loyalties towards the EU. Like 
chapter 3, one of the main purposes of chapter 4 is to assess (the potential for) the 
redirection of stakeholders’ expectations, political activities and loyalties from the 
national to the EU level through their participation in OMC activities on the domestic 
and EU level. 
 
The fieldwork for this chapter primarily took the form of five interviews with anti-
poverty NGOs and networks and two individuals who suffer from poverty and/or 
social exclusion in Greece. The use of this qualitative research methodology will 
allow for a detailed analysis of the views which participants have who are involved 
in social inclusion OMC activities on the domestic and EU level. Although an effort 
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was made to conduct interviews in different Greek regions, the vast majority of the 
organisations and networks involved in OMC activities were based in Athens.  
 
The next part (4.2) provides a brief overview of the main indices for poverty and 
social exclusion in Greece. The official Greek statistical authority (Elliniki Statistiki 
Ipiresia –El. Stat.) acknowledges a relatively static situation for the years 1994-2008 
(El. Stat. 2010). As will be explained below, an in depth analysis of the social 
inclusion OMC cannot be undertaken by focusing merely on quantitative data. Part 
4.3 explains the main obstacles which EU-induced reforms face in Greece. Part 4.4 
analyses whether the social inclusion OMC has promoted the participation of anti-
poverty NGOs, networks and people who experience poverty and exclusion in the 
Greek policy-making process. Finally, part 4.5 analyses the possible shifts in 
expectations, political activities and loyalties of Greek stakeholders who participate 
in the (OMC-sponsored) annual Brussels conferences.   
 
 
4.2 Indices of poverty and exclusion in Greece 
 
4.2.1 People at risk of poverty 
 
A report from the El. Stat. (2010), the findings of which are identical with those of 
Eurostat, showed that 19.7% of the population in Greece was at risk of poverty in 
2009. According to the gender breakdown the percentage figures were 19.1% (15.4% 
EU-27) for men and 20.2% (17.1% EU-27) for women (ibid: 6; Eurostat 2011). In 
2009 the threshold of poverty risk for individuals was set at the annual disposable 
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income of €6,897.30 and for households with two adults and two children, aged 14 
years or under, at €14,484.40 (El. Stat 2010: 3). Importantly, the index for people at 
risk of poverty ‘shows relative stability for the last fourteen years (1994-2008) 
between 20% and 23%’ (El. Stat. 2010: 1).  
 
Despite the Lisbon strategy’s objective to have a decisive impact on poverty, in 2009 
in Greece, 13.8% of the people at working ages (i.e. between 18 and 64) were living 
under the poverty line (ibid: 7) compared to only 8% for the average of the EU-2750. 
Amongst the unemployed, the rate of those at risk of poverty increased to 38.1% (El. 
Stat. 2010) which was however lower than the average of almost 42% for the EU-
2751. Nevertheless, the 38.1% figure reflects an increasing trend which started in 
2004 when 30.8% of the unemployed were living at risk of poverty (El. Stat. 2012: 
37). This means that unemployment has ever since started being a very important 
factor behind poverty and social exclusion. Statistics also show that in 2009, 23.7% 
of children up to the age of 17 lived at risk of poverty (El. Stat 2010: 1). This was the 
highest figure since statistics for children in poverty become available in Greece in 
2004 (El. Stat. 2012: 35). Additionally, in 2009, 18.4% of pensioners were at risk of 
poverty compared with a much higher 28% in 2003 when this type of statistics 
became available (El. Stat. 2012: 37; 2010: 11).  
 
The 2008-2010 NSR showed that in 2007 women’s employment was 47.9% while 
men’s employment was 74.9% and thus higher than the Lisbon target of 70% (NSR 
2008-2010: 1-2). According to the same source average employment amongst 
women in the EU was 58.3% (ibid.). In contrast to the EU average, Greece’s 
                                                 
50
 http://www.poverty.org.uk/e01b/index.shtml (17.11.2011 - graph 1) 
51
 http://www.poverty.org.uk/e01b/index.shtml (17.11.2011 - graph 2) 
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employment rate for women was falling short in respect to the 60% target (by 2010) 
that had been set by the Lisbon European Council in 2000 (European Council 
2000a). The financial crisis in Greece has gravely worsened the situation on the 
domestic labour market. It has made the Lisbon strategy’s targets unrealistic to 
achieve. From 10.5% average unemployment in 2001 (El. Stat. 2001) and 14.8% in 
December 2010 (El. Stat. 2011c), the 2011 data issued by the El. Stat. showed that in 
August 2011 the total unemployment figure was 18.4% in Greece which amounted to 
a rise by 105,469 unemployed people only compared to the previous month (El. Stat. 
2011a). In May 2011 the 16.6% unemployment figure was the highest percentage of 
unemployment that was recorded since 2004 when the El. Stat. started publishing 
monthly indices about the labour force (El Stat 2011b).   
 
4.2.2 Evaluation of indices 
 
When interpreting the unemployment figures in Greece, one should take into 
consideration in particular the following two factors. First, the definitions of 
‘employed’, ‘unemployed’, and ‘financially inactive population’ by the El. Stat., 
which follows the International Labour Organisation’s (ILO) and Eurostat’s 
methodology, have been fiercely criticised by the Greek Ombudsman on the basis 
that they downplay the real level of unemployment (Greek Ombudsman 2007: 12-
13). According to the Ombudsman’s report, the definition ‘financially inactive’ can 
be considered as unclear since it excludes some categories of jobless people to be 
considered unemployed (ibid.). Thus, for a person to be considered unemployed s/he 
‘must not have worked at all during the reference week, must seek actively for a job 
and must be available to work at short notice’ (ibid: 13; El. Stat. 2011a: 4). This 
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means, for example, that if one has worked for only one hour within the reference 
week then they are not considered to be employed according to the official 
definition. If they do not satisfy any of the other conditions then they also fall into 
the category of the ‘financially inactive population’. Their inclusion in this category 
has implications for their social inclusion and protection since ‘while they remain 
actually unemployed, they cannot enjoy benefits for long-term unemployment, they 
cannot receive healthcare services etc.’ (Greek Ombudsman 2007: 14). Second, 
unemployment in Greece follows the increasing trends of unemployment in the EU 
and Eurozone as was explained in a 2011 Eurostat report (2011: 1) which stated: 
 
Eurostat estimates that 23.264 million men and women in the EU-27, of 
whom 16.198 million were in the euro area (EA-17), were unemployed in 
September 2011. Compared with August 2011, the number of persons 
unemployed increased by 174 000 in the EU-27 and by 188 000 in the euro 
area. Compared with September 2010, unemployment increased by 215 000 
in the EU-27 and by 329 000 in the euro area.  
 
In 2011, the number of unemployed reached a record high in Ireland too. For the first 
time since 1967, which is the year when official monitoring of such data began in 
Ireland, 14.4% of the labour force was unemployed (Eleftherotypia, 31.08.2011). 
The same trends were recorded in the third trimester of the year 2011 in Spain where 
4,978,300 people were unemployed (21.52%) (El Pais, 28.10.2011) In November 
2011 Reuters reported that ‘[u]nemployment in Britain hit its highest in 15 years’ 
(Reuters, 16.11.2011).  
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The additional data from Ireland, Spain and the UK illustrates that the social 
situation in many EU member states has been aggravated by the financial crisis. In 
2002 the Commission argued that the precise assessment of the impact of the OMC 
was not possible due to the improvement of the economic situation in the EU (Zeitlin 
2005b; European Commission 2002). Since the financial crises begun in 2008, the 
economic situation has worsened in EU member states. This makes the assessment of 
the social inclusion OMC in Greece a complex analytical issue.  
 
Similar to the UK, the numerical data highlights the existence of certain social 
problems in Greece. However, the data cannot offer a comparative analysis of the 
effects of the efforts that have been made since the application of the EU’s OMC 
process. An assessment of the social inclusion OMC in Greece has to be undertaken 
with the help of a qualitative research approach. The next sections assess the impact 
of the social inclusion OMC by focusing primarily on the participation of primary 
and secondary stakeholders.   
 
 
4.3 The need for an OMC assessment through participation 
 
In Greece two competing evaluations of the impact of the OMC exist. First, there is 
the official evaluation which is reflected in the NAPs. Greek government officials 
appear satisfied with the application of the OMC and with its efficiency. One 
example of such a positive evaluation constitutes a speech which was made by Mr. 
Dimitris Kontos in 2009. In his speech, the then general secretary of the Ministry of 
Employment and Social Protection stated:   
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In our country, the impact of the European strategy on social inclusion is 
apparent as much on the content of the policy as on its tools. Greece’s 
participation in this strategy contributed not only to the definition of targets 
and priorities, to the underlining of the needs of the vulnerable groups, but 
also to the institutionalisation of the targets. The mutual learning and the best 
practices of other countries were the added value, I would say, of the Open 
Method of Coordination in Greece (EPEKSA 2009) 
 
According to Mr. Kontos’ evaluation, Greece influenced the setting of the OMC’s 
objectives for the European social inclusion strategy, and it learned from practices in 
other member states. Therefore, the social inclusion OMC has been perceived 
positively by the representative from the Ministry of Employment. However, the 
evaluation of the OMC by secondary stakeholders comes to a very different 
conclusion. In fact, stakeholders interviewed for this thesis were often critical of the 
Greek government’s implementation of the OMC in social inclusion. For example, 
the Director of an organisation which focuses on social inclusion of children with 
mental illnesses, asked:  
 
Have you actually realised that the OMC is almost an unknown term in 
Greece? I hope our conversation will help me answer your questions and find 
some evidence which indicates the presence of the OMC [in Greece] 
(Interview in Athens, 20.12.2010). 
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Of course this was an exaggeration since the interviewee appeared well informed 
about the priorities of the OMC, the developments which resulted from the Lisbon 
strategy, and the reasons why the OMC was not working in Greece as well as in 
other member states (such as the UK). What the interviewee wanted to highlight 
were the obstacles that the implementation of the social inclusion OMC faced in 
Greece. The following case from the mental health reform illustrates well the 
existing obstacles.  
 
In the context of the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) and United Nations’ (UN) 
mental health year (2001), the then Minister of Health, Alekos Papadopoulos, 
admitted that ‘the EU almost forced Greece to accept 70-90 billion drachmas 
[approx. €205-265 million] from the third CSF [2000-2006] in order to reform the 
mental health and the asylum systems’.52 The focus on mental health in Greece has 
been part of an EU level effort as described in a Commission Green Paper (European 
Commission 2005c). The Green Paper also highlighted the need for relevant actors’ 
involvement (ibid: 13) and the need to target the most vulnerable, in terms of mental 
ill health (ibid: 9). Once the EU induced reform had been completed, Greece was 
expected to be able to offer high quality mental health services in line with the 
principles of the WHO. The successful reforms would be diffused as a good practice 
within the EU-27 (SOP 2007). The European Federation of National Organisations 
Working with the Homeless (Fédération Européenne des Associations Nationales 
Travaillant avec les Sans-Abri –FEANTSA), which is the EU level specialised 
network on homelessness, responded to the Commission’s Green Paper by 
underlining the ‘importance of targeting the most excluded and marginalised groups 
                                                 
52
 http://health.in.gr/news/article.asp?lngArticleID=31360, accessed on 13.04.2010  
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suffering from mental illness’ (FEANTSA 2005: 9). It regarded these developments 
as an issue which would feed into the streamlined OMC (ibid: 8)  
 
Subsequently, the budget for mental health and asylum reform became the highest 
inside the operational programme ‘Health and Protection’. It therefore was one of the 
most important projects for the Ministry of Health and Social Solidarity in the period 
2000-2008 (MHSS 2005).53 In spite of the developments at EU level and the 
importance of the mental health policy reform, the Panhellenic Socialist Party’s 
(PaSoK) MP Skoulas criticised the Nea Democratia government in November 2008 
by stating that ‘the mental health reform in Greece is at a critical point. The asylum 
reform is ready to collapse and many patients are at risk to return to asylums’ (MP 
Skoulas, official portal).54 Three months earlier, the newspaper Eleftherotypia had 
revealed that the reform was failing since there was no strategy for the future and no 
sufficient funding from the Ministry. According to this report, most of the workers 
had not received any payment for eight months and they were complaining about 
continuously worsening quality of services for people with mental health problems 
(Eleftherotypia, 10.08.2008). The Ministry in turn was blaming the administrations 
of the organisations which had been established to improve the mental health system. 
Moreover, once the EU funding had expired, the situation became even worse 
(ibid.). Eventually, Vladimir Špidla, the Commissioner for Employment, Social 
Affairs and Equal Opportunities, decided to put Greece under surveillance although 
a two years extension of EU funding was granted for the completion of the project 
                                                 
53
 It was approved from the EU in 2001: Ε(2001) 583/04.04.2001 and funded by the ERDF, the ESF 
and the responsible Greek Ministry. In fact the funding for the project was higher than that which was 
mentioned by the Minister . In detail, 25% (=€129 million) was coming from national funds, 57.22% 
(=€220 million) from the ESF, and 42.78% (=€165 million) from the ERDF (MHSS 2005: 3)  
54
 MP’s Gainnis Skoulas official portal http://www.jskoulas.gr/index.php?jsk=03&idas=1712, 
accessed on 13.04.2010 
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(MHSS 2009).55 Commenting on the shortcomings, the Director of European Anti-
Poverty Network in Greece (EAPN-Greece) stated: 
 
Greece is in danger today to be named and shamed by the EU Commission 
and will have to pay fines since a huge good practice reform ended up in 
failure. It risks the efforts for reforms of mental health systems all over the 
EU. Today, EU delegates are still coming to Greece asking what is 
happening with the reform (Interview in Athens 08.12.2009)  
 
The representative of the EAPN-Greece complained also that the delays and 
extensions mentioned above discouraged the EU from supporting future reforms. 
This resulted in the postponement of policies for young persons’ social inclusion 
which were expected to be launched after the mental health reform was completed. 
According to the interviewee, the EU, which had already allocated €22 million to 
Greece, was likely to refuse to support the mental health project and similar future 
programmes (Interview in Athens 08.12.2009).56 
 
However, it is not only the shortcomings at national level which prevented the social 
inclusion OMC from producing positive policy outcomes in Greece. The approach to 
the evaluation of the OMC’s impact in Greece is even more perplexing when taking 
into account significant changes in the social inclusion policy-making process that 
take place every time one political party succeeds another in government office. 
                                                 
55
 Ministry of Health and Social Solidarity (official web-site http://www.yyka.gov.gr/health/domes-
kai-draseis-gia-tin-ygeia/programma-psychargos/to-programma-psychargos/i-b-fasi-toy-
programmatos-psychargos-2002-2009-1, visited on the 13.04.2010) 
56
 For more information regarding the background of the mental health system in Greece, the reasons 
of failure and the mistakes the actors blame on the governments, the reader can check the official web-
site of the Panhellenic Federation Of Families For Mental Health (http://www.posopsi.org/2009/11/h-
e.html -the page is only available in Greek)  
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Since the abolition of the military regime and the restoration of parliamentary 
democracy in 1974, there have been a series of parliamentary elections resulting only 
in the two major political parties replacing each other in the government.57 As one 
interviewee put it:  
 
In the UK there is ‘the state’. In Greece there is ‘the government’. Whereas 
everyone else [in Europe] is interested in the state, we are interested in the 
government (Interview in Athens 07.12.2009a).  
 
Another interviewee complained that ‘each political party, when in office, controls 
the whole process of the NAP’ (Interview in Athens, 20.12.2010). Therefore, the 
domination of the two political parties has affected significantly the implementation 
of EU policies including the implementation of the social inclusion OMC:  
 
I think that this whole thing [i.e. the drafting of the NAPs] goes through 
political party processes. I mean that each political party that governs this 
country has its own bodies to decide on the NAPs. We do not have a state… 
we have a state made by political parties (Interview in Athens 20.12.2010). 
 
The point here is that while Greece has agreed on the objectives set by the social 
inclusion OMC, the domestic partisan politics appears to prevent the development of 
a process of setting clear targets for social exclusion. Both political parties in Greece 
(PaSoK and Nea Democratia) have been unable to establish a sound (medium to long 
term) public policy on social inclusion. By maintaining a political culture of 
                                                 
57
 The June 2012 elections resulted in a three party (Nea Dimocratia, Pasok and the Democratic Left 
Party) coalition government. 
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‘bureaucratic clientelism’ (Featherstone 2005b: 228) where political parties promote 
the interests of those groups who vote for them, the succession of the two main 
political parties in office seems to fundamentally change the priorities of Greek 
public policy.  
 
It is not only representatives from NGOs who have highlighted the impact of such 
culture of partisan politics in the social inclusion OMC in Greece. Various 
newspapers and academic articles have also highlighted the same issue as one of the 
main reasons why Greece is lagging behind in implementing the social inclusion 
OMC in general, and in adopting a sound policy to combat social exclusion in 
particular (e.g. Economist 08.03.2010; Sotiropoulos 2004; Guillén and Matsaganis 
2000). For example, Guillén and Matsaganis (2000) have shown how social 
spending in Greece has inefficiently grown due to the ‘clientelistic mediation of 
access to resources’ which resulted from the dominance of the Greek political 
system by the earlier mentioned political parties (Guillén and Matsaganis 2000: 
122). However, the above mentioned interviewee highlighted another aspect of 
partisan politics in Greece which is also responsible for the lack of positive 
developments. The example she drew was from the public health sector:   
 
In 2008 it became obvious that in the field of health and especially of sanity 
there were problems related to the funding of the project and problems 
related to the staffing of the organisations responsible for the project. At that 
time a network of all the relevant associations approached the Commissioner 
Vladimir Špidla. This indeed worked as a leverage resulting in Mr. 
Avramopoulos’s [who was the Minister of Health at the time] commitment to 
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settle the issue by September 2009. Right after that a general election was 
declared and the issue was subsequently put aside. The EAPN–Greece could 
no longer blame the government for delays since the government had 
changed (Interview in Athens 07.12.2009a).       
 
As the case of the UK has shown, the transition period between administrations of 
successive political parties is characterised by constraints in the implementation of 
policies promoted in the context of the OMC. This shows that the OMC process is 
not perceived as a European process which should be implemented regardless of the 
priorities of the political parties in office. It is rather perceived as a domestic process 
which is changing according to the political parties’ priorities. However, in the case 
of the social inclusion OMC, the blame for shortcomings in the method’s impact on 
Greek public policy should not be exclusively based on domestic factors. It is worth 
recalling that disparities between member states in the area of social inclusion seem 
to create crucial problems for coordination efforts (Lopez-Santana 2006).  
 
A paper presented in the ESPAnet conference in Oxford in 2004 argued that, from a 
Greek perspective, EU guidelines are often incompatible with Greek priorities 
(Mabbett 2004). According to Mabbett, many of the policies adopted in the Greek 
NAPs followed the Community Structural Funds’ objectives. However, these 
objectives were related to general EU concerns and did not seem to take into 
consideration domestic particularities (ibid.). During the interviews in Greece a 
respondent from the Social Work Foundation (Idrima Koinonikis Ergasias –IKE) 
which is specialised in issues of mental health described a similar situation: 
 
 218 
The EU objectives identify policies that should be implemented. But when 
someone reads the context of these priorities, how one could draw up a 
programme to combat social exclusion according to these priorities, they 
discover how ‘out of the blue’ these priorities have arrived. They do not 
touch Greek reality. There is a massive gap between the [EU] decision-
making centres and the necessities at the local level (Interview in Athens 
20.12.2010).   
 
Therefore, the impact of the OMC in terms of dealing with problems that are faced 
by those who are targeted by its policies is also hindered because of the lack of 
alignment between Greek necessities and general European concerns. On the one 
hand, this argument challenges Mr Kontos’s optimism regarding the importance of 
the participation of Greece in the setting of the Lisbon strategy guidelines. 
Interviewees from the IKE foundation and the Klimaka organisation have argued 
that these objectives are irrelevant for the Greek case since they do not ‘touch the 
Greek reality’. On the other hand, the presentation of issue of the EU objectives has 
three additional implications as far as the analytical framework put forward in the 
present thesis is concerned. First, incompatibility between EU objectives and Greek 
necessities questions Trubek and Mosher’s (2003) argument according to which the 
OMC’s objectives provide a framework for policy learning. As said in chapter 1 
(section 1.2.5) Trubek and Mosher argue that objectives and other features of the 
OMC (i.e. benchmarking) challenge domestic actors’ understandings. However, for 
the involved Greek secondary stakeholders, the objectives do not provide a 
framework for learning. The objectives promoted a political discourse which was 
inapplicable in Greece. Therefore, Greek stakeholders argued that there were no 
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lessons to be drawn from the objectives since the latter were designed to help solving 
problems of advanced member states. 
 
The last remark leads to the second implication of the irrelevance between the 
domestic necessities and OMC objectives. The case of the environmental policy has 
shown that leader states (i.e. the Northern European states) set the priorities at EU 
level making it difficult for less advanced states to follow (Börzel 2002). The 
representative from Klimaka, a Greek organisation specialised in issues of 
homelessness, explained how difficult it was for Greece to follow priorities which 
have been set by other EU countries (i.e. Sweden and Portugal). According to this 
interview, Sweden proposed a platform for counting homeless in every member state 
at a time when Greece had not yet defined homelessness (Interview in Athens 
07.12.2009a). As will be shown later in this chapter, another interviewee compared 
Greece and Sweden in terms of involving primary stakeholders in the decision-
making process to argue that meeting the OMC’s objective for participation is a hard 
task for Greece. These cases indicate that the Europeanisation of the social inclusion 
policy is not facilitated by learning. Section 1.1.5 of chapter 1 has shown how 
learning can empower domestic actors and redefine their interests. In effect, through 
a process of learning, actors are expected to respond positively to the pressures for 
domestic adaptation to EU policies. However, in the case of Greece, neither a 
learning process was apparent nor did domestic actors’ interests appear to be 
redefined. Additionally, according to the analytical framework (chapter 1 sections 
1.1.5 and 1.2) learning has not only been expected to redefine interests and empower 
domestic actors but also to provide the framework for socialisation of participants 
under EU norms, objectives, ideas etc. In the context of the application of the social 
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inclusion OMC in Greece where no learning process emerged, the socialisation 
process of the domestic actors under common EU objectives did not emerge either.   
 
Thirdly, a study on Greece regarding the impact of EU efforts for pension systems’ 
coordination found that the European ‘stimuli’ for reform are ‘too weak’ 
(Featherstone 2005a: 734). Featherstone also argued in such cases where ‘the EU 
stimuli are in fact limited in their nature … entrenched institutional obstacles in 
domestic systems can readily thwart their potency’ (ibid.). In the case of the OMC, it 
has been argued that one of the method’s weaknesses is the broadness of its 
guidelines (PPMI 2011). Broadness of guidelines is an implication of the fact that 
these guidelines resulted from different political discourses all over the EU (ibid.). 
As will be shown below, interviewees in Greece complained about the ‘softness’ of 
the social inclusion OMC due to which the method was unable to bring about the 
desired change.  
 
In fact, the issue of the lack of alignment between Greek and European objectives 
does not concern only the official EU guidelines and the necessities of Greek public 
policy. But a similar lack of alignment also seems to exist between the EU level 
voluntary organisations and domestic Greek associations which belong to them. For 
example, the FEANTSA supported with seminars and conferences the Commission’s 
efforts about ‘How to improve the information base on homelessness on a regional, 
national and European level’ (European Commission 2008b). This support on behalf 
of the FEANTSA included the development of a method of numerical representation 
of the issue of homelessness (Interview in Athens, 07.12.2009a). Yet, as the 
representative of a Greek organisation, which is a member of the FEANTSA 
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admitted, that goal was too ambitious since ‘Greece has not yet adopted a definition 
of homelessness’ (ibid.). 
 
These statements by stakeholders question the OMC’s potential to have a positive 
impact on the Greek policy-making process. It is very difficult to decide whether 
even developments which have been made in the area of social inclusion and which 
are related to the social inclusion OMC should be ascribed to EU initiatives on 
tackling social exclusion. The example of the issue of homelessness illustrates the 
complexity of this issue. Before the year 2000, ‘little systematic research’ had been 
carried out in the field of homelessness in Greece (Sapounakis 2001: 12). Public 
opinion was not seeing homelessness as ‘a serious cause for concern’; therefore, the 
problem was perceived as non-existing (ibid: 4). Officials were arguing that the 
percentage of house ownership was so high as to exclude phenomena of housing 
deprivation (ibid: 4, 16; Interview in Athens 08.12.2009). According to the Director 
of the EAPN-Greece, it was only in 2000 when the lack of numerical data on the 
homeless started being considered (Interview in Athens 08.12.2009). In that year, a 
single researcher – Dr Sapounakis, who was supported by the FEANTSA and Greek 
NGOs – carried out quantitative research on homelessness (Interview in Athens 
08.12.2009). Around the same period a shift in attitudes occurred amongst the public 
and government officials who started to acknowledge the existence of deprived 
social groups (Sapounakis 2001). However, it is unclear whether it was EU level 
developments that brought about the ‘sensitisation of government officials and the 
general public’ and triggered the Greek research on homelessness (ibid: 4). On the 
one hand, the research was part of an EU initiative which was undertaken by the 
European Observatory on Homelessness that is run by the FEANTSA with the 
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support of the European Commission (Eurostat 2004: 15). Eurostat used Sapounakis’ 
survey in its report on homelessness in 2004. In this report Eurostat related the EU-
wide research to the Lisbon strategy by stating:  
 
[S]ince 2000 the struggle to improve social cohesion has moved higher up 
the European political agenda, and homelessness is now recognised as a 
subject of specific interest (ibid: 4).  
 
According to Eurostat, the EU Commission and the Lisbon strategy can be seen as 
the driving forces behind pushing the issue of homelessness onto the political agenda 
in Greece. However, Dr Sapounakis argued that the Greek government’s focus on 
homelessness emerged when the ‘influx of large numbers of immigrants’ became 
more evident in Greece (Sapounakis 2001: 4). The director of EAPN-Greece who 
was interviewed for this thesis initially ignored the EU level developments and 
thought that the Greek government started to show an interest in the issue of 
homelessness because Greece was preparing for the Olympic Games in 2004. For 
her Greece had to satisfy certain Human Rights preconditions (Interview in Athens 
08.12.2009). In 1999-2000 Greece was also preparing to apply for the 3rd ERDF. It 
was therefore obliged to present certain targets for its social policy. Due to these 
conflicting arguments, it is still unclear whether it was the EU stimuli behind the 
official recognition of the ‘ultimate level of social deprivation’ (ibid.). What is more 
interesting though, is that the official recognition has not triggered any further 
action. In 2008, the Kathimerini (04.12.2008) newspaper reported that,  
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homeless people have not yet been institutionally recognised as a group that 
needs social protection. Instead of the state, the charities, the NGOs, the city 
councils and the church are basically responsible for their relief. 
 
Since the financial crisis started in 2008, the problem has become even worse. 
Especially since 2009, the number of homeless people in Greece has risen by 25% 
which amounts to an increase of more than 20,000 people (Klimaka 2011). This 
increase affects now ‘populations which used to live with satisfactory standards of 
living, average to higher education, and were led to homelessness as a result of 
unemployment and/or low incomes’ (ibid: 2). Despite the fact that a substantive impact 
on homelessness is a core priority of the social inclusion OMC (e.g. European 
Commission 2010), any official reaction to the problem appears to be inexistent.   
 
Under these circumstances, the precise impact of the OMC on the Greek policy-
making process appears difficult to evaluate. The structural impediments, together 
with the softness of the social inclusion OMC, and the lack of alignment between 
European concerns and Greek public policy needs make it difficult to assess whether 
it was the European framework, or other domestic factors which triggered the above 
mentioned changes in Greek efforts to tackle social exclusion.  
 
The next section of chapter 4 intends to assess the OMC through a different 
analytical prism when focusing on its procedural impact in particular on the 
mobilisation of secondary and primary stakeholders. This will allow for the 
assessment of the impact of the social inclusion OMC on possible shifts in loyalties, 
expectations and political activities of the participants.    
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4.4 Participation of primary and secondary stakeholders  
 
4.4.1 Participation in the domestic social inclusion policy-making process 
 
In Greece, the EAPN-Greece is the main third sector network which is active in the 
field of social inclusion. The members of the EAPN-Greece are NGOs and 
associations which are primarily focused on issues of social exclusion. They 
represent various groups with disadvantages, including people with disabilities, lone 
parent families, the unemployed, abused people, young persons, the homeless, ethnic 
minorities, etc (EAPN-Greece web portal)58. In Greece there are also NGOs focused 
on social inclusion which are not members of the EAPN-Greece as, for example, 
Klimaka which is an organisation active in the field of mental health and 
homelessness. The Greek National Strategy Report (NSR)59 for 2008-2010 
mentioned that ‘24 civil society institutions participated in the ESDEN [NAP in 
social inclusion] preparation procedure’ (NSR Greece 2008-2010: 48). However, 
among civil society institutions it included the social partners while it did not provide 
a list of the anti-poverty associations. The empirical fieldwork for this thesis and the 
Greek Programme on the 2010 European year for combating poverty and social 
exclusion offered more information about the involved stakeholders in the social 
inclusion OMC process (National Programme Greece 2010). Table 4 provides a full 
list of anti-poverty NGOs and networks which have been consulted by the 
government for the purposes of the social inclusion OMC. 
 
                                                 
58
 http://www.antipoverty.gr/members, accessed on 10.10.2010 
59
 The documents which replaced the NAPs after the streamlining of the OMC in 2005 (see chapter 1) 
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Table 4: Greek anti-poverty NGOs and networks mobilised in the social inclusion 
OMC policy-making process. 
 
 
Networks 
 
• European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN-Greece) 
• Hellenic Forum for Migrants 
• National Federation for People with Disabilities (ESAMEA) 
• Network for Social Support for Refugees and Migrants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organisations 
 
• 50 plus Hellas  
• Arsis  
• Centre of Care for the Family and the Child 
• Centre of Research and Action for Peace  
• Centre of Research and Support for Victims of Abuse and Social 
Exclusion  
• Church of Greece  
• Greek Institute for Growth and Cooperation  
• Greek Red Cross  
• Human Rights Defence Centre  
• IKE  
• Institute for Immigration Policy 
• International Organisation for Migration 
• Klimaka  
• National Council for Greek Women  
• PRAXIS  
• The Smile of the Child  
Source: National Programme Greece 2010 and interviews with NGOs and networks in Greece 
 
As table 4 shows, the organisation Klimaka is also mobilised in the OMC process in 
social inclusion. It is a member of the umbrella organisation FEANTSA which 
regards very positively the OMC on social inclusion as can be seen from the 
following statement:   
 
The Social Inclusion OMC is truly an open method of coordination since the 
European Commission and national ministries work with civil society 
organisations such as networks of service providers (like FEANTSA), service 
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users, regional authorities, local authorities, and trade unions (FEANTSA 
2005b: 1). 
 
In contrast to the above cited assessment of FEANTSA, Klimaka does not hold the 
same optimistic view on the opportunities for participation in the domestic policy-
making process through the OMC. In fact, representatives from Klimaka argued that 
the theoretical premises for participation (see chapter 1) had little impact on the 
Greek policy-making process in the first years after the application of the social 
inclusion OMC in Greece. This happened mainly because although the OMC and its 
core objectives provided the framework for participation of primary and secondary 
stakeholders, Greek officials interpreted the provisions for participation of all 
relevant stakeholders restrictively. A representative from Klimaka argued that from 
2001 to 2003 the Greek government misinterpreted the provisions for wide 
participation. As the interviewee put it:  
 
The Lisbon strategy’s reference to relevant bodies such as civil society and 
NGOs [i.e. point 38 of the Presidency conclusions] can be considered as a 
provision with a broad meaning. The NGOs can potentially participate. 
However, when one refers to relevant social stakeholders, you know, it is 
such a wide term that the government can interpret it in many ways. The 
ministry can say: ‘we include the social partners and they are the only 
relevant stakeholders on the issue since they are institutionalised’ (Interview 
in Athens 07.12.2009a).  
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In fact, in many cases social partners have indeed been the only stakeholders 
who participate in the social inclusion policy-making process. As the 
representative from the IKE foundation stated during an interview, 
 
In many cases it [consultation] takes place between the government and the 
social partners. If you have a right-wing government you have polarisation 
and if you have the socialists you have agreement and convergence. This, at 
the end of the day, is not beneficial for any citizen or organisation. It is a 
closed circuit which excludes anyone else (Interview in Athens 20.12.2010).  
 
Various issues are mentioned in this statement. First, regardless of who is in power, 
both political parties appeared to downplay the importance of primary and secondary 
stakeholders’ participation in the consultation process. Instead governments included 
primarily the social partners. The two dominant political parties (i.e. PaSok and Nea 
Democratia) have been accused of promoting corporatism. For example, according 
to Sotiropoulos (1995: 2), the Greek policy-making process is one in which ‘the 
relations between the central Greek state and civil society are shaped by state 
corporatism’. Anti-poverty NGOs and networks criticised the fact that Greek 
governments often consulted only the social partners within the social inclusion 
OMC. The latter were pushing their own issues onto the NAPs while the issues 
which the secondary stakeholders in the social inclusion OMC process considered 
important were not part of the input of the civil society to the same NAPs.  
 
However, even when the social partners were invited for consultation, the consensus 
was difficult ‘to manage in a climate of antagonism and mistrust’ (Featherstone 
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2008: 7). The consensus was also dependent on the political party in office. The 
PaSoK, which since the beginning of the 1980s developed a somewhat ambiguous 
relationship with the trade unions, appeared to have been more capable of reaching 
the desired consensus when in office. Second, the fact that the main political parties 
were able to downplay the importance of consultation with NGOs reflects the 
perceived weakness of the OMC’s provisions for participation by secondary 
stakeholders. As shown above, secondary stakeholders perceived the OMC as too 
soft an instrument to provide the necessary procedural impact (Interview in Athens 
20.01.2010).  
 
Greek NGOs and networks (e.g. Klimaka, Arsis, EAPN-Greece) have also criticised 
the social dialogue between the government and social partners in the preparation of 
the NAPs on the grounds that social partners are less relevant to the field of social 
inclusion. Independent researchers have argued that social partners’ stances towards 
social inclusion policies are inescapably related to the supply and demand of 
employment when engaged in the social dialogue (Arapoglou and Petalas 2004). 
According to Arapoglou and Petalas’ (2004: 71) study on stakeholder participation 
in the Greek strategy against social exclusion, the General Confederation of Greek 
Workers (Geniki Synomospondia Ergaton Elladas –GSEE) has in the past 
propagated the concept of ‘employability’ while emphasising ‘the importance of 
knowledge as the leverage which leads to access in the labour market’. 
Simultaneously, the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises (Sillogos Ellinon Viomihanon 
–SEB) has for the same reason prioritised issues such as the need for flexibility and 
lifelong learning by the workforce (ibid: 71, 72). The GSEE has also been criticised 
of adopting a neo-liberal attitude which approaches poverty as an issue which entails 
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personal responsibility (ibid.). The SEB holds that deprivation should be tackled 
with cost-effective approaches. One of the core positions of the SEB is that ‘social 
exclusion creates moral hazards and large cost for society’ and that the combating of 
social exclusion must be achieved through strategic plans for growth, employment, 
employability, social protection and development of skills (SEB 2003: 1). As 
Arapoglou and Petalas (2004: 79) have concluded after interviews with SEB 
representatives, the consideration of the (financial and political) cost is directly 
influencing the planning of policies to support vulnerable groups who are socially 
excluded.  
 
The focus on employment and cost-effectiveness to tackle poverty as well as the lack 
of representation of stakeholders in efforts to reduce social exclusion are considered 
as inefficient as chapter 2 has shown. However, it is worth mentioning that in the 
field of employment, where social partners’ participation in the social dialogue is 
supported with treaty provisions (de la Porte and Pochet 2005), even the social 
partners appear unsatisfied with governments’ attitudes towards their involvement. 
For example, commenting on the 2003 NAP on employment, which was the fifth in 
Greece since the European Employment Strategy (EES) was launched, a member of 
the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 
(Eurofund) noted that  
 
[t]he process of designing the 2003 NAP is not seen by the social partners as 
satisfactory, due to a perceived lack of meaningful collaboration and 
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involvement of the partners at the national and particularly the regional level 
(Kretsos 2003: Eurofund official web portal60) 
 
In any case, the first NAP (2001-2003) was an amendment of the strategic plans 
which were compiled in order to justify the allocation of the ERDF without any 
participation of NGOs in its preparation (Interview in Athens 08.12.2009). As in the 
case of the first NAP in the UK, the short time period and the lack of experience in 
drafting such documents made it easier to turn the European Regional Development 
Fund (ERDF) documents into NAPs. 
 
Thus, for reasons of limited participation of new stakeholders in the first NAP 
process in member states such as Greece, the objectives set by the Council of the EU 
for the second round of NAPs on social inclusion (i.e. 2003-2005 NAP) referred 
more explicitly to the need to include NGOs along with social partners (Council of 
the EU 2002: 13). Additionally, the Commission had already taken action in order to 
correct such shortcomings by naming and shaming Greece when it lagged behind in 
terms of participation (de la Porte and Nanz 2004). This pressure from the EU level 
seemed initially to change the Greek government’s attitudes towards participation of 
stakeholders in the policy-making process. In the context of the preparations for the 
second round of NAPs across the EU, Greece officially established the National 
Committee for Social Protection (NCSP) in 2003 through a ministerial act (Act 
3144/2003). The members of this Committee were senior government officials61, the 
social partners, local and regional officials and representatives from NGOs. The 
                                                 
60
 EU Official Portal, Eurofund (2003), ‘Thematic Feature: Social Partner Involvement in the 2003 
NAP’, EIROnline. http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2003/10/tfeature/gr0310103t.htm, accessed 
on 28.11.2011. 
61
 The Minister for Employment and the General Secretaries from the Departments of Health, 
Economy and Financial Affairs, Home Affairs and Education, among others.  
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purpose behind the establishment of such a Committee was identical with the 
common objectives set by the Council of the EU for the second round of NAPs 
(Council of the EU 2002). According to the Greek government:  
 
The purpose of the Committee is the promotion of Social Dialogue in favour 
of the combating of poverty and social exclusion, the development of a 
Network for the Social Protection and Social Inclusion and the consultation 
for the planning, monitoring and evaluation of the National Action Plan on 
Social Inclusion (Hellenic Government Gazette 2003: 1696). 
 
The Greek NAP 2003-2005 claimed that the Committee would be used as the main 
lever to mobilise the relevant actors which, according to the document, were the 
local actors and civil society (NAP Greece 2003-2005: 47). However, the next NAP 
admitted that the NCSP had not been adequately used by the state, sub-state and civil 
society actors (NAP Greece 2005-2006). Finally, the following NSR (2006-2008) 
argued that the government consulted the stakeholders (i.e. social partners and 
NGOs) before deciding on the social inclusion policies. However, while the 
government was referring to a process of consultation during the agenda-setting 
stage of the NSR, the NSR stressed again the need for better use of the Committee 
for an ‘extensive dialogue’ between the government and the stakeholders (NSR 
Greece 2006-2008: 43). According to the same document, problems in cooperation 
and coordination among actors were expected to be gradually solved with the better 
use of the NCSP.  
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However, both stakeholders and independent experts argued that even when 
organisations were invited to participate their participation was weaker than often 
claimed in official documents. Despite the increasingly positive official assessments 
(through the NAPs/NSRs) of the role of the NCSP in mobilising secondary 
stakeholders in the consultation process, an independent experts’ evaluation of the 
social inclusion strategy noted that the process ‘was hardly open to participation by 
NGOs, Local Authorities and social services providers, preventing, thus, a thorough 
discussion on the issues at stake (Ziomas et al. 2007: 13). In this independent 
assessment of the official Greek response to the challenges identified at the EU level 
(2007 Greek Implementation Report), Ziomas and colleagues (2007:13) argued that,  
 
bureaucracy and closed procedures remain still dominant in Greece, 
restricting, thus, any flexibility for adopting new ways of policy decision-
making, which, among other things, would facilitate the participation of 
various stakeholders including, in particular civil society organisations. Thus, 
involvement of civil society organisations in the design, implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation of the measures related to social inclusion remains 
very minimal, being mainly confined to the implementation phase… (Ziomas 
et al. 2007:13).    
 
In other words, the independent experts noticed that the application of the EU-led 
process to combat social exclusion in Greece did not meet with a favourable 
environment. Thus, the framework that the OMC theoretically offered for policy 
change in terms of substantive participation did not function effectively in practice. 
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Contrary to independent experts’ evaluations, the 2008-2010 Greek NSR mentioned 
that the NCSP had eventually been activated in involving stakeholders. The report 
stated:  
 
The Greek state encourages more active involvement of these NGOs in the 
implementation of social inclusion policies, recognizes their importance and 
contribution, and promotes the participation of NGO representatives in 
drawing up and assessing said policies (NSR Greece 2008-2010: 49 –
emphasis added). 
 
The official statement paints the picture of a process of participation which 
constituted of the consultation of stakeholders in the agenda-setting and monitoring 
of the social inclusion OMC policy-making process in Greece. However, interviews 
with NGOs’ representatives reflected a much less optimistic stance towards the 
contribution which the OMC was able to make in Greece in terms of stakeholder 
participation. These interviews showed that participation in Greece did not 
sufficiently follow the social inclusion OMC’s objectives for participation of 
relevant stakeholders. While referring to the period of the agenda-setting of the 
2008-2010 Greek NAP on social inclusion, the Director of the EAPN-Greece 
criticised the Minister of Employment and Social Protection, Mrs Fani-Palli Petralia, 
who was also a member of the National Committee for Social Protection, for 
handing out for consultation ‘unacceptable texts’ (Interview in Athens 08.12.2009). 
In the interviewee’s own words, 
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If you could see the texts you would not believe their poor quality. We 
complained that in addition to the lack of proposals and credentials for 
developments there was no reference to the participation of the various 
actors. Our complaints were recorded in the meeting’s minutes. The Minister 
thanked us for our comments and the issue was put aside (ibid.). 
 
The above statement shows that in Greece there was no compliance with the Lisbon 
Treaty’s provisions for regular, open, and transparent dialogue. The same 
interviewee complained that the network was not aware of the final draft of the NSR 
2008-2010 before it was published by the EU Commission (Interview in Athens 
08.12.2009). In fact, the EAPN-Greece felt that its views were not taken into 
consideration by the officials (e.g. the Minister for Employment) in the Committee. 
In another meeting, which took place around the same time, the same minister 
invited the social partners to discuss the actions that the government would take in 
the context of the financial crisis. The SEB ignored this invitation while the GSEE 
withdrew from the meeting stating that its members will not attend any future 
Committee meeting. Like the EAPN-Greece, the GSEE blamed the government for 
not using the Committee for consultation but only as a forum in which it could 
announce its decisions to the social actors (Express 13.05.2009).  
 
In the same time period, the participation of NGOs in NAP consultation sessions on 
homelessness was limited to a one-off meeting between four NGOs and the 
government (Interview in Athens 17.12.2009a). A participant in this meeting 
acknowledged that this type of consultation took place due to the OMC and its 
requirements to draft NAPs with an input from stakeholders (ibid.). However, the 
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interviewee expressed the view that this was primarily an attempt to meet only 
formally the OMC’s objectives for dialogue with NGOs. There was never an official 
evaluation of whether the proposals made during the consultation were taken into 
consideration by those who eventually drafted the NAPs (ibid.). Other secondary 
stakeholders argued that they had been mobilised in the context of the OMC’s 
provisions for participation but only for ‘irregular and sketchy consultation’ 
(Interview in Athens 08.12.2009). Accordingly, in one case the Ministry for 
Employment only sent a questionnaire to every relevant NGO asking them to fill it 
with answers/proposals for a strategy towards the combating of homelessness (ibid.).  
 
The lack of proper consultation and participation was reported in the relevant NSR 
(2008-2010) with the words ‘24 civil society institutions participated in the ESDEN 
[NAP in social inclusion] preparation procedure’ (NSR Greece 2008-2010: 48). As 
the above cited interviewee pointed out, a response to a questionnaire did not amount 
to extensive in-depth deliberations as communicated by the government to the EU 
(Interview in Athens 08.12.2009). As other participants argued ‘a one-off meeting is 
far from being considered as working together with policy-makers’ (Interview in 
Athens 07.12.2009a).  
 
As with the impact of the social inclusion OMC in Greece so with the Greek 
response to the method’s provisions for participation, officials and secondary 
stakeholders hold different opinions. The official evaluations regarding participation 
of secondary stakeholders in the social inclusion OMC are rather positive. Contrary 
to these evaluations some secondary stakeholders appear less satisfied with the 
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domestic response to the OMC provisions for participation. As the representative 
from the IKE has argued –although initially with some exaggeration: 
 
I do not think that a window has opened for participation. While there are 
provisions for social dialogue in the OMC, the government has only 
borrowed the term ‘consultation’ and uses it in the official documents. This 
consultation is often a one or two days consultation and it can take place 
online (Interview in Athens 20.12.2010).  
 
Consequently, despite the EU efforts for wide participation, NGOs in Greece stated 
that they encountered particular difficulties in their effort to participate satisfactorily 
in the policy-making process. It is not only that Greek governments often excluded 
secondary stakeholders even from participating in the stage of agenda-setting as has 
been seen above. It is also that secondary stakeholders’ provision of services to 
socially excluded people did not seem to be properly acknowledged by Greek 
officials. The representative from IKE confirmed this in an interview when stating: 
 
Our organisation works for many years now on assisting technology. 
Through teleconferences [known as ‘telecast programme’] the support for 
children with mental paralysis services that we provide in our offices in 
Athens can be provided by us also to children and their families in remote 
areas. Thus, the families do not need to migrate losing the social network that 
they belong to … In 2010 our NGO was unique in this area, officially 
certified for the usage of this technology. We are still waiting for the ministry 
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[of Health] to call us and ask: ‘What are you guys doing there? Do you get 
results? Can I make this a national policy?’ (Interview in Athens 20.12.2010)   
 
Therefore, a form of partnership between the government and secondary 
stakeholders, which could have facilitated wider participation and which was missing 
before the OMC, was not developed during the application of the method either. In 
this case, wider participation refers not only to a higher number of secondary 
stakeholders but also to participation in more stages of the NAP process. NGOs like 
the IKE are service providers and the projects that they undertake to tackle social 
exclusion could contribute in the stage of implementation of the NAPs/NSRs. 
However, as the Director of the EAPN-Greece stated in an interview, anti-poverty 
NGOs were not participating in the implementation stage. Instead, she gave an 
example according to which the Church of Greece was granted €2million to promote 
the employability of the socially excluded which is one of the main objectives of the 
social inclusion OMC (Interview in Athens 08.12.2009; for the OMC objectives see 
chapter 1).   
 
According to NGOs, the limited participation in the OMC process was also due to 
the lack of commitment by civil servants who had the duty to evaluate different 
stakeholder proposals for the social inclusion strategy. One team responsible for the 
evaluation of proposals has been the Central Register of Evaluators (CRE) which 
states on its web site62:  
 
                                                 
62
 http://www.esfhellas.gr/english/categoryDetails.aspx?iden=45, accessed on 29.01.2011 
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Evaluators on the register are invited to evaluate projects by agencies to 
develop the country’s human resources. Such projects include training 
programmes, employment actions, programmes for the social inclusion of 
vulnerable groups and so on, submitted for approval and finance from the 
European Social Fund and the Greek state.  
 
The same source also states that people who are eligible to work in the CRE hold an 
academic degree and have at least three years of professional experience in the 
private or public sector. However, the civil servants who evaluate NGOs’ proposals 
through the CRE are criticised by the secondary stakeholders for their lack of 
knowledge and commitment in the field of social inclusion. According to this 
criticism, the eligibility criteria refer to ‘anyone who has been awarded a PhD…’ 
which means that these civil servants ‘do not necessarily constitute front line staff; 
they are simple technocrats’ (Interview in Athens 20.12.2010). As it will be further 
discussed in the comparative chapter (i.e. chapter 5), this is additional empirical 
evidence for the fact that the necessary commitment for participation of organisations 
and networks, which is evident in the UK, is missing in Greece.  
 
Until now the failure of the governments to acknowledge the importance of NGOs, 
the input of social partners’ opinions in the policy-making process, and the lack of 
commitment to social inclusion issues on behalf of the senior officers, have restricted 
the participation of the secondary stakeholders in the Greek policy-making process. 
At the same time, the lack of funding can be seen as an extra obstacle to the 
implementation of the participatory provisions of the social inclusion OMC. As the 
Director of the EAPN-Greece stated in an interview in Athens (08.12.2009): 
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Before 2000, the EU level networks (e.g. EAPN-EU, FEANTSA) were 
receiving money from the EU Commission in order to support the 
central/umbrella organisations and their member organisations in the member 
states. We as EAPN-Greece were using this money to fund our fixed costs 
and out activities in the field of social inclusion. Our own work was 
volunteering. After 2000, this type of EU funding stopped and organisations 
started to receive money through the European Social Fund only if they were 
involved in projects. 
 
The last remark implies that only those involved in the implementation of the NAPs 
NGOs are eligible to receive funding. However, as shown earlier, the same 
interviewee complained that the EAPN-Greece was not accredited by the 
government to participate in the implementation of the NAPs. Therefore it was not 
undertaking projects and, as a consequence, it was not receiving money. However, 
another problem in Greece has always been the ‘absorption rate’ for the EU funding 
(i.e. Greece’s capability to use available EU funds), in this case, the ESF 
(Kathimerini 24.05.2011). The problem of the NGOs’ funding has not been 
addressed satisfactorily at all despite the application of the OMC into Greek public 
policy. The adequate funding of anti-poverty NGOs and networks has been restricted 
by the inefficiency of domestic public policy. According to one stakeholder ‘Greece 
has many laws, some of which are very good; yet, these laws are not applied. The 
Greek government has the responsibility to fund 33% of the annual cost of the 
certified organisations’ (Interview in Athens 20.12.2010). This statement has been 
confirmed by the NAP 2005-2006, which expected that obstacles to the participation 
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of all relevant actors (among which the NGOs) would be gradually solved with the 
use of the National Committee for Social Protection (as shown above), and with 
actions such as the certification of the NGOs. This certification was expected to 
provide ‘a platform for development of the third sector according to the successful 
paradigms of other European countries’ (Greek NAP 2005-2006: 35). According to 
this NAP, the certification of the organisations would mean allocation of funding, 
which would help to improve the services that these organisations provide to socially 
excluded people. However, the certification of organisations was continuously 
postponed. Eventually some organisations were indeed certified in 2005. However, 
by the end of 2010, their funding had still not been granted (Interview in Athens 
20.12.2010).  
 
One positive impact of the implementation of the OMC within the British social 
inclusion process was the emerging cooperation between different government 
departments (Armstrong 2006). This cooperation emerged also in the Greek case. 
While the DESC had the responsibility for the issuing of the NAPs/NSRs on social 
inclusion, in practice there was a cross-departmental team of civil servants which 
was responsible for the drafting of those documents. Thus, Greek official documents 
have claimed that better ministerial coordination has taken place on issues of social 
inclusion. In the government’s own words, 
 
In the framework of efforts for better coordination, there are now designated 
working parties in three of the main Ministries [Economy and Finance, 
Employment and Social Protection, Health and Social Welfare] involved in 
the implementation of actions for the National Strategy Report, while 
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representatives from the competent Ministries participate in the coordination 
team for compilation of the report (NSR 2008-2010: 8). 
 
However, instead of being seen as positive, this ministerial cooperation has often 
been regarded as an extra obstacle for NGOs’ participation in the social inclusion 
policy-making process. As one NGO representative pointed out:  
 
Another thing in Greece is that you do not know to whom you should speak 
with. Social exclusion and poverty agendas are scattered among three or four 
departments: health, employment, economy, and education (Interview in 
Athens 08.12.2009). 
 
Independent experts who have evaluated the application of the OMC across the EU 
have appreciated the method ‘puts on horizontal links’ while they think that the 
OMC ‘helped to initiate some interaction [among Departments] which was not 
present before’ (e.g. PPMI 2011: 129). However, in Greece this development was 
seen by the NGOs as negative because it further complicated their efforts to lobby 
the administration for their inclusion in the consultation, monitoring and evaluation 
of the national action on social inclusion.  
 
Considering the importance of the social inclusion OMC for the Greek government it 
is surprising that the Greek official Implementation Reports which report the Greek 
strategy towards the Lisbon objectives to the EU do not refer to the OMC. In their 
evaluation of the Implementation Report of 2007, independent experts concluded 
that ‘no links are evident in the Implementation Report in relation to the E.U. Social 
 242 
Protection and Social Inclusion Process, while no reference is made to the OMC 
process…’ (Ziomas et al. 2007: 4). However, despite this criticism and despite the 
NGOs’ complaints about the Greek government’s unwillingness to promote their 
participation and to acknowledge their role, official documents appear satisfied with 
the participation of the secondary stakeholders (as, for example, the above cited 
words of the NSR Greece 2008-2010 showed). Nevertheless, even the NSR Greece 
2008-2010 report did not make adequate references to the OMC according to 
stakeholders interviewed for this thesis (Interviews in Athens 07.12.2009a and 
08.12.2009). In fact, the above cited NSR claimed that it was based on ‘three 
strategic directions’ (i.e. social inclusion, pensions, health and long term care) which 
were expected to ‘decisively contribute to fulfilment of the three main goals set by 
OMC on social protection and social exclusion (sic)’ (Greece NSR 2008-2010: 6). 
Throughout the second part, which was titled ‘National Action Plan on Social 
Inclusion’, there was no reference to the OMC at all.  
 
Despite serious shortcomings in the engagement of the Greek stakeholders in the 
social inclusion OMC, some secondary stakeholders compared positively the 
existing involvement with the situation in the early years of the application of the 
OMC or the pre-OMC years. Because of the NGOs’ almost total absence from the 
Greek policy-making process before the Lisbon strategy, the years of the application 
of the OMC have been seen as an improvement in terms of the mobilisation of 
actors. Another interviewee from the EAPN-Greece argued that civil servants had 
shown signs of increasing engagement in consultation meetings with organisations 
and networks (Interview in Athens, 01.12.2011). The respondent referred to the call 
for proposals for projects which aimed at social inclusion in the context of the 
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PROGRESS programme. A limited participation of secondary stakeholders had been 
created which would not have happened without the OMC (ibid.). However, the 
participation never reached the point at which it was considered satisfactory by anti-
poverty NGOs and networks. Even when the organisations had indeed been 
mobilised, the result was a consultation which failed to influence the policy agenda: 
‘NGOs will be invited to be heard but, in fact, they will not be heard. Policies will be 
planned independently of what the NGOs will say’ (ibid.).  
 
The previous interviewee who positively commented on the increasing engagement 
between senior officials and representatives from associations also acknowledged 
that there were additional obstacles which prevented this mobilisation of secondary 
stakeholders to be reflected in the policy output:   
 
These civil servants, who are on a daily basis dealing with issues of poverty 
and social exclusion, hold the same opinions as us; yet, the final decision 
regarding which policies will be implemented and how, is being taken at a 
higher level, remote from the civil servants and from us (Interview in Athens 
01.12.2011).    
 
There is clearly a difference between the views of the administration and the political 
leadership on issues such as stakeholder consultation. As was mentioned by a 
representative from the EAPN-Greece: 
 
The discussion on the EU objectives in Greece has been limited to a group of 
administrators. The whole work is being done at that level. Sometimes anti-
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poverty networks and organisations are consulted. The administrators can say 
‘Yes! What you are saying is nice but the decision will be taken by 
somebody else’ (Interview in Athens 08.12.2009). 
 
Once again it was not only the secondary stakeholders who commented on such 
shortcomings but also academics and independent experts. Featherstone (2005b: 
229) has noted that the political leadership in Greece is made up by Ministers and 
their personal advisers who are cut-off from the civil society and other groups input 
which could provide the necessary ‘technocratic legitimation’. A study on 
stakeholder participation in the social OMC by Delistathis and colleagues (2009: 1) 
found: 
 
The administration is involved in the preparation of the National Strategy 
Report, takes part in committees and working groups and provides the 
necessary input, but it is not part of the decision making process and it is not 
clear if and how its views influence the final decisions.    
 
These last citations, which refer to the gap between the administration and the 
political leadership do not only illustrate the shortcomings in the Greek policy-
making process but also confirm that the involvement of secondary stakeholders in 
the agenda-setting stage is not eventually reflected in the NAPs/NSRs. Additionally, 
the lack of the NGOs’ input into the NAPs was further aggravated by the absence of 
any process of monitoring and evaluation of the NAPs. In fact, the monitoring of the 
NAPs/NSRs has been seen as of secondary importance by the Greek government. 
The NSR 2008-2010 acknowledged ‘the absence of a permanent, autonomous 
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monitoring agency that would ensure greater efficiency and continuation of applied 
policies’ (NSR Greece 2008-2010: 47). According to interviewees, only a couple of 
civil servants monitor the process (Interview in Athens 08.12.2009). Overall, 
agenda-setting is the only stage of the policy-making process in which secondary 
stakeholders can potentially participate, since right after that ‘the contact between 
the actors and the administration on issues regarding the NAP ends’ (Interview in 
Athens 07.12.2009a). However, even during the agenda-setting, the participation of 
secondary stakeholders hardly takes the form of a satisfactory consultation process. 
Instead, participants’ views are welcomed but eventually not taken into consideration 
by the decision-makers. This situation prevents the incorporation of proposals by 
NGOs in the NAPs as well as the evaluation of the influence of these actors on 
Greek social policy (ibid.).    
 
In the period 2001-2010, the level of participation by anti-poverty NGOs and 
networks was, overall, far from reaching a level which was required by the OMC. 
However, in a few cases the OMC was seen as the main reason behind stakeholder 
participation at the agenda-setting stage of the public policy-making process in 
Greece. Secondary stakeholders assigned these developments to the EU framework 
but considered the social inclusion OMC as too weak an instrument to be able to 
meet their expectations in terms of participation. These issues will be discussed in 
more detail in part 4.5 of this chapter. Prior to this, the following part intends to look 
into whether the OMC triggered participation of primary stakeholders in the social 
inclusion policy-making process. 
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4.4.2 Participation of primary stakeholders 
 
In a country where even organisations with notable umbrella networks at EU level 
struggle to get heard by policy-makers, the mobilisation of primary stakeholders for 
the social inclusion OMC is even more difficult. As was shown in part 4.4.1, official 
documents (such as the NAPs/NSRs) appear satisfied with the participation of anti-
poverty associations and optimistic about the envisaged further improvement of their 
participation in future. However, these documents never refer to the ‘self-expression’ 
of people who experience poverty and social exclusion, although this was one of the 
Council’s main objectives for the social inclusion OMC (Council of the EU 2002: 
12; see also chapter 1 section 1.1.1). While grassroots associations are part of the 
EAPN-Greece (see table 4), their views are incorporated in the views of the network 
which, however, struggle to feed them into the administration as was shown above. 
Apart from this, there are no direct talks between people in poverty and senior 
officers. The coordinator of the Greek delegation to the annual Brussels meeting of 
people experiencing poverty is, due to her role, in contact with people in poverty and 
social exclusion. In an interview in Athens she made the following statement about 
primary stakeholders’ direct talks with government officials (01.12.2011):  
 
I do not think that there are any contacts [between officials and primary 
stakeholders]. Actually, I am sure about this. The officials hardly get into 
contact with the Greek network [EAPN-Greece] which represents these 
people and forms a part of the civil society. The MPs do not want to see 
them, and the Prefect never gets in touch with them. In Greece, the 
reasonable thinking ‘I will sit and talk with people who actually live in this 
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situation’ does not exist. Therefore, we have to communicate their problems. 
But I think that even our voice is not getting heard.  
 
This statement confirms that the participation of people in poverty in the policy-
making process is not happening. Greek policy-makers do not appear engaged in 
participatory practices which have been asked for by the OMC that requests the 
highest possible involvement of primary stakeholders in the policy-making process. 
Another interviewee described in similar words the lack of participation of primary 
stakeholders in the policy-making process:  
 
In Greece, we have not learned to ask for the views of those who experience 
social inequalities. Even in conferences which are organised by us the so-
called social actors. I stand up and speak; someone else may speak too. 
However, the homeless do not speak, nor do the abused women. It is the 
same with all socially deprived groups. The participation of these groups in 
the drafting of the policies has not yet been introduced in our political 
consciousness. It does simply not exist (Interview in Athens 07.12.2009a).  
 
The use of the term ‘political consciousness’ brings forward an issue raised in the 
analytical framework (chapter 1 section 1.1.5). According to it, one of the factors 
which potentially promote Europeanisation is the ‘political and organisational 
cultures and collective understandings’ (Cowles et al. 2001: 11). In Greece, such a 
factor was not in place. The absence of primary stakeholder participation does not 
only concern the official policy-making process but also anti-poverty associations. 
There is a notable difference between Greece and the UK in this sense. While both 
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member states were excluding primary stakeholders from the policy-making process 
prior to the OMC, antipoverty associations in Greece did not manage to promote the 
participation of the primary stakeholders in the policy-making process after the 
OMC. This happened not only because of the obstacles to their participation but also 
because Greek secondary stakeholders work for but not with primary stakeholders. 
Anti-poverty NGOs and networks in Greece do not appear to use the same 
participatory processes as organisations in member states such as the UK (see 
chapter 3). In an interview carried out in Athens (20.12.2010) with the Director of 
the IKE, the interviewee described as follows her experience when visiting 
Sweden63: 
 
At the end of the 1990s, I was working with an NGO in Sweden which was 
set up by parents of people with mental illnesses. There [in Sweden] they 
have set such high standards in terms of combating social exclusion and give 
a high level of access to people with mental illnesses. In every meeting the 
organisation’s board comprises the outer circle while the inner circle in turn 
consisted of people with mental illnesses. The latter are sitting next to their 
personal assistant with whom they have worked on each of the issues which 
have been agreed on to be raised at the meeting. They all decide together on 
what they will do. When I saw this practice I experienced a professional and 
personal shock! I said to myself that this is not only approaching democratic 
processes but it is also a deeply ethical and humanistic issue. Because you 
                                                 
63
 The reason behind this visit was the Council’s support to the promotion of cooperation across the 
EU around issues of disability (Geyer 2002). An action programme in the context of the Horizon 
programme, the Helios II (1993-1996), was seeking for the development and improvement of 
information among member-states and among NGOs, the coordination and betterment of existing, by 
that time, programmes, the promotion of a European level cooperation and best practice exchanges 
between member states and NGOs  (ibid: 73). 
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cannot decide for anyone –even for someone who is mentally ill– on their 
behalf. 
 
The difference among the secondary stakeholders in Greece and in member states 
which apply well-developed participatory practices that are closer to the EU’s 
objectives should have become clear by now. Greek secondary stakeholders did not 
introduce participatory practices in their own organisations. The absence of 
participation of primary stakeholders in the Greek policy-making process must be 
seen together with the lack of their participation in the anti-poverty NGOs and 
networks. Some representatives acknowledged their organisations’ weaknesses by 
saying that they too see the socially excluded as ‘victims of a situation’ and 
‘recipients of policies’ instead of persons who ‘should obtain a beneficial presence in 
the planning [of the policies]’ (Interview in Athens, 07.12.2009a). Others, such as 
the Director of IKE who visited Sweden in the 1990s, argued that they had actually 
tried to introduce participatory practices in Greece but the necessary funding was not 
provided by the government:   
 
Through the Horizon Programme for disabled people I tried to bring the 
Swedish practices for participation to Greece. I decided to draft an official 
proposal. It was turned down! (Interview in Athens 20.12.2010) 
 
When the interviewee was asked why she thought that her proposal was not funded 
so as to become a practice in Greece, she argued that the Greek government in 
general is not giving any feedback on the reasons for the rejection of proposals. In 
her case, she blamed it on the way the government allocates funding received from 
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the EU. Like a previously cited interview with the Director of the EAPN-Greece 
who complained about the funding to the Church of Greece, the Director of IKE 
implied that only certain organisations receive funding. She wondered how it was 
possible to turn down an application that had been submitted by people who were 
funded by the EU for this reason. Eventually, she expressed her disappointment by 
giving her own (negative) opinion on the overall Greek response to Europeanisation 
pressures: ‘I eventually gave up. I never believed that some European institution 
could rationalise this country’ (ibid.).  
 
While this interviewee implied the lack of primary stakeholder participation in the 
1990s (i.e. before the adoption of the OMC), other interviewees referred to the lack 
of participation since the launch of the social inclusion OMC in 2001. The following 
cases of two socially excluded groups serve as examples.  
 
The first example of an excluded group (the members of which can be regarded as 
primary stakeholder), concerns the Roma communities in Greece. As has been 
argued above, both the secondary stakeholders and decision-makers treat the socially 
excluded as victims of a situation and recipients of policies rather than people who 
should feed their views into the policy-making process. According to the 
interviewees this approach has inevitably led to a costly but inefficient practice:  
 
The Roma were only receiving money. The money was used by them 
inefficiently since they did not have the skills and the knowledge of how to 
invest on the community development … Because of the structure of the 
Roma communities in Greece –and in the Balkans– where there are many 
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‘individual collectives’64 and everyone is a chairperson, money from the 
EQUAL or the ESF were not allocated in larger parts of these communities. 
(Interview in Athens 07.12.2009a). 
 
As a result, there have been no opportunities for the participation of this group of 
primary stakeholders in the policy-making process. Despite the generous funding, 
approximately 200,000-350,000 Roma people in Greece do not have any access to 
the local or national policy-making process (Divani 2001: 5). Often they do not even 
have access to activities organised by NGOs and other actors which have been 
mobilised on their behalf (ibid.) 
 
Another example constitutes the case of immigrants. They are also excluded from 
the policy-making process and find it impossible to influence decisions regarding the 
right to asylum. According to a Presidential decree in 2009, the members of the 
Committee which was established to assess applications for asylum were two senior 
ranking police officers, one civil servant from the immigration office, and one 
representative from the UN Refugee Agency (Hellenic Government Gazette 2009). 
Secondary and primary stakeholders in the asylum policy field were not provided 
with opportunities to influence the decision-making process which instead was 
entirely dominated by the police. Thus, the representative from the Klimaka 
organisation complained:   
 
In the talks in the Committee for the Immigrants’ Asylum, immigrants do 
not participate. Only the UN Refugee Agency, not even the Greek Council 
                                                 
64
 According to the interviewee, this refers to the organizations which have up to three members. 
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for Refugees which through its services is in daily contact with 
approximately six hundred refugees (Interview in Athens 07.12.2009b). 
 
Less than a month after the above mentioned Presidential decree, the UN Refugee 
Agency withdrew its cooperation from the works of the Committee. It criticised the 
government that the provisions of the Decree ‘do not ensure a just and efficient 
process of the recognition of the refugees’ issue in Greece according to international 
and European law’ (Rizospastis 22.07.2009). Fourteen NGOs and associations also 
fiercely criticised the government by arguing that the dialogue about immigration is 
actually ‘a governmental monologue’ and that ‘the only actual agent which is 
officially assigned to the issue [were] the police’ (Greek Council for Refugees 2009: 
official portal). Even the 2011 law, which replaced the 2009 Presidential decree and 
which was welcomed by the UN Refugee Agency, did not provide for the 
participation of the secondary stakeholders or primary stakeholders in the asylum 
committees. According to the decree, the chair of the Committee should be a person 
of ‘prestige’ with ‘academic education’ and ‘managerial skills’ (Hellenic 
Government Gazette 2011: 20). Similarly, the recruitment of its members should be 
carried out among academics, executives, translators, civil servants and so on 
(ibid.).65    
 
This problematic situation regarding the involvement of primary stakeholders has 
been reflected in the activities of the grassroots communities and the networks that 
                                                 
65
 On 05.04.11 the Greek Ombudsman concluded in the Autopsy in the Retention Centers for 
Immigrants in the Counties of Rodopi and Evros: ‘The situation in this area, especially in the last two 
years, has the dimensions of a humanitarian crisis, due to the increase of the number of immigrants … 
It must particularly be underlined that there are crucial questions about the violation of fundamental 
rights, for which are responsible the extremely bad conditions of retention, the important 
shortcomings in the recruitment of the relevant divisions of Greek police, and the non-adopting of 
necessary measures which have been approved and funded by the EU’ (Greek Ombudsman 2011: 1).   
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they have created. For example, the Pan-Hellenic Federation of Societies of Parents 
and Guardians of People with Disabilities (POSGAMEA) holds annual conferences 
to which grassroots associations are invited to participate. The federation itself is 
made up of grassroots groups and it is a member of the National Confederation of 
People with Disabilities (ESAMEA) which was also established by grassroots 
associations (ESAMEA web-portal)66. The memorandum of the POSGAMEA 
regards the EU projects, funds and laws as means to achieve its aims for social 
inclusion of people with disabilities.67 The ESAMEA acknowledges the importance 
of the decisions which are taken at EU level and their impact on the life of the people 
with disabilities in Greece (ibid.). For this reason, it is a member of the European 
Disability Forum (EDF) which represents the people with disabilities in the dialogue 
with the EU relevant institutions.  
 
POSGAMEA’s declaration of the annual conference in 2008 calls on the EP and the 
European Commission (together with the Greek parliament and government) to 
protect the human and social rights of people with disabilities (POSGAMEA 2008). 
Additionally it calls on the EP and Commission to guarantee equal opportunities and 
to accept, as official consultants in the national and European level policy-making 
process, the relevant organisations and associations (ibid.). However, despite all the 
references to the EU, none of these actors has been given the opportunity to 
influence the NAPs. One interviewee, who participates in domestic conferences of 
grassroots communities, explained that this participation was not even intended by 
the policy-makers. Instead, it is merely a process which concerns an internal 
                                                 
66http://www.esaea.gr/index.php?module=pagemaster&PAGE_user_op=view_page&PAGE_id=8&th
ms=1, accessed on 12.08.2011; ESAMEA is also a member of the Greek National Committee for 
Social Protection (NCSP). However it is represented by one person only. 
67
 http://www.posgamea.gr/Uploads/katastatikoposgameanew.pdf, accessed on 24.09.2011 
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exchange of information among grassroots communities (Interview in Athens 
03.12.2011).  
 
Consequently, empirical evidence gathered for this thesis suggests that in Greece the 
OMC had no significant impact in terms of participation of primary stakeholders. 
Once more, fundamental OMC objectives (in this case, the participation of primary 
stakeholders) have been proven irrelevant to the policy-making process in Greece. 
Therefore, no domestic response to the theoretical provisions of the OMC emerged. 
The next part of the chapter analyses the changes in expectations, political activities 
and loyalties of the participants who participate in the OMC-led Greek social 
inclusion strategy. It is primarily concerned with secondary stakeholders. However, 
due to the social inclusion OMC, primary stakeholders participate at the European 
level through the EU annual conferences of people experiencing poverty. Thus, the 
following part will also assess whether this participation did have an impact in the 
participants’ expectations, political activities and loyalties. 
 
 
4.5 Expectations, political activities and loyalties 
 
4.5.1 The domestic level 
 
In the decade 2001-2010 Greece failed to respond to the social inclusion OMC’s 
provisions in terms of the mobilisation of people in poverty and social exclusion (i.e. 
primary stakeholders) within the Greek policy-making process. The absence of 
people in poverty in the Greek policy-making process has meant that their views 
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were not heard by the policy-makers (see in part 4.4.2 above). In fact, primary 
stakeholders’ views were absent not only from the formal policy-making process but 
often also not taken into account by the anti-poverty associations. The OMC and its 
provisions for the self-expression of primary stakeholders did not help to change this 
situation.  
 
However, the participation of secondary stakeholders in the Greek policy-making 
process has increased somewhat as a result of the OMC. This development initially 
seemed to redirect some secondary stakeholders’ expectations and political activities 
from the domestic level towards the EU level. Stakeholders argued that compared 
with the pre-OMC years, the social inclusion OMC had an impact on the domestic 
policy-making process. This happened mainly through the NAPs which formed the 
basis for a sort of consultation process between the secondary stakeholders and the 
government in Greece (Interviews in Athens 01.12.2011 and 07.12.2009a). The 
setting up of this basis was seen by these stakeholders as a positive development 
especially when compared to the pre-OMC situation. In fact, secondary stakeholders 
observed an increasing engagement between the civil servants and the NGOs while 
arguing that this would not have happened without the OMC. As one interviewee 
stated: 
 
In any case, we have reached a level where we can say that people 
[governments and secondary stakeholders] discuss. And this [the OMC], for 
me, is an exceptional tool to work with. Its results in policy outcomes is 
another issue; but for me this [the discussions] is an exceptional tool’ 
(Interview in Athens 01.12.2011) 
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While the interviewee appeared to doubt about the OMC’s potential to treat issues of 
poverty, she expressed the view that the OMC’s contribution was to provide a 
framework for participation of stakeholders within this EU-driven process. This 
created a positive evaluation of the EU and its role in the social inclusion field. 
Therefore, another interviewee characterised the EU structure as ‘exceptional’ and 
argued that:  
 
The participation of some people in EU initiatives, such as the OMC, is an 
opportunity for them to remember the self-evident or, in other words, to 
remember that things can steadily develop as long as there is a basis, a 
framework and the appropriate tools (Interview in Athens 08.12.2009).  
 
The disappointment with the domestic public policy process is evident from this 
statement. However, it also shows that the disappointment was mitigated by 
expectations that the EU provided a framework which has the potential of offering 
the ‘appropriate tools’ for developments in the domestic policy-making process. One 
of these tools was the provisions for stakeholder participation in the process. Due to 
the problems that the secondary stakeholders encountered in their efforts to make use 
of the provisions on the domestic level, they appeared to shift (at least some of) their 
political activities towards the EU level. The Director of the EAPN-Greece stated 
during an interview that the Greek network asked the Director of the umbrella 
network (i.e. EAPN-EU) to put pressure to the Greek government to allow for the 
participation of NGOs in the social inclusion policy-making process (Interview in 
Athens 08.12.2009). Between 2003 and 2006, the Director of the EAPN-EU was 
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Mrs Maria Marinakou from Greece. However, the EAPN-EU Director’s 
commitment and her efforts to change the Greek government’s attitudes came to no 
avail. To the disappointment of the Greek secondary stakeholders no improvements 
were achieved in terms of their participation (ibid.).  
 
As was explained in section 4.3 above, the Director of IKE which is a member of the 
EAPN-Greece emphasised that she could hardly recognise any elements of a process 
called OMC in Greece (Interview in Athens 20.01.2011). This was rather an 
exaggeration because as the same interviewee and other key secondary stakeholders 
showed during interviews, they were all very well aware of the features of the OMC. 
Key secondary stakeholders in Greece appeared to have a sound knowledge of issues 
concerning the method at both EU and member state level. The Director of the 
EAPN-Greece argued that members of the network had closely followed the OMC-
related developments at EU level and scrutinized whether these developments were 
applied in Greece (Interview in Athens 08.12.2009). Another interviewee 
emphasised that the OMC had managed to create opportunities for the self-
expression of people in poverty in Germany and in Ireland (Interview in Athens 
01.12.2011). Therefore, the OMC appeared to create an EU framework favourable to 
the dissemination of information from the EU to the domestic level and between 
member states. However, it would be overly ambitious to resemble this 
dissemination of information to policy learning. Greek secondary stakeholders 
realised that the OMC was indeed working in other member states but this is far 
from being regarded as learning of new ideas to solve policy problems. Additionally, 
contrary to the potential of the policy learning to promote socialisation (Jacobsson 
2004; see also chapter 1 section 1.2.5), this dissemination of information did not 
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promote socialisation of stakeholders under common concerns and common 
solutions and objectives. As shown earlier, developments at EU level, such as the 
OMC’s objectives and developments in other member states, have been seen as 
irrelevant to the particularities in Greece. Therefore, Greek secondary stakeholders 
were informed about OMC related developments but they were not seeing these 
developments happening in Greece. It can be argued that instead of Greek 
stakeholders feeling part of a new system of governance, they felt excluded from it. 
Ideas, norms, policy solutions, objectives and discourses were shared between 
stakeholders in other European member states but not with stakeholders in Greece.  
 
The provisions for participation and the small improvements in the consultation of 
the NGOs in Greece as well as the much wider developments in the mobilisation of 
stakeholders in other member states revealed a rational assessment by stakeholders 
who participated in the social inclusion OMC. This positive rational assessment 
initially redirected the expectations and political activities of the stakeholders from 
the national to the EU level. At least in one case a respondent argued that ‘Brussels, 
regardless whether they satisfy our proposals, at least takes them into consideration’ 
(Interview in Athens 08.12.2009). Therefore, in comparison to the Greek policy-
making process the EU policy-making process seemed to be capable of providing a 
framework which at least partly satisfied the expectations from secondary 
stakeholders for participation in the social inclusion policy-making process.  
 
However, the redirections in expectations and political activities did not affect all 
stakeholders who participated in the OMC process. One stakeholder perceived the 
added value which the OMC offered in Greece in terms of participation, merely as a 
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response to the needs and priorities of European citizens. Thus, in an interview in 
Athens (07.12.2009b) conducted for the present thesis, the Director of Klimaka 
avoided crediting the OMC or EU for the (positive) developments in the social 
inclusion field. In his own words, ‘states develop together with societies. States 
cannot move forward without correcting social disparities’. According to this 
argument, positive domestic developments in the field of social inclusion would 
have happened even without the EU. These positive domestic developments include 
the dialogue between stakeholders and the government during the planning of 
strategies (ibid.). However, the Director of Klimaka acknowledged that the EU has 
achieved in some issues, to have had an impact on the policy-making process in 
Greece.  
 
Even the more satisfied stakeholders, after expressing expectations in the first years 
of the application of the OMC in Greece, appeared to change their stances after the 
continuous obstacles which they met with whilst trying to achieve better domestic 
participation. Their expectations (directed to the EU) turned eventually into 
disappointment. This disappointment seemed to refer in particular to the softness of 
the OMC which greatly restricted its effectiveness in terms of widening 
participation. The participation was only in times referring to proper consultation. In 
the majority of the cases, participation in practice meant an ‘irregular and sketchy’ 
consultation process (e.g. Interview in Athens 08.12.2009). Chapter 1 (section 1.3.1) 
showed that the degree of involvement is necessary for the understanding of 
participation and therefore for the understanding of potential redirections of 
expectations, political activities and loyalties. According to the Inbas and Engender 
(2010: 3), ‘consultation’ describes a participatory process in which policy-makers 
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‘inform and get feedback from stakeholders’. However, as shown above, the 
Director of the EAPN-Greece said that the network was not aware of the final draft 
of the NAP before this was published by the Commission. Therefore, the 
stakeholders were not always getting feedback by the policy-makers. Neither were 
they always requested to inform the policy-makers. Finally, as was shown that in 
section 4.4.1 above, the consultation process did not have any significant impact on 
the NAPs and the policy agenda since even when stakeholders were being heard, 
their views were not taken into consideration.  
 
 The redirection of stakeholders’ expectations and political activities from the 
national to the EU level did not occur in a sustained manner in Greece for the 
reasons which were explained above. The same actors who had initially been 
positive about the EU’s role in fighting poverty expressed their dissatisfaction also 
with the abandoning of the Lisbon targets after the review of the agenda in 2005. 
The reformed Lisbon strategy and the review of the anti-poverty objectives 
disappointed the anti-poverty associations. Greek stakeholders perceived this review 
as a retreat by the EU from its social inclusion OMC and its previous objectives as 
the following statement shows:  
 
The Lisbon agenda is now in general and tactical retreat. The objectives 
which should have been met by 2010 were abandoned. Among these 
objectives was the objective of participation through the OMC as a tool for 
social dialogue and reforms. Since the Lisbon objectives were abandoned 
with the review of the Lisbon strategy, I think that anti-poverty networks got 
involved more ‘loosely’ … The EU is a union of economies. In Lisbon, we 
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[the anti-poverty associations] fought for a union of societies. This battle has 
been lost. For some reason, you can name it liberalism, the social agenda has 
lost ground (Interview in Athens 08.12.2009).  
 
This statement flags up the importance of the issue of a social Europe. The Lisbon 
strategy was intended to balance the free market with social (and environmental) 
concerns. It could have corrected some of the social inequalities in the EU (see also 
chapter 1, part 1.2.2.1). As was shown in chapter 1, there is indeed strong public 
support for the EU’s role in social policy. This support contradicts the conventional 
wisdom which assumes that elites are much more pro-European than the citizens 
(Hooghe 2003). As was shown above, the reasons why the interviewees shifted their 
expectations and political activities some degree from the domestic to the European 
level was due to a rational assessment. Greek stakeholders seemed to believe that the 
EU had the potential to help them in their fight against poverty across member states. 
However, it seems that the shift in expectations and political activities (e.g. the battle 
to create a social EU) declined after the Greek stakeholder realised that participation 
in OMC activities on the domestic level remained weak while their views were not 
actually taken into consideration by the policy-makers, who later abandoned the 
objectives of the Lisbon strategy. The positive rational assessment that existed and 
positively affected their attitudes towards the EU started to be questioned.   
 
Finally, the fierce financial crisis which has hit Greece has made some stakeholders 
even more disappointed about the EU. As was shown in chapter 1, the crisis-hit 
citizens in Greece have changed significantly their views about the EU. 
Eurobarometer surveys have clearly shown a decrease in support for the European 
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institutions (e.g. Eurobarometer 2011a). Amongst some (primary and secondary) 
stakeholders this declining support has turned into disappointment and fierce 
accusations of the EU political system, as can be seen from the following statement: 
 
I believe that the EU, its political system and structure reproduce poverty and 
social exclusion. Why are we now all wondering about this? The EU and 
Merkel and Sarkozy who dominate the EU, reproduce these inequalities. Are 
we trying to fool ourselves? Are we playing with words? Who is behind 
poverty and social exclusion in Greece in this period? (Interview in Athens 
20.12.2010)  
 
Apart from identifying the EU political system and structures with the negative 
images which Merkel and Sarkozy have in Greece, the interviewee confirmed the 
pessimistic attitude of the population towards the EU in a period of crisis. One has 
therefore to be cautious when proclaiming that participants’ expectations, political 
activities and loyalties have shifted from the domestic level towards the EU level. 
The involvement of two EU institutions – the European Central Bank and EU 
Commission (in addition to the International Monetary Fund) - in the troika which, 
has been considered responsible for mishandling the Greek financial crisis, has had a 
negative impact on the EU’s image in Greece. 
 
As was explained in chapter 1, participants’ shifts in loyalties from the domestic to 
the EU level occur only when expectations and political activities are redirected to 
the EU ‘over long periods’ (Haas 1958: 5). In the case of Greek participants in the 
social inclusion OMC, expectations and political activities were redirected to the EU 
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level for only a limited period of time. The difficulties that the stakeholders 
encountered in their efforts to be satisfactory involved in the policy-making process 
and the developments at the EU level turned the positive expectations into 
disappointment. Thus, in line with the analytical framework put forward in chapter 1, 
the loyalties of stakeholders in Greece did not shift mainly due to the disappointment 
about the limited participation which the OMC established in Greece. At the same 
time, the reform of the Lisbon agenda and the financial crisis and the involvement of 
the EU in the Greek rescue plan has also been perceived negatively by the 
interviewees who are specialised in issues of social inclusion. 
 
Importantly, the above analysis refers exclusively to the participation of secondary 
stakeholders in the domestic consultation and participation process. Nevertheless, the 
implementation of the OMC has offered the opportunity for some primary 
stakeholders to be involved in a European level process, mainly through the annual 
European Meeting of People Experiencing Poverty (EMPEP). Chapter 4 has 
discussed key issues which concern these meetings between 2001 and 2010. Since 
their first appearance in 2001 the meetings have been quasi-institutionalised. The 
following part intends to assess whether participants’ loyalties, expectations and 
political activities have shifted as a result of participation in these EU-level 
conferences. 
 
4.5.2 The EU level 
 
 The following statement by the Director of the EAPN-Greece, who admitted that 
she had changed her initial attitudes about participation in the EMPEP, could be 
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interpreted as providing empirical evidence for the redirection of expectations, 
political activities and loyalties of the participants: 
 
In the beginning I was doubtful about these meetings at EU level because 
people go there, show their agendas but changes in their lives never seem to 
occur. However, the European meetings have the excellent effect which 
makes participants feel that ‘I am not standing alone’. There is an excellent 
experience at a personal and later at a team level. They are all links of the 
same chain. This observation has changed my opinion about the meetings. In 
the past we went with a Greek delegation to a conference in Brussels. It 
helped the Greek delegates to widen their horizons. It took them out of their 
‘micro-level’ [i.e. the focus only on their personal problems] and showed 
them that similar issues concern people in Europe. Still, the impact of the 
policies in their daily life is negligible (Interview in Athens 08.12.2009) 
 
Despite the lack of discernible influence on the policy outcomes, the interviewee 
thought that participation in these meetings has been beneficial for the stakeholders. 
In fact, the interviewee argued that loyalties to the EU emerged and were built on 
common concerns. In other words, the perceptions of socially excluded people 
seemed to change when they realised that there were other people across the EU who 
were coping with similar problems. This same situation has been described by the 
coordinator of the Greek delegation to the EU conferences of people in poverty as 
the ‘enthusiasm of the identification’. As the coordinator stated: 
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The participants may think ‘what I am going through now –or we in Greece 
are going through– may occur to someone else in Portugal’. When people 
realise the similarity of the problems this creates perceptions that did not 
exist. Instead of thinking that this happens in Greece you start seeing that this 
is actually the result of processes across Europe. It takes you out of the 
national context and puts you in a European one (Interview in Athens 
01.12.2011).  
 
In fact, this was not just the opinion of the coordinator who participated in the OMC 
as a secondary stakeholder. It was also the experience of one interviewee who 
participated as a primary stakeholder in these EU level meetings, as can be seen by 
the following statement: 
 
When I spoke about daily life in Greece I discovered that participants from 
all member states were facing the same problems. For example, the agony 
of the parents concerning the entering of their children in the society is the 
same everywhere. For the children, the access [to society] is nowhere 
guaranteed (Interview in Athens 03.12.2011)  
 
The ‘discovery’ of common concerns among the participants has been described as 
‘a process that makes you break out of the national context and puts you in a 
European context’ by the Director of the EAPN-Greece (Interview in Athens 
08.12.2009). By definition, social exclusion refers to the exclusion of people from 
communities. Through the EMPEP participants are given the opportunity to get 
involved in a group of people across the EU who do not only express common 
 266 
concerns but also put forward common proposals for political actions against these 
concerns. The coordinator of the Greek delegations to these Brussels conferences 
stated: 
 
A statement that will be issued and will have been agreed upon by all 
national delegations and that will be accepted by the Commission is 
something gained by all participants together (Interview in Athens 
01.12.2011) 
 
Another participant in the 2009 conference also commented positively on the 
proposals that Greek delegates made together with the delegates from other member 
states. According to the Greek participant, there were many proposals and the 
participants decided altogether which of them would be put forward to the 
Commission (Interview in Crete 20.01.2011) 
 
The participation in a community, the realisation of common concerns, and the 
formulation of common proposals were followed by the acknowledgement that the 
EU was the institution which was offering the opportunities for participation. This 
acknowledgment appeared to indicate the redirection of expectations and political 
activities towards the EU level. As the above mentioned participant stated, ‘I knew 
about the EU before the meeting; what I did not know was its sensitivity to listen to 
the problems of the people’ (ibid.). Once again, the redirection of expectations and 
political activities from the national to the EU level took place after a comparison 
between the opportunities offered at the domestic and EU levels. As has been shown 
in part 4 of this chapter such opportunities for primary stakeholders’ participation 
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were not offered (before or after the launch of the social inclusion OMC) in Greece. 
Another participant in the 2009 EMPEP expressed her disappointment that socially 
excluded people’s views are not taken into consideration by Greek policy-makers. 
However, the fact that MEPs from member states across the EU were invited to 
attend the meetings created high expectations amongst the participants. The 
participants were aware of the fact that important EU decision-makers were invited 
to listen to their problems. They therefore decided to redirect their political activities 
to the EU level (Interview in Crete 20.01.2011). Consequently,  
 
I felt, I swear to god, that this is my big opportunity. I said: ‘Here, we will 
have some positive results, it cannot go wrong!’ I charged my batteries, I 
prepared myself; I had great hopes and high expectations, expecting many, 
many, many, many things… (Interview in Crete 20.01.2011) 
 
As the study of the EAPN-EU on the impact of these meetings in Brussels has 
shown, the majority of policy-makers do acquire knowledge and change their 
perceptions about social exclusion when they listen to the views of the grassroots 
participants (Dierckx and Van Herck 2010). For the Greek participants in these 
meetings the EU has provided a space in which policy-makers would eventually 
listen to grassroots actors. Therefore, the opening of a forum for primary 
stakeholders to express their views and concerns by the EU created enthusiasm 
among the participants (Interviews in Athens 08.12.2009; 20.01.2011; 01.12.2011; 
03.12.2011). Clearly participants created EU-wide community feelings if not an EU-
wide community which, however, was only a temporary community. This created 
expectations and redirected political activities towards the EU level which were seen 
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as being capable of listening to people’s views and concerns. According to a 
participant in the meetings: 
 
People who participate want to get heard by those who will understand us. 
And those who will understand us are the MEPs who have knowledge of the 
reality (Interview in Athens 01.12.2011).    
 
In fact, the same interviewee participated in the following conference in Brussels in 
June 2010. The community feelings that were emerging amongst the participants in 
these meetings were once again confirmed. As the participant stated:  
 
The second time delegates from every member state showed a kind of 
familiarity. We all knew each other and it was much better to act inside a 
group of people that you know (Interview in Athens 03.12.2011) 
 
According to the coordinator of the Greek delegations to Brussels, this sense of 
belonging to a wider EU community empowered the Greek delegates who, after the 
meetings, expressed intentions to start political activities in the domestic level. Thus 
following the participation in the EU conferences, Greek delegates started being 
politically active in their local communities (Interview in Athens 01.12.2011). 
Another interviewee highlighted the same issue by stating: 
 
[After the EU meetings] people returned to their local communities and 
established unions. They are not afraid anymore to travel in order to talk in a 
meeting, in a task force. Their words have changed as well; they are not 
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anymore words which express personal concerns, but words with political 
meaning (Interview in Athens 08.12.2009)  
 
However, a person argued that socially excluded people at the local level are 
concerned with their own problems and they do not care ‘that much about the 
European framework’ (Interview in Athens 03.12.2011).  
 
Once again the redirection of the participants’ expectations and political activities 
towards the EU did not seem to last for long. The initial enthusiasm amongst 
stakeholders for the EU was followed by disappointment. The disappointment had to 
do with both the lack of policy outcomes and the observation that the actual 
attendance by the MEPs was much lower than expected by the primary stakeholders. 
In one case, a participant argued that even the MEPs who attended the 2009 meeting 
did so for reasons of publicity as the following statement shows: 
 
The response from the [Greek] MEPs was really disappointing. No one 
showed up! Only some MEPs from Sweden, Finland, Portugal who, I have 
the feeling, came for their own reasons of publicity. No Greek MEPs. 
Entering the EU building there were some letter boxes one for each MEP. I 
said ‘we are Greeks and our MEPs have given the worst impressions’. I 
wanted to write a reprimand letter and put it in the letter box of each Greek 
MEP. The other members of the group did not agree and I had to let that 
go… (Interview in Crete 20.01.2011)  
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Finally, despite the empowerment of the people who participated in the EU 
conferences, interviews with participants reflected once again a sense of 
disappointment with the EU. The main reason behind this disappointment was that 
their participation at the EU level had no impact at all on their daily lives. As the 
participant put it: ‘I think that the EU is not helping us. I think that our whole effort 
is being lost’ (Interview in Athens 03.12.2011) 
 
Therefore, like in the case of the participation at the domestic level, participation at 
the EU level has the potential of redirecting expectations and political activities 
although in practice the shifts in expectations and political activities do not seem to 
have lasted for long. The main difference between the domestic and EU levels is that 
people who participate in the domestic level activities redirect their expectations and 
political activities towards the EU after a rational assessment of the EU decision-
making framework. According to this assessment, the EU framework appears more 
capable than the domestic framework to satisfy the stakeholders’ interests regarding 
participation in the policy-making process and to influence the policy agenda. In 
contrast, stakeholders who participate in the EU level become socialised into 
common EU concerns and adopt common objectives. They therefore redirect 
temporarily their expectations and political activities to the EU level. However, in 
both cases, Greek primary and secondary stakeholders appeared eventually 
disappointed by the fact that their participation did not meet their expectations and 
did not have any impact in the domestic or the European social inclusion policy-
making process. Inevitably, the overall limited and short-term shifts in expectations 
and political activities did not trigger permanent shifts in the loyalties of the 
participants.    
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Conclusion 
 
The first part of this chapter provided a brief quantitative assessment of the social 
situation in Greece. The quantitative data were not able to show any significant 
impact of the OMC on the levels of poverty and social exclusion within the years 
2001-2010. Chapter 4 therefore provided mainly a qualitative assessment of the 
application of the social inclusion OMC in Greece. By drawing examples from the 
mental health sector and from the issue of homelessness, the present chapter showed 
that contrary to the official assessments of the OMC by Greek government actors 
and the NAPs, there was hardly any Greek response to the OMC pressures for 
reforms. A reason identified for this lack of response is the domination of the two 
most popular (until 2012) Greek political parties which were deciding and 
implementing public policy according to clientelistic criteria and according to their 
own interests. At the same time, the OMC with its lack of sanctions for non-
compliance is too weak an instrument to change the partisan politics culture. As 
Featherstone (2005a) has shown, when EU stimuli for reforms are weak they are 
prevented by domestic obstacles. Featherstone has identified the lack of precision of 
EU stimuli as another reason for their weakness (ibid.). In the case of the social 
inclusion OMC the overarching objectives do lack precision since they are reported 
to be incompatible with the Greek necessities. Sections 4.3 and 4.5 above showed 
that this incompatibility prevented a process of policy learning which, according to 
the analytical framework in chapter 1, was expected to facilitate Europeanisation and 
to trigger shifts in expectations, political activities and loyalties of the participants. 
Due to the lack of a policy learning process, domestic stakeholders did not come into 
contact with problem solving ideas; at least ideas compatible with the Greek policy 
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problems. The lack of the policy learning process meant simultaneously a lack of a 
process of participant stakeholders’ socialisation under common, EU concerns, ideas 
and objectives. Secondary stakeholders did not appear to feel ‘hedged in’ (Jacobsson 
2004: 359) an emerging system of governance or integrated in ‘structures, norms and 
values of the EU’ (Shore 2000: 149). Instead, they felt excluded because ideas, 
norms, policy solutions, objectives and discourses were shared between other 
European member states but not with Greece.  
 
In this context of institutional obstacles and OMC weaknesses, another core 
objective of the social inclusion OMC, i.e. participation of primary and secondary 
stakeholders, was responded to by Greece only by the mobilisation of the latter. The 
views of the primary stakeholders were excluded from the policy-making process 
and in many cases also from the social NGOs. Therefore, due to the initial 
misinterpretation of the OMC provisions for participation, the Greek government 
involved mainly social partners in the policy-making process. However, more EU 
pressures (e.g. naming and shaming and Joint Reports) led to the establishment of 
the National Committee for Social Protection. This Committee far from facilitating a 
type of participation similar to the one required by the OMC, managed however to 
bring about a few developments in terms of participation. The participation which 
emerged through the NCSP, referred only to the agenda-setting stage of the NAPs. 
Evidence brought forward showed that there was no participation of secondary 
stakeholders in the stages of decision-making, implementation, and monitoring. 
During the stage of agenda-setting, secondary stakeholders were either only 
informed by the government about policies concerning social inclusion or, at best, 
consulted by the government. While this consultation was ranging from filling 
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questionnaires to direct talks, this was an input which was not being taken into 
consideration during the decision-making stage of the NAPs process. Therefore, 
secondary stakeholders’ views did not have any significant impact on the NAPs/ 
NSRs.  
 
With the launch of the OMC secondary stakeholders redirected their expectations to 
the EU because its participatory provisions appeared capable of satisfying their 
interests. In the context of the OMC they also redirected political activities. The 
initial redirection of expectations and political activities was triggered by a positive 
rational evaluation of the OMC, in particular, and the EU in general. While there 
were doubts about the OMC’s potential to treat issues of poverty, stakeholders 
expressed the view that the OMC’s contribution was that it provided a framework for 
participation. This positive evaluation emerged as the result of a comparison with the 
pre-OMC period during which no opportunities for participation had existed. The 
OMC framework appeared as more possible than the domestic framework if not to 
have an impact on poverty, at least to promote participation. However, secondary 
stakeholders’ expectations and political activities in Greece soon turned into 
disappointment because of the domestic obstacles to participation. Stakeholders 
perceived the review of the Lisbon strategy in 2005 as a retreat from the 
participatory framework the OMC had intended to establish in Greece. Additionally, 
the severe financial crisis was an additional factor due to which the initially 
redirected expectations (from the national to the EU level) were turned into 
disappointment. According to Haas’s (1958) definition, people are loyal to a 
supranational framework (i.e. the EU) when they redirect expectations and political 
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activities to that framework for long periods. This was not the case in Greece; 
therefore, secondary stakeholders did not appear to shift loyalties towards the EU.  
 
The participation of primary stakeholders in EU level consultation projects seemed 
to follow the same route. Participants in the EU conferences of people who 
experience poverty initially redirected their expectations and political activities 
towards the EU. Once again this happened because, compared to the Greek 
framework, the EU was perceived as more capable of involving primary 
stakeholders and taking their views and concerns seriously. At the same time, a 
community feeling or, in the words of Haas (1958), a ‘community sentiment’ (see 
also chapter 1) emerged amongst the Greek delegates after their contact with 
participants across the EU in the annual EMPEP in Brussels. As Jacobsson (2004) 
has argued, the OMC has the potential to socialise participants in the context of EU 
common concerns and common objectives. Empirical evidence from the fieldwork in 
Greece presented in this chapter showed that such socialisation processes indeed 
took place during the conferences in Brussels. Participants realised that they 
belonged to a wider community with common concerns and articulated political 
actions that were based on common objectives. However, the effects of such 
socialisation should not be overestimated. Socialisation in the EU annual 
conferences was not a long lasting process. Similarly with secondary stakeholders 
who were participating at the domestic level, initial expectations and political 
activities were turned into disappointment. The reasons were the limited attendance 
of the MEPs, the lack of policy outcomes and the financial crisis. For these reasons, 
the expectations and political activities which had been redirected from the national 
to the EU level did not appear to remain there for long. Therefore, similar to 
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secondary stakeholders, primary stakeholders did not show signs of loyalties to the 
EU. 
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Chapter 5: Comparative Analysis  
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Numerical data on poverty and social exclusion issues was presented at the 
beginning of chapters 3 and 4. The purpose was to provide the reader with an 
overview of the social situation in the UK and in Greece. It also aimed to show that a 
precise assessment of the social inclusion OMC’s impact on member states cannot be 
based only on a quantitative analysis. As chapters 3 and 4 showed, the improvement 
of the economic situation in the EU during the first years of the implementation of 
the Lisbon strategy, the relatively stagnant indices of social exclusion in Greece and 
the UK in most of the period within the timeframe of the research (i.e. 2001-2010) 
and the serious economic crisis since 2008, have all made it very challenging for 
researchers to assess qualitatively the impact of the social inclusion OMC in different 
member states. Chapters 3 and 4 also showed that there are very different 
interpretations of the main quantitative social inclusion indices in the UK and Greece 
making necessary a qualitative approach for the assessment of the implementation of 
the OMC in these two countries. 
 
In the UK the social inclusion OMC appeared to add value to domestic efforts to 
combat social exclusion which started under a newly elected New Labour 
government in 1997. Chapter 3 explained that the pre-Lisbon focus and efforts of the 
New Labour party on combating social exclusion (Levitas 1999; Levitas 1998) were 
later strengthened by the social OMC (Armstrong 2006, 2005). Importantly, chapter 
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1 explained –while using Börzel’s (2002) variation of Europeanisation as a process 
of uploading and downloading policies and practices– that the UK was expected to 
respond positively to the social inclusion OMC because the Labour government had 
played an active role in the shaping of the Lisbon agenda (Bulmer 2008). At the 
same time Greece, which is often criticised for the obstacles its domestic political 
system poses to the Europeanisation of Greek public policies (e.g. Featherstone and 
Papadimitriou 2008; Mossialos and Allin 2005), did not respond as positively to the 
social inclusion OMC. As was shown in chapter 1, Greece has been described as a 
‘foot-dragger’ in terms of the uploading and downloading of policies within the 
context of the Europeanisation of member state public policies (e.g. Börzel 2002: 
203). Within the context of the Lisbon reform agenda, some scholars have 
highlighted the poor ‘reform capacity’ of Greece (Featherstone 2008: 3; Tinios 2005; 
Mossialos and Allin 2005; Papadimitriou 2005). In contrast to the UK, none of the 
two political parties which have governed Greece between 2001-2010 focused 
strongly on social inclusion issues during their time in office.  
 
As was shown in chapter 1, the launch of the social inclusion OMC was followed by 
explicit references to the need for participation of anti-poverty NGOs and networks 
and of people who experience poverty and social exclusion (i.e. secondary and 
primary stakeholders respectively) implicitly in the European, and explicitly in the 
domestic social inclusion policy-making process. The impact of participation on 
secondary and primary stakeholders has been the main focus of the analysis in this 
thesis. According to the first hypothesis, which was put forward in chapter 1, ’the 
participation of primary and secondary stakeholders in the domestic social inclusion 
OMC process leads to shifts in their expectations, political activities and loyalties 
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from the national to the EU’. A key feature of the OMC is that the domestic social 
inclusion policy-making process must be reflected in National Action Plans (NAPs) 
(replaced after 2005 by the National Strategy Reports (NSRs)). For this reason, 
chapters 3 and 4 focused on whether the (primary and secondary) stakeholders 
participated in the stages of agenda-setting, decision-making, implementation and 
monitoring of the NAPs/NSRs between 2001 and 2010. Considering different 
degrees of participation, chapters 3 and 4 assessed whether participants were 
informed or consulted by their domestic governments, whether they were involved in 
the policy-making process, collaborated with the government or whether they were 
even empowered (see also chapter 1 section 1.3.1). However, during the course of the 
fieldwork for this thesis it emerged that other factors are also important for the 
understanding of stakeholder views and their self-perceptions in addition to the 
actual participation in the social inclusion OMC process. The most important factors 
identified include the satisfaction of the participants regarding their own participation 
and the actual impact which the participation of stakeholders has on the NAPs.  
 
The two country case studies showed that the participation of primary and secondary 
stakeholders in social inclusion OMC-sponsored processes can lead to redirections of 
expectations, political activities and loyalties from the domestic level to the EU level. 
However, between 2001 and 2010, participation by primary and secondary 
stakeholders differed significantly in the UK and in Greece. Therefore, it had 
different impact on participants’ expectations, political activities and loyalties. 
Borrowing from Haas (1958), redirection of expectations from the national to the EU 
level means that people think that the EU framework is more possible to satisfy their 
goals than the national framework. Accordingly, people shift their political activities 
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to the EU level in order to pursue their goals. Finally, people who redirect their 
expectations and political activities to the EU level for long periods are considered to 
be loyal to the EU (Haas 1958).  
 
As a result of the OMC provisions for wide participation, primary stakeholders from 
every member state have participated in the European Meetings of People 
Experiencing Poverty (EMPEP) since 2001 (see chapter 2 section 2.5). The main 
purpose of these conferences is to allow the participants to feed their experiences and 
views into the EU policy-making process. The second hypothesis put forward in 
chapter 1 therefore proposed that such participation at the EU level will lead to the 
shift in expectations, political activities and loyalties from the domestic level towards 
the EU level. New empirical evidence put forward in chapters 3 and 4 showed that 
the validity of this hypothesis should be seen in context. The shifts in loyalties seem 
to have been only temporary rather than long lasting shifts. The new empirical 
evidence also showed that there were important differences between Greece and the 
UK.   
 
This chapter offers a comparative analysis of the most important empirical findings 
presented in chapters 3 and 4. The following section (section 5.2) compares the 
participation of primary and secondary stakeholders in Greece and the UK. Section 
5.3 compares the impact of participation on participants’ expectations, political 
activities and loyalties towards the EU. Section 5.4 intends to compare the impact 
which participation in the annual EU conferences has on participants’ expectations, 
political activities and loyalties. Finally, the last section discusses the conclusion of 
this chapter.   
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5.2 Participation in the British and Greek social inclusion processes 
 
As was explained in chapters 3 and 4, the UK and Greece followed different routes 
regarding the participation of anti-poverty associations and people in poverty as 
required by the social inclusion OMC. Chapter 3 has shown that the British senior 
officers and members of anti-poverty networks responded positively to the OMC’s 
pressures for stakeholder participation. Already in 2001, a Social Policy Task Force 
(SPTF) was set up by the UK Coalition Against Poverty (UKCAP) and the British 
Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN-UK) with the support of the Department for Work and 
Pensions (DWP). The SPTF’s objective was to bring together primary and secondary 
stakeholders who wanted to have direct talks with the government about social 
inclusion policies (Interview in Liverpool 24.03.2010). This meant that through 
membership in the SPTF, members of anti-poverty NGOs and networks including 
people with direct experience in poverty would come into contact with senior 
officers from the DWP so as to influence the NAPs.  
 
‘Structural impediments’ such as clientelism and corporatism (Featherstone 2005b: 
223), and the absence of a ‘political and organisational culture’ (Cowles et al. 2001: 
11) which would promote the participation of primary stakeholders in the policy-
making process, plus the lack of a process of learning which would facilitate 
Europeanisation (de la Porte and Pochet 2012), prevented Greece from responding 
positively to the OMC pressures for participation. As was shown in chapter 4 
(section 4.4), in the first two years after the launch of the OMC, the Greek 
government considered the social partners as the only relevant stakeholders who 
were invited to talks on issues of social inclusion. It was only in 2003 –two years 
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after the launch of the OMC– and after additional pressures from the EU, when the 
Greek government established a National Committee for Social Protection (NCSP) to 
open up forums for dialogue with a wider range of stakeholders. Like the British 
government had launched with anti-poverty associations the SPTF, the Greek 
government established the NCSP to promote dialogue with the relevant stakeholders 
about social inclusion policies. However, different issues emerged in the Greek 
NCSP and the British SPTF. Table 5.1 provides an overview of these differences. 
 
5.2.1 Members of the Social Policy Task Force and the National Committee for 
Social Protection 
 
The first British NAP on social inclusion stated the government’s intention to 
mobilise primary and secondary stakeholders through the social inclusion strategy 
(NAP UK 2001-2003). This statement of intent was followed up by action in the 
form of the government’s support for the establishment of the Social Policy Task 
Force. In Greece, the first NAP communicated the government’s intensions to 
mobilise, relevant to the social inclusion strategy, stakeholders among which 
included the NGOs. However, representatives from relevant NGOs (i.e. EAPN-
Greece, Arsis and Klimaka) stated in interviews which were conducted for this thesis 
that in the first years of the application of the OMC and before the establishment of 
the NCSP, the Greek government was only considering the social partners as relevant 
stakeholders in the fight against poverty. 
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Table 5.1: British and Greek responses to the OMC’s provisions for participation  
Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of interview information 
 
Additionally, the first Greek NAP did not make any reference to primary 
stakeholders. Although the establishment of the NCSP made some anti-poverty 
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 See chapter 1, part 3.1 
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SPTF (UK) 
 
NCSP (Greece) 
Year of establishment 2001 2003 
Members 
Primary and secondary 
stakeholders 
Government actors, social 
partners, secondary 
stakeholders. 
Stages of participation in 
the domestic strategy68 
Agenda-setting, 
implementation, 
monitoring 
Agenda-setting 
Degrees of participation69 
From involvement to 
collaboration 
From information to 
consultation 
Impact on NAPs 
Participants were 
influencing the NAPs 
No impact 
Performance (according to 
the participants' perception) 
Good Poor 
Status Informal Formal 
Participatory projects 
undertaken 
Get Heard, Bridging The 
Policy Gap (BTPG) 
No projects 
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associations official members of the dialogue with the government70, it did not offer 
people with direct experience in poverty the opportunity to participate in the 
dialogue. The only exception constituted the grassroots association the National 
Confederation of People with Disabilities (ESAEA) which had one member in the 
Committee. 
 
The lack of mobilisation of primary stakeholders in Greece was not only the 
responsibility of the government or the NCSP. As the case of the UK showed, the 
secondary stakeholders, who participated in the SPTF, promoted the involvement of 
primary stakeholders in the social inclusion policy-making process. British anti-
poverty associations have prioritised the participation of primary stakeholders in 
their own operations. For example, in the UKCAP, which was one of the two 
networks that established the SPTF together with the DWP, the board of directors 
comprised of equal numbers of secondary and primary stakeholders.71 Additionally, 
membership to the board of the Anti-Poverty Network Cymru (APNC), which was 
itself a member of the SPTF, was concerning only primary stakeholders. In fact, 
although secondary stakeholders were members of the APNC they were excluded 
from its board (Interview in Rhyl 24.02.2010).  
 
The attention that British anti-poverty NGOs and networks pay on the participation 
of primary stakeholders has been highlighted in chapter 3. British NGOs tend to look 
for socially excluded people and try to empower them to get involved in EU and 
domestic participatory projects and processes. Chapter 3 presented empirical 
                                                 
70
 Members of the Committee were also actors from the official sector (ministers and general 
secretaries), Greek social partners, the church and anti-poverty NGOs and networks (see section 4.4).  
71
 The board of the UKCAP has five members who are paid workers and five members who are 
people with direct experience in poverty (Interview in Liverpool 20.03.2010). 
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evidence that certain NGOs and networks (e.g. ATD-Fourth World, Migrants 
Resource Centre –MRC) were actively seeking socially excluded people and 
motivating them to participate in the policy-making process. Other NGOs such as the 
Off the Streets into Work (OSW) provided opportunities for primary stakeholders to 
self-organise workshops and conferences about social inclusion (Interview in London 
15.12.2009). Based on such a culture of anti-poverty organisations, the establishment 
of the SPTF as a forum for direct talks between the anti-poverty associations and the 
government resulted in the inclusion of primary stakeholders in the dialogue with the 
government.  
 
In Greece the NGOs and networks which participated in the National Committee of 
Social Protection were not represented by primary stakeholders. As was shown in 
chapter 4, a culture to include socially excluded people in the policy-making process 
has been absent in Greece. This applied not only to government officials but also to 
the operations of the secondary stakeholders. Thus, in Greece the views of socially 
excluded people had not been taken into consideration by the government and by 
many anti-poverty associations. As the representatives from the NGOs and networks 
which participated in the NCSP admitted in interviews, their associations do not 
systematically ask primary stakeholders for their views (Interviews in Athens 
07.12.2009a and 01.12.2011). Groups of socially excluded people in Greece (such as 
the Roma) were merely passive recipients of (EU and Greek) funding rather than 
active participants in social inclusion OMC activities. Since this funding was granted 
without further planning for social inclusion measures, it was often badly allocated 
and had no impact on the empowerment of the individuals and the communities in 
terms of participation.   
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Apart from showing a lack of ‘organisational culture’ (Cowles et al 2001: 11) which 
would otherwise facilitate Europeanisation (see also chapter 1 section 1.1.5), the 
findings from the interviews in Greece, which were presented in chapters 4, 
contradict de la Porte and Pochet’s (2005) claim that secondary stakeholders’ 
involvement in the domestic policy-making process triggers the involvement of 
primary stakeholders (see also chapter 1 section 1.3.1). De la Porte and Pochet 
(2005) found that in both Greece and the UK the participation of NGOs was good, 
while they classified the participation of people in poverty as medium. The term 
‘good’ was used by de la Porte and Pochet to describe a process of ‘genuine 
consultation’ between the government and stakeholders, while the term ‘medium’ 
described a process where there was dissemination of information from the 
government to the participating stakeholders (de la Porte and Pochet 2005: 378). 
However, the new empirical research findings put forward in this thesis about the 
participation of stakeholders in Greece and the UK show that in the first ten years 
after the launch of the social inclusion OMC, a significant level of secondary and 
primary stakeholder participation could only be found in the British implementation 
of the social OMC. In Greece, neither the participation of the NGOs in social 
inclusion OMC activities was found to be satisfactory, nor was it followed by the 
participation of people in poverty.   
 
5.2.2 Stages and degrees of participation 
 
Chapter 1 has shown that the analysis of the participation of primary and secondary 
stakeholders would particularly focus on the different stages of the policy-making 
 287 
process (i.e. agenda-setting, decision-making, implementation, and monitoring), as 
well as the different degrees of participation (i.e. information, consultation, 
involvement, collaboration, and empowerment). The fieldwork in the UK undertaken 
for this thesis showed that since its establishment in 2001 and until 2010 the SPTF 
was indeed participating in different stages of the policy-making process. One 
representative from the SPTF argued that during the agenda-setting stage of the 
NAPs the SPTF ‘worked together with the government’ (Interview in London 
05.02.2010). A representative from another NGO, which was also a member of the 
SPTF, stated that the SPTF was ‘fundamentally shaping the NAPs’ (Interview in 
London 15.12.2009). The representative from the EAPN-England stated in an 
interview that the SPTF was meeting with civil servants from the DWP on a regular 
basis i.e. every six weeks (Interview in Nottingham, 24.01.2009) while the director 
of Poverty Alliance highlighted the emergence of an on-going dialogue due to the 
OMC (Interview in Glasgow 02.12.2010). Thus, the direct dialogue was not limited 
to agenda-setting periods of the NAPs, but was extending to the monitoring of the 
NAPs. All of the interviews carried out with primary and secondary stakeholders for 
the UK case study praised the UK government for supporting the dialogue with 
stakeholders (e.g. Interview in Nottingham 24.11.2009). Certain interviewees argued 
that in the period 2001-2010 this dialogue went well beyond simple consultation (i.e. 
to inform and get feedback from stakeholders –see chapter 1 section 1.3.1). 
Considering the degrees of participation (as shown in chapter 1 section 1.3.1) British 
primary and secondary stakeholders were involved in the NAPs process because the 
SPTF was able to ensure that the views and concerns of its members were taken 
seriously by the policy-makers (Interview in Glasgow, 02.12.2010). Thus, issues 
which were raised in the dialogue between the stakeholders and the government were 
 288 
cited in the NAPs. For example, the British NAP 2008-2010 stated the main 
challenges (e.g. child poverty, income inequality etc) which, according to the 
document, had been identified by the SPTF and its members (UK NAP 2008-2010: 
2-3). Kenneth Armstrong appears to doubt whether this involvement can be 
considered as generally satisfactory in terms of its impacts on the policy agenda 
(Armstrong 2010). However, as has been argued earlier in this chapter, from the 
fieldwork carried out for this thesis emerged that participants’ views varied 
concerning their own participation. Participants in the SPTF considered the 
promotion of the above mentioned issues onto the political agenda as one of their 
‘main achievements’ (SPTF 2008: 45). These points will be taken up in the 
conclusion chapter. 
 
Other examples of policy influence include the incorporation of the key messages of 
the Get Heard and the Bridging the Policy Gap (BTPG) projects (see chapter 3 
section 3.4.2) in the annexes of the NAP 2006-2008 and NAP 2008-2010 
respectively. These projects were launched by the anti-poverty associations (e.g. 
UKCAP, EAPN-UK, Poverty Alliance) with the support of the DWP in an effort to 
meet the social inclusion OMC’s objective for the self-expression of primary 
stakeholders. This means that the government worked together with stakeholders 
during the stage of implementation of the NAPs. According to the analysis put 
forward in chapter 1 (section 1.3.1) primary and secondary stakeholders collaborated 
with the government in this stage of the NAP process.  
 
In Greece regular meetings between the government and anti-poverty associations 
did not take place. Interviews with representatives from these associations showed 
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that the OMC resulted only in limited participation. Interviewees referred to one-off 
meetings between the administration and anti-poverty associations which took place 
within the context of the social inclusion OMC. They also complained about the 
government merely sending out questionnaires instead of holding meetings with 
stakeholders. Chapter 4 argued that one of the core reasons why secondary 
stakeholders abandoned their efforts to participate in the NCSP was that they felt the 
government was using the Committee merely to inform them about decisions which 
had already been taken. In contrast to the UK where a direct and on-going dialogue 
emerged which included the agenda-setting and monitoring stages of the policy-
making process, the Greek interviewees argued that consultation occurred largely on 
an ad hoc basis and was sometimes used by the government merely to inform 
secondary stakeholders (i.e. one way information from the government to the NGOs) 
during only the agenda-setting stage. In an extreme case, the director of the EAPN-
Greece argued that the NAPs were submitted to the EU by the Greek government 
without stakeholders having been informed of the content of the final version 
(Interview in Athens 08.12.2009). Shortcomings were not only reported by 
interviewees from anti-poverty associations. Even the official NAPs admitted that the 
government tended to consider the implementation and monitoring of social 
inclusion policies as of secondary importance (e.g. Greece NSR 2008-2010). The 
limited involvement of NGOs and networks in the social inclusion OMC process in 
Greece, and the lack of involvement of primary stakeholders, have also been 
highlighted in the academic literature (Delistathis et al. 2009; Ziomas et al. 2007).  
 
Therefore, the lack of impact of the stakeholders’ views on the NAPs comes as no 
surprise as only very limited participation of stakeholders took place in Greece which 
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could not have been expected to influence the government’s policy agenda. Another 
explanation is that in Greece there is a gap between those who discuss with 
organisations (i.e. the administration) and those who take the decisions (i.e. the 
political leadership) (Delistathis et al. 2009). As key stakeholders have pointed out, 
even when civil servants understand the concerns of secondary stakeholders, the final 
decisions are taken by politicians who, in turn, decide according to the priorities of 
the political party in power. According to this argument, the priorities of the political 
decision-makers are often incongruent with those topics that have been discussed 
during the consultation process (Interview in Athens 08.12.2009; see also 
Featherstone 2005b). Moreover, corporatist structures have prevented stakeholders 
(other than the social partners) from being represented in the social dialogue 
(Interview in Athens 08.12.2009). It is for these reasons that the opinions and 
concerns of the stakeholders, who are involved in the consultation phase only to a 
limited degree and on an ad hoc basis, are not been taken up by the political decision-
makers. 
 
While the UK seems to have found it much easier to implement the social inclusion 
OMC when compared to Greece, even in the UK things are not always ideal. In other 
words, progress in participation ‘will never be uniformly positive’ (Poverty Alliance 
2005: 3). Anti-poverty associations (through the CEFET72 network in East Midlands) 
have argued that the government did not really promote the mobilisation of all 
groups of socially excluded people. According to this criticism, quite often people 
who were facilitated by the government to participate, were people who were not 
                                                 
72
 ‘As the East Midlands European Social Fund Third Sector Technical Assistance body, CEFET acts 
as a “bridge” between the administration of the Funds and Community, Voluntary and Social 
Economy Groups who are interested in contributing to the development of an effective ESF 
programme in the region.’ From the official CEFET web portal: 
 http://www.cefet.org.uk/eastmidsob3.asp, accessed on 12.02.2012. 
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facing social exclusion or poverty, but multiple disadvantages (CEFET 2007).73 
Similar concerns have been addressed by the ATD-Fourth World (and the Poverty 
Alliance), as chapter 3 has shown.  
 
Two additional issues emerged from the fieldwork for this thesis. The first issue 
relates to the nature of participation, namely whether it amounts to formal or 
informal consultation. The second issue relates to the participation of primary 
stakeholders in two projects in the UK, namely Get Heard and Bridging the Policy 
Gap. 
 
5.2.3 Formal vs. informal participation 
 
In the UK the participation of primary and secondary stakeholders took place despite 
the fact that the SPTF was an informal forum for dialogue. In Greece the limited 
participation which took place happened within the NCSP which was an official 
Committee set up by ministerial act (Act 3144/2003). In the UK, the Labour 
government decided (shortly before the 2010 elections, which it lost) to formalise the 
emerged on-going dialogue by establishing a Social Inclusion Advisory Group 
(SIAG) in the place of the SPTF. The DWP favoured the establishment of the SIAG 
with delegates from the relevant departments, members from NGOs, academics and 
people with direct experience in poverty. The SPTF held its last meeting in January 
2010 and the SIAG was set up before the general elections in May 2010 (Interview in 
Liverpool 20.03.2010). However, the SIAG met only twice. According to 
                                                 
73
 According to CEFET (2007: 4), multiple disadvantages ‘do not in themselves constitute exclusion’ 
(emphasis in the original). 
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Schönheinz (forthcoming) the SIAG’s operations have been cut significantly due to 
the austerity budgets by the Conservative-Liberal coalition government.  
 
Consequently in the UK an informal (i.e. SPTF) rather than a formal forum (i.e. 
SIAG) led to direct and on-going dialogue between (secondary and primary 
stakeholders) and the government (i.e. DWP). In Greece, an officially established 
committee triggered only a limited dialogue between the government and anti-
poverty associations. There seems to be a paradox between the formalisation of the 
social inclusion OMC processes in Greece and the UK and the perceptions of the 
stakeholders about the nature of their participation in the OMC in these two member 
states. As was explained in chapter 4 the OMC was seen by most Greek stakeholders 
as a very soft method which failed to produce significant changes in the domestic 
social inclusion process in general, and in participation practices in particular. As 
was pointed out in chapter 3, British stakeholders perceived the social inclusion 
OMC as strong enough to raise issues of social inclusion onto the domestic political 
agenda. Greek stakeholders perceive the OMC as soft, despite the fact that the Greek 
government had set up an official Committee for dialogue. In contrast, British 
stakeholders perceived the OMC as a relatively hard tool although it promoted an 
informal dialogue (i.e. through the SPTF).   
 
In addition to the softness or the hardness of the OMC, what matters is also the 
commitment of the officials to the OMC-led social inclusion strategy. This 
commitment influences the participation of primary and secondary stakeholders at 
the domestic level. As Vanhercke has argued ‘it is not the “hardness” or the 
“softness” of the OMC that matters, but its capacity to stimulate creative 
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appropriation and action by European, national and sub-national actors’ (Vanhercke 
2010: 116; see also chapter 1 section 1.1.5). The creative implementation of the 
social inclusion OMC seemed to exist in the UK. Senior officers of the DWP 
appeared to use the OMC to promote the participation of primary and secondary 
stakeholders. The senior DWP officers were perceived by secondary and primary 
stakeholders to be committed and engaged with social inclusion issues (e.g. 
Interview in Liverpool 24.03.2010). They thus took advantage of the OMC 
provisions and promoted the participation of stakeholders who focused on issues of 
social inclusion. 
 
5.2.4 Participatory projects undertaken in the context of the OMC 
 
The OMC’s provisions spurred on anti-poverty associations to focus on the 
participation of primary stakeholders in the UK social inclusion policy-making 
process. They triggered the setting up of the two major projects in terms of 
participation of primary stakeholders, namely the Get Heard and the Bridging the 
Policy Gap projects which both called for primary stakeholders’ participation in the 
NAP with the support of the DWP. In the context of these projects, more than 150 
workshops and peer reviews, with the participation of people in poverty, were 
organised across the UK. Participants in the workshops discussed what was working, 
what was not working and what should be done in terms of domestic social inclusion 
policies (UKCAP 2004b). Stakeholder participation in these projects can therefore be 
seen as an effort for feeding participants’ views and concerns in the agenda-setting 
and monitoring stages of the British social inclusion policy-making process (see 
chapter 3.4.2). Full reports of the findings of Get Heard and BTPG were included in 
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the annexes of the NAP 2006-2008 and NAP 2008-2010, which shows that 
participants’ views were taken seriously by the policy-makers. 
 
Importantly, the ideas for the launch and structure of the projects were, according to 
key actors, downloaded from the EU level where they had been identified as good 
practices (Interviews in London 05.02.2010, 16.02.2010a). For example, 
representatives from ATD-Fourth World and MRC confirmed in interviews for this 
thesis, that their organisations downloaded the idea for the Get Heard directly from 
the EU which had organised quasi-institutionalised annual meetings for people in 
poverty in which the interviewees had participated (Interview in London 
05.02.2010). One representative from the ATD-Fourth World argued that the EU’s 
annual meetings were ‘uploaded’ by countries such as France and Belgium which 
have held similar events on the domestic level before the social inclusion OMC was 
adopted (Interview in London 16.02.2010a).  
 
The Poverty Alliance, which is made up of anti-poverty associations and undertook 
the BTPG project, and the EAPN-EU as well as academic research, all have 
confirmed that the idea of organising workshops in the form of peer reviews was 
downloaded from the EU since ‘peer review’ itself is a ‘European concept’ 
(Interview in Glasgow 02.12.2010; see also Armstrong, 2010: 184; EAPN-EU, 2009: 
65). The uploading and downloading of good practices plays an important role in 
Börzel’s Europeanisation concept. The empirical evidence put forward in the case 
studies show that the British social inclusion strategy has been Europeanised in terms 
of the participation of primary stakeholders. This must be seen in contrast to the 
Greek social inclusion policy-making process As said earlier, the primary 
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stakeholders continued to be excluded from expressing their views and experiences 
within the Greek domestic social inclusion OMC activities.  
 
While drawing on the findings of chapters 3 and 4, the next part of this chapter will 
show how differences in the nature of participation in Greece and the UK resulted in 
different impacts on participants’ expectations, political activities and loyalties. 
Additionally, it will show how and in which cases the participation in the OMC 
triggered shifts in expectations, political activities and loyalties from the domestic 
level to the EU. 
 
 
5.3 Domestic participation and the redirection of expectations, political activities 
and loyalties 
 
Despite the social inclusion OMC’s provisions for participation of primary and 
secondary stakeholders, the analytical framework in chapter 1 acknowledged that the 
limited visibility of the method was likely to be an obstacle for the participation of 
large numbers of stakeholders. Chapters 3 and 4 partly confirmed the argument in 
literature according to which the participation of stakeholders makes the OMC ‘more 
visible’ to them (PPMI 2011: 14). Interviewees from the NCSP in Greece and the 
SPTF in the UK were aware of the social inclusion OMC and the developments (or 
the obstacles to them) which the method had triggered domestically and at EU level. 
However, in the UK despite the mobilisation of primary stakeholders for the Get 
Heard and BTPG projects, evidence presented in chapter 3 and above showed that 
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those who participated in the two projects remained unaware of the EU framework 
which had triggered their participation.  
 
Thus, the Europeanisation of the British social inclusion policy did not automatically 
lead to the redirection of the expectations, political activities and loyalties from the 
national to the EU level of the participants in the Get Heard and BTPG projects. The 
impact of the OMC on the launch of these participatory projects in the UK was 
highlighted in chapter 3 which also researched the ‘stakeholder visibility’ (de la 
Porte 2010: 10). In other words, it focused on whether participants in the projects 
were aware of the OMC. It is worth repeating that the projects were funded by the 
EU in order to meet the objective of:  
 
improving information and raising awareness among concerned stakeholders 
and the wider public about the relevance of the European Union’s social 
inclusion and the social protection processes with regard to the efforts 
undertaken at the national level to prevent and reduce poverty and social 
exclusion (EC 2006c: 4 –see also chapter 3 section 3.5) 
 
Empirical evidence gathered from interviews and documents produced by Get Heard 
and BTPG showed that despite the initial objectives of the projects to raise awareness 
about the EU’s social inclusion strategy, participants focused exclusively on the 
domestic strategy. They discussed complex issues of social inclusion on the local, 
regional and national levels but they ignored the EU level. Participation in these 
projects empowered participants to start political activities and made them express 
loyalties to a community of common concerns. However, this phenomenon cannot be 
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regarded as a redirection of expectations, political activities and loyalties from the 
national to the EU level. Because the participants in the projects focused on the local, 
regional and domestic levels their expectations, political activities and loyalties were 
also directed at the local, regional and domestic levels. 
 
The reasons for the invisibility of the social inclusion OMC identified included the 
lack of dissemination of information about the EU by the organisations which 
organised the projects, and the fact that the former organisations eventually 
considered these projects as projects addressing domestic concerns and not EU 
concerns. In general, the field research in the UK showed that key members of the 
SPTF did not consider domestic participation as part of a European process which 
had been launched to address common European concerns and solutions. Instead the 
SPTF members perceived participation as a process which was promoted by the EU 
as solution for the domestic concerns of primary and secondary stakeholders. As a 
result, the common European concerns and objectives were not evident not only in 
either of the two projects but also in the overall application of the social inclusion 
OMC in the UK.     
 
Despite the absence of a socialisation process under common concerns and 
objectives, all stakeholders in Greece and the UK (who were aware of the role of the 
social inclusion OMC) viewed participation as a benefit from the EU’s initiatives. 
However, the above mentioned differences led to differences between British and 
Greek participants’ redirections of expectations, political activities and loyalties, as 
the following sections show.   
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5.3.1 Expectations towards the EU 
 
Greek stakeholders involved in the social inclusion OMC process (e.g. members of 
the EAPN-Greece, Klimaka and Arsis) argued that the launch of the method created 
expectations towards the EU. This was largely due to the method’s provisions for 
participation which were perceived by stakeholders as provisions that would give 
them the desired role in the domestic social inclusion policy-making process. 
Because the domestic framework did not provide stakeholders with opportunities to 
participate in the social inclusion process, they perceived the OMC provisions as a 
new European framework which would empower them to influence the policies of 
their concern. Greek stakeholders argued that the OMC provided the basis for 
discussions of the NAPs between the government and secondary stakeholders 
(Interviews in Athens 07.12.2009a, 01.12.2010). Interviewees argued that this 
dialogue would not have emerged without the OMC. The director of the EAPN-
Greece stated that the OMC was seen as part of the European framework and 
perceived as the ‘appropriate tool’ to pursue participation and to influence domestic 
social inclusion policies (Interview in Athens 08.12.2009).  
 
However, while the launch of the OMC seemed to provide the basis for participation, 
it raised stakeholder expectations towards the EU only temporarily. These 
stakeholder expectations were influenced negatively by the domestic social inclusion 
OMC activities, as these allowed for only a very limited participation of secondary 
stakeholders while excluding primary stakeholders. The establishment of the 
National Committee for Social Protection created a formal space for dialogue 
between the government and the anti-poverty associations. It provided the secondary 
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stakeholders with a formally recognised position. However, the participation 
activities did not meet stakeholders’ expectations for the following three main 
reasons. First, because participants realised that the participation included only 
secondary stakeholders while excluding primary stakeholders. Second, the 
participation amounted only to irregular consultation at the agenda-setting stage of 
the NAPs, as most interviewees in Greece perceived it as a purely formal exercise 
(e.g. Interviews in Athens 07.12.2009a, 08.12.2009). And thirdly, the concerns of 
participants were not taken into consideration by the policy-makers. In the period 
2001-2010, none of the NAPs referred to an input provided by stakeholders.  
 
During the interviews carried out in Greece, it was emerged that after the review of 
the Lisbon strategy (March 2005), even fewer anti-poverty networks were 
participating in the domestic OMC-led process (e.g. Interview in Athens 
08.12.2009). This happened because the review of the Lisbon strategy was perceived 
as leading to a significant reduction of the EU efforts to create participatory 
frameworks in the member states. According to the director of the EAPN-Greece, the 
EU’s decisions to abandon the Lisbon’s quantitative objectives were perceived by 
Greek secondary stakeholders as retreat from the strategy’s overall objectives 
including participation (Interview in Athens 08.12.2009). The review therefore 
created even more disappointment among the (secondary) stakeholders which were 
involved in limited participation at the agenda-setting stage of the social inclusion 
OMC in Greece. While the opportunities for participation and the early 
developments created expectations among the stakeholders towards the EU 
framework, developments related to the participation turned these expectations into 
disappointment.  
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In the UK too, the OMC and its provisions created expectations amongst (secondary 
and primary) stakeholders since the method was theoretically providing the 
necessary framework for them to participate in the social inclusion policy-making 
process and to influence the policies which concerned them. Similar to the case of 
Greece, British key stakeholders (e.g. ATD-Fourth World, MRC, EAPN-England, 
UKCAP) argued that people in poverty and anti-poverty associations were unable to 
participate in the domestic social inclusion policy-making process prior to the EU’s 
involvement. The exception was Scotland where primary and secondary stakeholders 
were mobilised to be consulted by the devolved government. However, this was not 
an on-going dialogue similar to the one required by the OMC (Interview in Glasgow 
02.12.2010). It was only after the establishment of the SPTF, that the level of actual 
participation exceeded their initial expectations and, as shown earlier in this chapter, 
in many cases the SPTF managed to influence the NAPs. Stakeholders who 
participated in the social inclusion policy-making process through the SPTF assigned 
these positive developments to the social inclusion OMC and the European 
framework. All interviewees from the SPTF argued that participation in the form of 
an on-going regular dialogue, which included different stages of the social inclusion 
policy-making process (see also section 5.2 above), would not have emerged without 
the OMC. They thought that through the OMC a strong framework had been created 
which gave them a recognised position (e.g. Interview in London 05.02.2010). One 
interviewee argued that before the OMC primary and secondary stakeholders were 
unable to speak to the government about poverty (Interview in London 16.02.2010a). 
Due to the OMC the government recognised that it should involve stakeholders in the 
policy-making process (ibid.). What is more, in the UK the review of the Lisbon 
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strategy did not affect the participation of primary and secondary stakeholders or 
their perceptions regarding the EU’s role. The biggest participatory projects (i.e. Get 
Heard and BTPG) with primary stakeholders took place during and after that review. 
Thus, primary and secondary stakeholders who participated in the SPTF shifted their 
expectations from the domestic level to the EU level due to the benefits which the 
latter continuously provided in the period 2001-2010.   
 
5.3.2 Political activities towards the EU 
 
Following shifts in expectations, British secondary stakeholders also appeared to 
redirect their political activities towards the EU level. For example, one interviewee 
pointed out that while the UKCAP had been exclusively focused on the domestic 
social inclusion strategy, participation in the OMC context made them realise that a 
lot of the domestic strategy was actually influenced by the EU (ibid.). Thus, after the 
launch of the OMC and in order to meet their increasing expectations from the EU 
framework, they established partnerships with EU oriented associations (particularly 
the EAPN-UK). It seems that for stakeholders who participated in the application of 
the OMC in the UK, the importance of the EU in the domestic social inclusion policy 
process was apparent and perceived as positive. The representative from the EAPN-
England stated that stakeholders perceived the EU’s social inclusion OMC as strong 
enough to put pressure on the British government to provide the relevant non-
traditional stakeholders with opportunities for participation (Interview in Nottingham 
24.01.2009).   
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Interviews in Greece did not provide evidence that the participation through the 
OMC led to stakeholders’ redirection of political activities towards the EU, at least 
not on a regular basis. Greek stakeholders redirected their political activities towards 
the EU framework only after the Greek government had been found out to be 
reluctant to adapt to the social inclusion OMC pressures in general, and the pressures 
for stakeholders’ participation. As chapter 4 showed, in their efforts to overcome 
obstacles to widened participation in Greece, Greek secondary stakeholders became 
interested in developments that the OMC framework brought about at EU level and 
in other member states. The EAPN-Greece asked the director of the EAPN-EU –at a 
time when its director was Greek– to put pressure on the Greek government to enable 
the participation of anti-poverty associations. However, pressure from the EAPN-EU 
did not succeed in changing the governments’ attitudes (Interview in Athens 
08.12.2009). As a result, the Greek stakeholders abandoned their redirection of 
political activities towards the EU because their expectations had turned into 
disappointment. According to interviewees from anti-poverty NGOs (i.e. Klimaka 
and IKE), the possibility that the EU would be able to put pressure on the Greek 
government to meet the OMC objectives was very limited (e.g. Interviews in Athens 
07.12.2009a). Asked whether they felt that the EU could indeed put pressure on the 
government to promote participation, interviewees argued that the OMC was merely 
a soft instrument of coordination which had turned out to be too soft to be able to 
influence significantly the participation of stakeholders in the consultation stage, let 
alone in other stages of the social policy-making process (Interviews in Athens 
20.12.2010, 08.12.2009). Therefore, in contrast to the UK, the importance of the EU 
in the field of social inclusion was not acknowledged or at least not valued positively 
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by Greek stakeholders, although there were some exceptions as were pointed out 
above.  
 
5.3.3 Loyalties towards the EU  
 
The above described differences in the expectations and political activities of the 
participating stakeholders in Greece and the UK have also had an impact on primary 
(in the UK) and secondary stakeholder loyalties towards the EU. As was argued 
earlier in this chapter, stakeholders who shift their expectations and political 
activities towards the EU level may also shift their loyalties if the shifts in 
expectations and political activities have occurred persistently over a significant 
period of time. According to Ernst Haas’s (1958: 5) definition of loyalties,  
 
a population may be said to be loyal to a set of symbols and institutions when 
it habitually and predictably over long period obeys the injunctions of their 
authority and turns to them for the satisfaction of important expectations.  
 
The empirical evidence provided in this thesis (see in particular chapters 3 and 4) 
showed that the persistence in the shift of stakeholder expectations and political 
activities from the domestic level towards the EU level did exist in the case of the 
UK. British stakeholders appeared to acknowledge the EU’s authority as long as the 
EU’s involvement in the field of social inclusion was beneficial to them. In Greece 
the initial moderate redirection of stakeholders’ expectations and political activities 
towards the EU level was soon followed by disappointment and the EU’s authority 
was not acknowledged due to its incapacity to bring about the expected benefits.  
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Additionally, since the financial crisis the Eurobarometer survey results have 
reflected a notable decrease in British and Greek citizens’ trust of EU institutions 
(Eurobarometer 2011a). However, the decline in support for EU institutions in 
Greece was confirmed in interviews with stakeholders. The following statement 
illustrates this point well:  
 
I believe that as regards the EU, its political system and structure reproduce 
poverty and social exclusion. Why are we now wondering about all this? The 
EU reproduces them [i.e. poverty and social exclusion] - Merkel and Sarkozy 
… Who is behind poverty and social exclusion in Greece in this period of 
time? (Interview in Athens 20.12.2010)       
 
As said above, the fieldwork carried out for this thesis in Greece showed that the 
emergence of expectations and political activities among the Greek participants in 
the social inclusion OMC process did not involve an acknowledgment of the 
authority and positive role of the EU in changing Greek public policy. According to 
Haas’s (1958) predictions, the limited, ad hoc redirection of expectations and 
political activities does not trigger a shift in loyalties from the domestic level toward 
the EU level. Since the severe financial crisis became evident in Greece, it has 
become apparent that stakeholders’ limited shift in expectations and political 
activities towards the EU have been met with disappointment.  
 
In contrast to Greece, in the UK the stakeholders’ shifts in expectations and political 
activities towards the EU level were stronger and more durable. British (primary and 
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secondary) stakeholders acknowledged the EU’s authority and valued positively its 
contribution. This, in turn, facilitated a shift in loyalties from the domestic towards 
the EU level. Some interviewees in the UK explained how participation through the 
OMC made them shift their loyalties to the EU (e.g. Interview in Liverpool 
24.03.2010). Other interviewees stated that participation is one of the political 
activities (together with street protests and lobbying) that have to be combined in a 
period of economic crisis in order to influence the EU’s social inclusion strategy 
(Interview in Glasgow 02.12.2010). The value of the last statement is easier to 
understand when it is compared with the statements from Greek stakeholders. The 
Greek stakeholders did not show any durable shifts in loyalties towards the EU 
which they accused for the worsening of the economic situation since the onset of 
the financial crises. In Britain, members of the SPTF appeared to have shifted their 
loyalties to the EU level, despite the (when compared to Greece, less severe) 
financial crisis and several austerity budgets implemented by the Conservative-
Liberal coalition government. For this reason British stakeholders appeared to 
consider the EU level as an important political level towards which their political 
activities should (continue to) be directed.      
  
The comparison of the expectations, political activities and loyalties towards the EU 
concern primarily a rational assessment of the EU through participation in the OMC. 
As has been shown in chapter 1, participation in the OMC can advance ‘domestic 
actors’ pre-existing interests and goals’ (Zeitlin 2005: 37). Accordingly, actors who 
could not pursue their interests domestically, prior to the OMC have used the OMC 
for the pursuit of their interests (de la Porte and Pochet 2005). As Haas (1958) 
argued with regard to the shift of expectations, political activities and loyalties, 
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groups and individuals can redirect these attitudes towards the supranational level if 
this is the level at which they expect to realise their interests. Participants in the UK 
shifted their expectations, political activities and loyalties towards the EU. These 
shifts in expectations, political activities and loyalties were based on a rational 
assessment of the EU by the involved stakeholders. Due to the lack of OMC features 
which were expected to promote socialisation (e.g. indicators and objectives which 
promote policy learning –see chapter 3 section 3.3), these redirections were not the 
result of socialisation under EU norms and common concerns. The positive rational 
assessment, which triggered the redirection of expectations, political activities and 
loyalties in the UK, seemed to be much weaker in the case of Greece. This is the 
reason why Greek stakeholders experienced only limited shifts in expectations and 
political activities and no shifts in loyalties. Before entering in the issue of the 
possible shifts in expectations, political activities and loyalties that participation 
through the OMC at EU level can trigger, table 5.2 provides an overview of the 
expectations, political activities and loyalties towards the EU among stakeholders 
who in the period 2001-2010 were involved in the domestic social inclusion policy-
making process in Greece and the UK 
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Table 5.2: Domestic Participation of non-traditional stakeholders in Greece and the 
UK and the redirection of their loyalties, expectations and political activities 
towards the EU. 
 
 
UK Greece 
 
Expectations 
 
Significant 
 
Limited 
 
Political Activities 
 
Significant 
 
Limited 
 
Loyalties 
 
Significant 
 
No loyalties 
Source: Based on the analysis of the interviews carried out for this thesis 
 
 
5.4 Stakeholders’ participation in EU projects and the redirection of 
expectations, political activities and loyalties 
 
According to the OMC’s participatory provisions (see chapter 1) primary 
stakeholders (i.e. people who experience poverty) were expected to be involved in 
the domestic social inclusion policies. However, the participatory provisions were 
not implemented by the Greek government. In the UK, where major projects took 
place, the participants were not aware of the EU’s role in the field of social inclusion. 
However, as has been shown in chapters 1 and 2, the social inclusion OMC has been 
behind an important quasi-institutionalised EU participatory project, namely the 
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annual Brussels European Meetings of People Experiencing Poverty (EMPEP). 
While these annual conferences have been highly valued by the participants and anti-
poverty NGOs and networks (see chapter 2), they have been largely neglected by the 
existing academic studies of the social inclusion OMC (see also chapter 1). This 
section intends to fill this gap in the academic literature by offering a comparative 
analysis of the impact which stakeholder participation in these conferences has had 
on their expectations, political activities and loyalties.  
 
Like all member states, the UK and Greece participated every year in the Brussels 
conference with delegations that consisted of one coordinator and between five and 
six primary stakeholders. The national delegates were chosen by the EAPN-Greece 
and the EAPN-UK respectively. The only difference between the two member states 
is that in the UK there is an effort to represent primary stakeholders from one of the 
four nations’ networks (EAPN-England, APNC, Poverty Alliance and Northern 
Ireland Anti-Poverty Network) each year.  
 
According to the new empirical findings put forward in chapters 3 and 4, 
participation in these conferences in the period within the timeframe of this thesis 
(i.e. 2001-2010) had a moderate impact on the expectations, political activities and 
loyalties of the participants. However, while the expectations, political activities and 
loyalties of the participants at the domestic level were influenced solely by 
rationalism, the participants in the annual conference in Brussels were also affected 
by a socialisation process under common EU concerns and objectives amongst the 
involved stakeholders. Table 5.3 provides an overview of the redirections (or the lack 
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of redirections) in British and Greek participants’ expectations, political activities 
and loyalties towards the EU. 
 
Table 5.3: Participation of British and Greek primary stakeholders at the EU level 
and the redirection of their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards the 
EU. 
 
 
 
UK 
 
Greece 
 
Expectations 
 
No expectations 
 
Limited 
 
Political Activities 
 
Limited 
 
Limited 
 
Loyalties 
 
Limited 
 
Limited 
Source: Compiled on the basis of findings derived from interviews which were undertaken for this 
thesis. 
 
5.4.1 Expectations towards the EU 
 
As has been shown in chapter 4, and above in this chapter, the voices of the people 
who experience poverty in Greece were not being heard by Greek policy-makers 
(prior or during the application of the social inclusion OMC in Greece). These 
people’s views were largely neglected even by the anti-poverty NGOs and networks. 
As a result, delegates from Greece were initially enthusiastic about the EU as they 
were given, for the first time, the opportunity to express their experiences and views 
about the policies which affect them (Interview in Crete 20.01.2011). For this reason 
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they appeared to raise expectations towards the EU. Expectations towards the EU 
were particularly strong in the case of Greece as can be seen, for example, from the 
statement of one participant who argued that the possible failure of a positive policy 
outcome should be blamed on the Greek social inclusion strategy and not on the 
European (ibid.).  
 
The British delegates appeared more experienced in terms of participation in the 
social inclusion strategy. Due to the domestic implementation of the social inclusion 
OMC, the primary stakeholders in the UK started being involved and collaborated 
with officials in the domestic policy-making process. This happened either through 
participation in the SPTF or through participation in the Get Heard and BTPG 
projects. In the period 2001-2010, primary stakeholders were also consulted by the 
anti-poverty associations (i.e. NGOs and networks) of the boards of which they were 
members. Therefore, these primary stakeholders had strong expectations from the 
domestic policy framework. At the same time, representatives from anti-poverty 
associations (such as the ATD-Fourth World and the Poverty Alliance) admitted that 
they were intentionally playing down expectations towards the EU before the 
participation of primary stakeholders in the Brussels meetings. Overall, for the 
British delegates, the conferences in Brussels were neither seen as unique spaces for 
self-expression and participation in the consultation of the social inclusion strategy, 
nor as opportunities for the change of the policies which affect the participants 
(Interview in Rhyl 24.02.2010).  
 
From this comparison it seems that the Greek delegates’ expectations were initially 
based on a rational assessment of the EU, this was similar to the one which was 
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found among the stakeholders who participate in domestic level social inclusion 
OMC activities in the UK and Greece. According to this assessment, the EU offered 
benefits which were not available in the domestic framework. However, comparable 
to the participation on the domestic level, the expectations from the EU level turned 
into disappointment. Participants soon realised that participation in the annual 
Brussels meetings did not result in changes in their daily life. Additionally, the Greek 
interviewees stated their belief that the EU was not actually considering these 
meetings as important; the absence of the invited MEPs from almost all the member 
states was interpreted as lack of interest on behalf of the EU for the primary 
stakeholders’ voices (Interview in Athens 03.12.2011).    
 
5.4.2 Political activities towards the EU 
 
For British and Greek delegates political activities were limited to the days that the 
conferences were taking place. Some participants argued that people were going to 
these conferences with the intention to promote their own interests rather than those 
of other participants or common interests. However, during the conferences these 
attitudes were changing and participants were starting to articulate common 
(European) problems, priorities and solutions. Yet, the empirical evidence provided 
in chapters 3 and 4 shows that after the conferences the participants did not continue 
to plan further political activities towards the EU. They appeared to believe that all 
policies were coming from the EU, but that the EU level was too remote to be 
affected by their political activities. According to this line of thinking, political 
activism at local, regional and national level was more likely to produce policy 
outcomes than political activities directed to the EU level (Interview in Crete 
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20.02.2011; Interview in Rhyl 24.02.2011). Additionally, activism towards the EU 
was presupposing that other members from the local community would also shift 
their political activities towards the EU. However, as a Greek delegate to the EU 
conferences said in an interview for this thesis, people locally were unaware of the 
EU’s role in the field of social inclusion (Interview in Crete 03.12.2012). According 
to the same interviewee, people from the local community were not at all interested 
in actions which would be oriented towards the EU level.  
 
In both Greece and the UK, interviewees highlighted that Greek and British 
participants in the European meetings of people experiencing poverty became active 
after their participation primarily at the local level. According to the director of the 
EAPN-Greece, one Greek participant decided to set up a women’s union in the 
Northern Greece in order to promote socially excluded women’s interests (Interview 
in Athens 08.12.2009). In the UK, interviewees from the ATD-Fourth World and the 
MRC, which participated together in the Sixth EMPEP in 2007, argued that British 
delegates to the EMPEP expressed solidarity between each other on return from 
Brussels. They participated in common local projects trying to respond to different 
challenges that different forms of social exclusion posed (see also Dierckx and Van 
Herck 2010: 20).  
 
 
 
5.4.3 Loyalties towards the EU 
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As has been shown above, the impact of participation at the EU level on the 
expectations and political activities of the participants was limited. In the case of the 
UK, expectations towards the EU did not emerge after participation. In the case of 
Greece, initial (positive) expectations were soon turned into disappointment. 
Concerning political activities, delegates from both countries focused on common 
priorities and demands from the EU which, however, was limited to the duration of 
the conferences. After the conferences participants launched political activities 
which, however, were focused at the local level. 
 
The primary stakeholders’ limited presence of the EU in their daily life seems to 
have been crucial for the (potential) emergence of loyalties. According to Herrmann 
and Brewer (2004: 14; see also chapter 1) people’s loyalties are expected to be 
redirected towards the EU level only if the supranational institutions are ‘salient’ to 
the people’s personal lives. In fact participants acknowledged that the EU institutions 
were increasingly affecting their lives. Nevertheless, they felt that their own input 
into the EU policy-making process through the participation in the annual 
conferences in Brussels did not have an impact on policy decisions. This is the main 
reason why expectations and political activities turned into disappointment. 
However, the EU annual conferences provided for ‘shared experiences’ and ‘shared 
social norms’ which was one of the prerequisites for the shift in loyalties stipulated 
by Hermann and Brewer (ibid.). A process of socialisation with people from other 
member states with similar concerns and similar objectives seemed to redirect the 
loyalties of the participants towards the EU level.  
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The evidence put forward in chapters 3 and 4 showed that the shift in loyalties 
towards the EU followed a different route from the shift in expectations and political 
activities. From the comparison of Greek and British participation of stakeholders at 
the domestic level, it emerged that the more expectations and political activities are 
directed towards the EU, the more loyalties are likely to shift from the domestic 
towards the EU level. However, after participation in the Brussels conferences, the 
shift of loyalties did not appear to depend on the expectations and political activities 
which primary stakeholders had had before the conference. The fieldwork for this 
thesis showed that participants redirected their loyalties towards the EU level, but 
these redirections were based on the socialisation process with delegates from other 
member states (rather than the result of expectations towards the EU level) (e.g. 
Interview in Athens 20.01.2011; Interview in Rhyl 24.02.2010). In the absence of a 
possibility of influencing changes in EU policies through participating in the 
Brussels conferences, the sharing of experiences was underlined by the participants 
as of major importance (see also Hermann and Brewer 2004). Based on this sharing 
of experiences, participants from both Greece and the UK developed a sense of 
belonging to a European community. This community seems to include all those who 
face similar problems and challenges regardless of their country of origin. 
Coordinators from delegations from both Greece and the UK argued in interviews for 
this thesis that the people who participated started to realise that there are different 
levels of social inclusion in different member states. However, these differences did 
not seem to prevent the emergence of community feelings and affinities among the 
participants (e.g. Interview in Athens 08.12.2009; Interview in London 16.02.2010a). 
Participants did not redirect their loyalties towards the EU because of the benefits 
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which they expected from the EU level. They appeared to view the EU as a 
community of destiny (see chapter 1 section 1.2.5).  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter offered a comparative analysis between Greece and the UK in the 
context of the research question upon whether participation in the social inclusion 
OMC leads to a shift in the participants’ expectations, political activities and 
loyalties. The first concern of this chapter was to compare the different patterns of 
participation of primary and secondary stakeholders in the application of the social 
inclusion OMC in Greece and the UK. Chapter 1, differentiated between the degrees 
of stakeholder participation (e.g. information, consultation, involvement, 
collaboration etc) in the different stages of the policy-making process (i.e. agenda-
setting, decision-making, implementation and monitoring). However, the empirical 
research carried out for this thesis found that other factors are equally important for 
the assessment of the impact which participation in the social inclusion OMC has on 
stakeholders. Therefore, this chapter focused also on participants’ satisfaction of 
participation and the impact of participation on the NAPs.  
 
In line with the OMC’s provisions for participation (e.g. European Commission 
2005b), British primary and secondary stakeholders were participating, in the period 
2001-2010, in different stages of the policy-making process, namely agenda-setting, 
implementation and monitoring. Their views were indeed taken into consideration by 
the policy-makers: issues raised by them during the agenda-setting stage were 
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included in the NAPs. Additionally, primary and secondary stakeholders worked 
with the government during the stage of the implementation of the NAPs (e.g. by 
organising the Get Heard and BTPG projects). All stakeholders interviewed for this 
thesis expressed their satisfaction with the government’s response to the OMC 
pressures for participation and praised the OMC for triggering these developments. 
 
Greece did not respond positively to the OMC’s pressures for participation. Only 
secondary stakeholders were mobilised in the period 2001-2010 and only during the 
agenda-setting stage. Their participation amounted in times to the degree of 
consultation which meant that the government was informing and getting feedback 
from these stakeholders about the NAPs/NSRs. However, some interviewees (e.g. 
from the EAPN-Greece and the IKE) argued that this was an irregular and sketchy 
consultation and that they were actually only informed by the government about 
already taken decisions. Regardless of the degree of participation (i.e. involvement or 
consultation) in both cases, secondary stakeholders’ views and concerns were not 
taken into consideration by the decision-makers, and they had no impact on the 
NAPs. Greek stakeholders appeared in general disappointed and they criticised both 
the Greek governments and the OMC’s potential for change.  
 
Therefore, the OMC’s pressures led to the Europeanisation of British social inclusion 
policy in terms of participation of (secondary and primary) stakeholders. At the same 
time the Greek response to the OMC’s pressures for participation of primary and 
secondary stakeholders was limited. The different responses can be explained by the 
mediating factors which define the Europeanisation of domestic public policy. In 
Greece, ‘structural impediments’ (Featherstone 2005b: 223) such as corporatism, 
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clientelism, the lack of a culture (both from the official policy-making process and 
the secondary stakeholders) which would facilitate the participation of primary 
stakeholders, and the lack of a learning process under the OMC objectives, prevented 
the domestic adaptation to the OMC provisions for participation. In the UK, the pre-
OMC political environment which was favourable to social inclusion policies (i.e. 
the New Labour party’s focus on combating social exclusion), and the positive 
response of official actors (i.e. DWP senior officers) and secondary stakeholders (e.g. 
members from anti-poverty NGOs) explain the positive response to the OMC 
pressures for participation. 
 
In both countries the participation of stakeholders has brought about shifts in 
participants’ expectations and political activities, yet loyalties were redirected to the 
EU only in the case of the British stakeholders. The differences in participation 
constitute an important explanatory factor for the differences in the shifts of 
expectations, political activities and loyalties by Greek and British stakeholders. The 
main reason behind these shifts was that stakeholders considered the EU framework 
as more likely to satisfy their interests which had not been satisfied on the domestic 
level. However, in Greece these shifts did not last long enough to comply with 
Haas’s (1958) definition of loyalties as long lasting expectations and political 
activities (see chapter 1 section 1.2). In fact, the shifts in Greek participants’ 
expectations and political activities to the EU level were soon followed by 
disappointment. This disappointment seems to highlight the importance of the 
rational assessment which was arguably the driving factor behind the initial 
redirections of expectations, political activities and loyalties. Greek actors eventually 
considered that the EU framework could not satisfy their interests and they stopped 
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shifting their expectations and political activities to the EU level. In contrast, the 
application of the social inclusion OMC in the UK was followed by British 
participants’ redirections of expectations and political activities to the EU level. In 
this case, expectations and political activities were shifted towards the EU level for 
the whole period of the application of the Lisbon strategy. Empirical evidence 
gathered for this thesis seems to confirm Haas’s (1958) definition of loyalties as long 
term shifts in expectations and political activities. Importantly, these redirections 
were only referring to primary and secondary participating stakeholders who were 
aware of the application of the OMC in the UK. Primary stakeholders who 
participated in the Get Heard and BTPG projects were not aware of the EU 
framework and therefore, they did not redirect expectations, political activities and 
loyalties to the EU level. 
 
 Concerning the second hypothesis, participation at EU level through the OMC has 
influenced redirections of expectations, political activities and loyalties unequally in 
both countries. The comparison between Greek and British participation in the 
European Meetings of People Experiencing Poverty showed that Greek stakeholders 
redirected their expectations towards the EU level for rational reasons. Because the 
domestic framework was not providing opportunities for participation, Greek 
stakeholders expected that they would influence positively the political agenda 
through participation at EU level. It was the opportunities that the EU offered for 
participation which made these stakeholders redirect their expectations from the 
national to the EU level. At the same time, participation opportunities at domestic 
level (i.e. SPTF, Get Heard and BTPG) made British stakeholders not to consider the 
EU level as the primary framework for participation. Instead they viewed the 
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domestic level as the only level at which they could influence social inclusion policy 
outcomes that affect them. However, the reason behind the emergence of loyalties 
towards the EU between participants of the Brussels conferences were based not on 
rational evaluations –the meetings did not satisfy the participants’ expectations– but 
were the result of a socialisation process under common concerns and solutions 
amongst the primary stakeholders who participated. Evidence taken from primary 
documents and interviewees from Greece and the UK showed that the participants 
realised that people from across the EU face similar problems leading them not to 
focus on differences between them but on similarities. The participants all valued the 
sharing of the common experiences as the most significant outcome of the Brussels 
conferences. Yet, while the salience of the EU in their daily life was acknowledged 
by the participants who were interviewed for this thesis, the lack of their input into 
the EU decision-making moderated the emergence of the shifts in expectations, 
political activities and loyalties from the domestic level towards the EU level. 
 
The next chapter will discuss the conclusion of this thesis. Its first concern is to 
analyse the domestic responses to the EU pressures for participation of primary and 
secondary stakeholders and the mediating factors which define the degree of 
Europeanisation. Following this analysis, it will consider the redirection of 
expectations, political activities and loyalties in both the domestic level and the 
European. As said in chapter 1 (see section 1.1.5), two mediating factors have been 
expected to redirect participants’ expectations, political activities and loyalties: 
rationalism and socialisation.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The timeframe of this thesis was the period 2001-2010. This is the period when the 
social inclusion Open Method of Coordination (OMC) was intended to coordinate 
policies across member states within the context of the Lisbon strategy. Since the 
Nice European Council in 2000, one of the core provisions/objectives of the OMC 
has been the participation of people in poverty and social exclusion (i.e. primary 
stakeholders) and anti-poverty NGOs and networks (i.e. secondary stakeholders) in 
the social inclusion OMC process. The present thesis analysed the application of 
these provisions in the UK and Greece in order to assess whether the participation of 
(primary and secondary) stakeholders in domestic level and EU-level social inclusion 
OMC activities triggers the redirection of expectations, political activities and 
loyalties from the national to the EU level.  
 
Some studies, and in particular neofunctionalist studies, have argued that 
participation in EU institutions and processes leads to a redirection of expectations, 
political activities and loyalties from the national to the EU level (e.g. Shore 2000; 
Haas 1958). After the launch of the Lisbon strategy, researchers have argued that 
participation in the OMC also leads to redirections of expectations, political activities 
and loyalties (e.g. Vifell 2009, 2004; Jacobsson 2004; Haahr 2004). However, these 
studies focused mainly on elite and state actors. This thesis has provided strong 
empirical evidence that participation in the social inclusion OMC has the potential to 
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redirect expectations, political activities and loyalties of other groups of actors, 
namely primary and secondary stakeholders (rather than merely elite and state 
actors). The UK and Greece case studies (chapters 3 and 4) and the comparative 
chapter 5 have shown that differences in the types of participation in the OMC help 
to explain differences in the redirection of expectations, political activities and 
loyalties.  
 
The present thesis adopted Haas’s (1958) definitions of expectations, political 
activities and loyalties, and gave in chapter 1 (p. 50) the following example: 
stakeholders aiming at combating of poverty may redirect their expectations to the 
EU when they believe that they are more easily able to satisfy their goals at the EU 
level than the national level. Following their emerging expectations, these 
stakeholders redirect their political activities to the EU level when they try to combat 
poverty (e.g. through lobbying, campaigns or street protests in front of the EU 
buildings). They can be said to be loyal to the EU when their expectations and 
political activities are directed towards the EU for long periods of time. 
 
This thesis has drawn on theories of European identity while combining them with 
Europeanisation theories. This was done in order to analyse the participation of 
primary and secondary stakeholders and to understand the impact which the 
participation of British and Greek (primary and secondary) stakeholders in the social 
inclusion OMC has on the expectations, political activities and loyalties of these 
actors. 
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The first important contribution of this thesis to the OMC literature is the analysis of 
the mediating factors which promote the Europeanisation of the domestic public 
policy through the OMC. The OMC literature which is based on theories of 
Europeanisation does not appear to take full advantage of this analytical framework. 
It rather analyses whether the OMC creates strong or weak adaptational pressures to 
the member states. In this manner, scholars have largely based their theories on the 
Europeanisation through the OMC on two levels of the process. The first refers to the 
adaptational pressures which emanate from the OMC (e.g. Armstrong 2010, 2006; 
Caviedes 2004). The second refers to the output of these pressures on the public 
policy as an indication of the domestic response (e.g. Sotiropoulos 2011). In this 
manner, they have neglected the analysis of the mediating factors74 which determine 
the relation between pressures for domestic adaptation and effectiveness or 
efficiency (PPMI 2011). Additionally, the above mentioned studies have not 
contributed to the study of the degrees of the Europeanisation of the domestic policy 
(as described by Börzel and Risse 2003; Radaelli 2003). Unlike the OMC literature, 
the present thesis has largely focused on the mediating factors and the degrees of 
Europeanisation through the social inclusion OMC. One of its best findings is that 
the balance of power between veto points and the other mediating factors (see section 
1.1.5) is the core determinant of the degree of Europeanisation through the social 
inclusion OMC.   
 
This thesis also adds to the OMC literature by taking into serious consideration an 
often overlooked part of Börzel’s theory (2002). Börzel (2002) stresses out the 
importance of keeping into consideration that, apart from the different responses to 
                                                 
74
 As these are described in the Europeanisation literature (Börzel and Risse 2003; Cowles et al. 2001; 
for a detailed analysis see section 1.1.5) 
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pressures for Europeanisation between countries, there are also important differences 
not only within countries but between different policies and even between policy 
issues (ibid.). Generally, OMC scholars appear to neglect this point; they tend to use 
their findings on one or a few policy issues and then to draw general conclusions on 
the Europeanisation of the whole domestic public policy through the OMC. The 
present thesis focused explicitly on the Europeanisation of participation of primary 
and secondary stakeholders in the social inclusion policy-making process. Even in 
this policy issue however, different degrees of Europeanisation were found not only 
between Greece and the UK but also between the participation of primary and 
secondary stakeholders within each of the studied countries.  
 
On the issue of participation of the above mentioned stakeholders, the present thesis 
has taken advantage of the momentum of the more detailed research on participation 
–through the OMC– in the social inclusion policy-making process. A gap in the 
OMC literature which existed even ten years after the launch of the method has 
started being filled in. An EU-wide study was conducted in 2010 on the degrees of 
participation in the different stages of the policy-making process (Inbas and 
Engender 2010). The present thesis built on this methodology and also contributed to 
it. It combined the above mentioned analysis on stages and degrees with the levels of 
participation (i.e. national and EU level). By building on such methodology this 
thesis did not only contribute to the literature by studying in detail the application of 
the social inclusion OMC’s participatory provisions. The latter had not sufficiently 
being studied, not least with relation to the degrees of Europeanisation. The present 
thesis was also led to its major contribution to the OMC literature: the impact that 
participation of non-traditional stakeholders in the OMC social inclusion process has 
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had on their expectations, political activities and loyalties. Thus, the central finding 
of the thesis is that the OMC, apart from state actors (Zeitlin 2005b; Jacobsson 2004; 
Haahr 2004) and sub-state actors (Vifell 2009; Zeitlin 2005b), can trigger cognitive 
changes also among secondary and primary stakeholders.  
 
But the present thesis did not conclude with this central finding. On the contrary, this 
finding was the beginning of an even deeper analysis which had two additional 
interrelated important findings which contrasted central arguments of the OMC 
literature: First, the potential of the OMC to trigger cognitive changes was found less 
strong than it has been argued by the previously mentioned scholars. Second, 
contrary to previous research on cognitive changes, the latter rarely appeared to be 
triggered by a framework of socialisation (for the OMC literature on socialisation, 
see section 1.2.5). Shifts in expectations, political activities and loyalties were rather 
found to depend upon the benefits (i.e. access to participation in the policy-making 
process and its potential and success to affect the policy outcomes) which were 
provided by the OMC to the examined stakeholders. 
 
Another important contribution to the OMC literature is that the assessment of the 
participation through the OMC in particular and the assessment of the method in 
general was heavily based on the views of the relevant primary and secondary 
stakeholders (participating or not). Most studies on the OMC focus largely on official 
documents and interviews with officials which are only supplemented by interviews 
with representatives from major NGOs (e.g. Schönheinz forthcoming). The present 
thesis, focused on the views of representatives from major and local NGOs and of 
primary stakeholders. The research planning outlined in the first chapter (section 1.3) 
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has been proven successful in spotting the shifts of expectations, political activities 
and loyalties. With only a few exemptions (e.g. Dierckx and Van Herck 2010), the 
views of primary stakeholders were ironically ignored by previous OMC literature 
particularly concerning participation in the domestic level. This thesis has found –
especially in Greece– that the official stance on the social inclusion OMC is in sharp 
contrast with the stance of the secondary and the primary stakeholders. The latter 
appeared, in the end of the studied period, to be disappointed by the OMC and the 
EU. 
 
The decision in the first chapter of this thesis to further analyse the concept of the 
European identity with Haas’s expectations, political activities and loyalties helped 
analyse the cognitive changes which were found to be created by participation in the 
OMC process. When the OMC literature refers to cognitive changes it does not 
appear to specify whether these changes refer to expectations, political activities and 
loyalties. It rather focuses on the potential of learning (Sabel and Zeitlin 2008; 
Zeitlin 2005b, Trubek and Mosher 2003), and of a framework for socialisation 
(Jacobsson 2004; Haahr 2004) on people’s stances towards the EU. This thesis found 
that both learning and the framework of socialisation triggered indeed cognitive 
changes. But this was not the conclusion of the thesis which was designed to analyse 
what it is meant by cognitive changes and which are the variables which influence 
them. Socialisation among primary stakeholders under an EU framework was only 
found to exist at EU level and only for a limited period of time (usually during the 
EMPEP) redirecting some of the participants’ expectations and political activities but 
not loyalties. Thus, a central finding of this thesis which has helped explain the limits 
of the shifts of expectations, political activities and loyalties concerns the limited 
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potential of the OMC to create a framework for socialisation. Contrary to its design 
which was expected to make member states to approach poverty and social exclusion 
as common European problems and to seek common European solutions, the studied 
participants perceived the OMC as a contribution of the EU to help solve domestic 
problems.   
 
At domestic and EU level, the determinant for long(er) term changes in expectations, 
political activities which lead to loyalties was the rational assessment of the benefits 
of the OMC; its ability to help participants pursue their interests, namely 
participation in and impact on the policy outcomes. Participation without impact has 
only been found to temporarily redirect expectations and political activities and 
therefore, following the analytical framework of chapter 1, it has not been proven to 
lead to loyalties. The more these interests were satisfied through the application of 
the social inclusion OMC the more expectations, political activities and loyalties 
were found to shift from the national to the EU level.  
 
However, another variable upon which the shifts in expectations were depended is 
the invisibility of the OMC. This thesis has not only found that the invisibility of the 
method has prevented it from redirecting expectations, political activities and 
loyalties among the participants. It has also contributed to the OMC/invisibility 
literature (see section 1.1.3) by researching the invisibility of the OMC among two 
ironically neglected groups, i. e. primary and secondary stakeholders.  
 
Furthermore, this thesis has contradicted scholars’ explanations why the elites are 
more loyal to the EU than the public. Thus, scholars agree that this happens because 
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the EU is more salient to the elites than the public (e.g. Herman and Brewer 2004; 
Castano 2004; Shore 2000). In contrast, this thesis has found that the reason why 
elites are more loyal to the EU that the rest of the population is not because of the 
salience of the EU in their daily lives but rather because the former are far more 
probable to participate and influence the EU policy outputs than the latter. 
 
Last but not least, this thesis made another important contribution to the EU 
governance literature. It questioned both output and input democratic legitimacy and 
found mixed results. These results show that contrary to academics’ conclusions, the 
OMC cannot be classified either as a democratic or a technocratic method, as a ten 
year debate on this issue shows (for this debate, see for example PPMI 2011; Kröger 
2009, Büchs 2008, Borrás and Jacobsson 2004). Thus, this thesis has found that there 
are major differences between countries in terms of input and output democracy as 
the comparison between Greece and the UK shows. But, more impressively, there are 
differences between what academics mean when they say democratic method and 
how participants themselves perceive the democratic contribution of the OMC. 
 
The following sections analyse the above mentioned best findings of the present 
thesis in detail.  
 
 
 
 
6.2 Research hypotheses reassessed 
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6.2.1 Domestic participation and expectations, political activities and loyalties  
 
The first hypothesis put forward in chapter 1 stated that ‘the participation of primary 
and secondary stakeholders in the domestic social inclusion OMC process leads to 
shifts in their expectations, political activities and loyalties from the national to the 
EU level’. The OMC itself is an effort to help solve domestic problems with EU 
level contributions. This remark fits nicely with Börzel’s (1999: 574) definition of 
Europeanisation ‘as a process by which domestic policy areas become increasingly 
subject to European policy-making’. According to theories of Europeanisation (e.g. 
Börzel and Risse 2003; Radaelli 2003; Risse et al. 2000; see also chapter 1 section 
1.1.5), the adaptation pressures on member states emerge due to the authoritative 
power of the EU. In the case of the OMC, which is a soft law instrument that entails 
no sanctions in cases of non-compliance (e.g. Trubek and Trubek 2005), the 
authoritative power of the EU is low. Nevertheless, for reasons explained in the 
analytical framework of this thesis (see chapter 1 section 1.1.5), the social inclusion 
OMC was expected to put pressure on member states to adapt their public policy to 
EU pressures. Scholars have also shown that the OMC can indeed promote the 
Europeanisation of domestic public policy (e.g. Armstrong 2006; Radaelli 2003b). 
This thesis studied the Europeanisation of domestic social inclusion public policy 
with regard to the participation of primary and secondary stakeholders.  
 
The analysis of the domestic response to Europeanisation pressures does not mean 
that the present thesis has not acknowledged the fact that Europeanisation is 
generally a two-way process. Europeanisation is concerned with both the domestic 
adaptation to EU pressures and with the EU’s adaptation (e.g. the deepening of 
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integration and emergence of new institutional actors) to member states’ pressures 
(Armstrong 2010; Olsen 2002). However, this thesis belongs to the group of studies 
which focus primarily on the domestic adaptation by member states to the EU 
pressures (e.g. Olsen 2002; Cowles et al. 2001; Börzel and Risse 2003; Radaelli 
2003b; Armstrong 2010, 2006, 2005) 
  
6.2.1.1 Europeanisation of participation 
 
As was argued in chapter 1 (section 1.1.5), the first condition for Europeanisation is a 
misfit between EU and domestic public policies (Börzel and Risse 2003; Cowles et 
al. 2001). This condition was fulfilled both in Greece and the UK for the OMC case 
studies. Chapter 4 has shown that in Greece the social inclusion policy-making 
process did not involve primary and/or secondary stakeholders prior to the launch of 
the OMC. As was argued in chapter 3, in the UK a process of consulting primary and 
secondary stakeholders had started prior to the OMC although this happened mainly 
in Scotland. English primary and secondary stakeholders stated that prior to the 
OMC they were not participating in the social inclusion policy-making process (e.g. 
Interviews in London 05.02.2010 and 16.02.2010a). Additionally, one interview in 
Scotland showed that even Scottish primary and secondary stakeholders were being 
consulted only irregularly and only by the Scottish devolved government and not the 
British government (Interview in Glasgow 02.12.2010).  
 
Owing to this misfit, the OMC’s provisions for participation created ‘adaptational 
pressures’ (Börzel and Risse 2003: 58) in the two member states. Chapter 1 (section 
1.1.2) explained how the pressures for participation emerged from the European 
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Council and the European Commission. The pressures have also been identified in 
both academic studies of the OMC’s participatory provisions (e.g. Telò 2002; 
Rodrigues 2001) and Europeanisation studies which have focused on the OMC (e.g. 
Armstrong 2006, 2005; Radaelli 2003a). The existence of the misfit and the 
emanating pressures for domestic adaptation to the EU public policy is only a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for Europeanisation (Börzel and Risse 2003). 
For Europeanisation to occur another condition must be in place. This is the domestic 
response to adaptational pressures. It depends upon different mediating factors such 
as multiple veto points, mediating formal institutions, political and organisational 
cultures and collective understandings, differential empowerment of domestic actors, 
and learning (Cowles et al. 2001 –for an analysis of these factors see chapter 1 
section 1.1.5).  
 
In the UK the social inclusion OMC’s pressures for participation were responded to 
immediately by official actors and secondary stakeholders. Concerning the first 
group of actors, the fieldwork carried out for this thesis in the UK - see chapter 3 for 
a detailed assessment of the findings - provided strong evidence that the positive 
response by senior officials in the Department for Work and Pensions’ (DWP) to the 
OMC’s pressures for participation was due to their experience in, and commitment 
to, tackling poverty and social exclusion. Because they were committed to promote 
social inclusion, DWP senior officials used the OMC and its provisions for 
participation as a lever to pursue their goals. This finding bears similarities with the 
concept of ‘differential empowerment of domestic actors’ according to which actors 
are expected to ‘use Europeanisation as an opportunity to further their goals’ 
(Cowles et al. 2001: 11; see also chapter 1 section 1.1.5). However, because these 
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actors are members of the administration and therefore have a strong institutional 
role, their response is even better explained with Vanhercke’s (2010: 116) concept of 
‘creative appropriation’.  
 
The analytical framework put forward in chapter 1 made use of the concept of 
‘creative appropriation’ to show that Europeanisation through the OMC does not rely 
on the method’s hardness or softness (i.e. its authority to impose change or the lack 
of it). It rather relies on whether domestic actors use the OMC’s toolkit (i.e. 
objectives, concepts, indicators etc) ‘for their own purposes and independent policy 
initiatives’ (ibid: 133). As Armstrong (2006: 91) has found, DWP civil servants have, 
due to the OMC, more ‘autonomy’ to prepare the NAPs than they had in the pre-
OMC preparation of the social inclusion strategy. Taking advantage of this 
autonomy, senior officers from the DWP have been able to promote a participatory 
social inclusion policy-making process which is, at the same time, the social 
inclusion OMC’s fourth objective.  
 
Cowles and colleagues’ (2001: 11) concept of ‘differential empowerment of actors’ 
explains the case of the British secondary stakeholders who perceived the EU’s 
involvement in the field of social inclusion as an opportunity to pursue their interests. 
Thus, chapter 3 has shown that secondary stakeholders such as the members of the 
European Anti-Poverty Network UK (EAPN-UK) and the UK Coalition Against 
Poverty (UKCAP) perceived the OMC as an opportunity to get involved in the 
domestic social inclusion policy-making process. They thus took advantage of the 
OMC’s provisions for participation to set up a Social Policy Task Force (SPTF) and 
involved themselves and primary stakeholders in the policy-making process.  
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Concerning participation, another mediating factor has been in place in the UK. As 
Cowles and colleagues (2001: 11) have shown, ‘political and organisational cultures 
and collective understandings’ can influence domestic actors to respond positively to 
EU pressures for adaptation. As was argued in chapter 3, the organisational culture of 
the anti-poverty associations was entailing the involvement of primary stakeholders 
in these organisations’ operations. Anti-poverty associations were not only working 
with primary stakeholders but in some cases (i.e. UKCAP and Anti Poverty Network 
Cymru – APNC) they were directed by them. Due to this organisational culture 
secondary stakeholders facilitated the domestic adaptation to the OMC’s pressures 
for participation of primary stakeholders. The strong involvement of primary 
stakeholders in the operations of the secondary stakeholders was the main reason 
why the participation of the latter group in the policy-making process meant 
simultaneously the participation of the former group.   
 
Learning has also been an important factor which facilitated the Europeanisation of 
the domestic public policy, particularly in terms of participation of primary 
stakeholders. As chapter 1 (section 1.1.5) has shown, through the OMC, stakeholders 
have been expected to get engaged in a wider forum of ideas for problem-solving 
(Sabel and Zeitlin 2008). Interviews in the UK (e.g. London 05.02.2010 and 
16.02.2010a) have shown that the launch of the Get Heard and Bridging The Policy 
Gap (BTPG) projects, as an effort to respond to the need for wide participation of 
primary stakeholders, was due to British actors’ exposure to ideas of participatory 
projects in other member states (e.g. Belgium and France) and at the EU level (peer 
reviews and European Meetings of People Experiencing Poverty – EMPEP). 
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The role of the two groups (i.e. DWP senior officials and secondary stakeholders) 
which facilitated the Europeanisation of British public policy in terms of 
participation, cannot be assessed independently of the fact that the domestic political 
system did not pose significant veto points apart from those emerging from the 
British governments’ reluctance to formalise an informal process, as will be shown 
below. As has been argued in chapter 1 (see section 1.3.5.1), the UK was expected to 
respond positively to the Lisbon strategy since it had been an influential actor in 
shaping the Lisbon agenda and, in particular, its economic reform and 
competitiveness issues (Bulmer 2008). According to Börzel (2002), member states 
which upload practices and policies to the EU level generally find it much easier to 
adapt to the Europeanisation pressures than member states which are policy-takers. 
Concerning Britain, a central priority of the social inclusion OMC (i.e. the combating 
of child poverty) has been uploaded to the EU from the UK (Schönheinz 
forthcoming). In fact, consecutive Labour governments from 1997 to 2010 did not 
only prioritise social inclusion as part of their commitment to the Third Way politics 
(Atkins 2008), but they were also eager to promote participation of stakeholders as 
can be seen, for example, from Labour Party manifestos (1997 and 2001).  
 
In Greece such mediating factors as the ones found in the UK did not manage to 
promote the requested Europeanisation of social inclusion public policy in terms of 
participation. Both concepts of ‘differential empowerment of actors’ (Cowles et al. 
2001: 11) and ‘creative appropriation’ (Vanhercke 2010: 116) do not appear to 
explain cases where the veto points were proven too strong to be circumvented. 
Interviews with secondary stakeholders in Greece showed that the administration 
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was eager to consult them and was often persuaded by their views (e.g. Interview in 
Athens 08.12.2009). However, the decisions about the stakeholders’ participation, 
and the input of such participation in the drafting of the NAPs were taken by the 
political leaders (e.g. ministers and their personal advisers). Confirming Featherstone 
(2005b), during the decision-making stage of the NAP process, the political 
leadership in Greece was cut-off from civil society. Additionally, decision-makers 
were acting in accordance with the governing political parties’ priorities which were 
not necessarily similar to the need for social inclusion (Interviews in Athens 
08.12.2009; 20.12.2010). Additional obstacles to Europeanisation emerged from 
issues related to partisan politics culture in Greece such as corporatism and 
clientelism. Chapter 4 showed that these ‘structural impediments’ (Featherstone 
2005b: 223) limited the participation of secondary stakeholders in the social dialogue 
and prevented them from having an impact on the NAPs.  
 
Consequently, Greece did not manage to respond positively to the pressures for 
participation of primary stakeholders. The reason identified for this shortcoming was 
that, contrary to the UK, the participation of primary stakeholders has not been part 
of the political and organisational culture in Greece. Thus, another mediating factor 
which could facilitate Europeanisation in terms of involvement of primary 
stakeholders in the policy-making process, has been absent in Greece. Prior to the 
OMC Greek (and British) public policy did not involve primary stakeholders. 
However, due to the fact that many anti-poverty associations in the UK were directed 
by primary stakeholders, the inclusion of anti-poverty associations in the SPTF as 
secondary stakeholders meant automatically that primary stakeholders were also 
included. In Greece neither the official process of policy-making nor operations in 
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the anti-poverty associations involved primary stakeholders. The non-response to 
Europeanisation pressures therefore comes as no surprise.   
 
Finally, as was mentioned above, learning, as a potential mediating factor has been 
expected to empower actors with new ideas of problem solving (see chapter 1 section 
1.1.5). The actors would redefine their interests and facilitate Europeanisation (de la 
Porte and Pochet 2012; Jacobsson 2004; Trubek and Mosher 2003). However, the 
OMC objectives and guidelines were proven inapplicable to the Greek public policy 
and they did not stimulate a process of policy learning in Greece. In fact, Greek 
stakeholders felt excluded from the forum of ideas of problem solving. Instead of 
feeling ‘hedged in’ (Jacobsson 2004: 359) the OMC, they perceived it as referring 
mainly to actors from more advanced, in terms of social policy, member states. 
Overall, faced with the obstacles posed by the Greek public policy process the OMC 
has been proven too soft to overcome veto points and to promote Europeanisation. 
As Featherstone (2005a: 734) has argued, when ‘the EU stimuli are in fact limited in 
their nature’ then ‘…entrenched institutional obstacles in domestic systems can 
readily thwart their potency’.  
 
Greece has been described as a ‘foot-dragger’ in uploading and downloading policies 
in the context of Europeanisation (Börzel 2002: 203). Europeanisation pressures for 
reform have been proven largely unsuccessful as the cases of pensions, health system 
and the labour market have shown (Tinios 2005; Mossialos and Allin 2005; 
Papadimitriou 2005). From the beginning of the Lisbon strategy Greece was 
expected to be the ‘“least likely” case in relation to structural reform’ (Featherstone 
and Papadimitriou 2008: 5). Additionally, Greece did not appear to upload its 
 337 
rudimentary social inclusion policy practices to the EU. Thus, it had to download 
through the social inclusion OMC practices which had a ‘poor fit’ on the domestic 
level. Greece became a foot-dragger in terms of the implementation of the social 
inclusion OMC.  
 
Concerning the different participation patterns in Greece and the UK, chapter 1 
(section 1.3) took into consideration previous studies of stakeholders’ participation in 
member states (e.g. INBAS and Engender 2010; de la Porte and Pochet 2005). While 
drawing on these studies, this thesis has analysed the participation of primary and 
secondary stakeholders in the different stages of the social inclusion policy-making 
process (i.e. agenda-setting, decision-making, implementation and monitoring). 
Member states’ responses to the OMC’s overarching objectives are outlined and 
reflected in the NAPs. Various scholars have indicated that primary and secondary 
stakeholders’ participation refers to participation in the NAP process (e.g. Armstrong 
2006; de la Porte and Pochet 2005). Therefore, the focus of the present thesis has 
been on the different stages of the NAP process, i.e. agenda-setting, decision-
making, implementation and monitoring. The analysis of primary and secondary 
stakeholders’ participation was also designed to capture the different degrees of 
participation. These include according to INBAS and Engender (2010: 3 –emphasis 
added; see also chapter 1 section 1.3.1):  
 
to inform: one-way dissemination of information [by the government] to 
stakeholders on a specific issue; to consult: to inform and get feedback from 
stakeholders, a two-way information channel; to involve: gathering 
stakeholders’ views and ensuring that their concerns and views are 
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understood and considered; to collaborate: to work with stakeholders as 
partners throughout a process, including in analyses, development and 
decision-making; to empower: to place final decision-making in the hands of 
stakeholders.  
 
Shortcomings in participation of stakeholders, which have occurred not only in 
Greece, generated extra pressures from the EU. As could be seen in chapter 4, a Joint 
Report in 2002 urged the need for participation through its recommendations for the 
next rounds of the NAPs (European Commission 2002). Additionally the 
Commission had already particularly named and shamed Greece for its shortcomings 
in participation (de la Porte and Nanz 2004). Greece responded to these pressures 
with the official establishment of a space for dialogue with relevant stakeholders (i.e. 
the National Committee of Social Protection – NCSP). However, this space for 
dialogue only brought limited changes to the domestic policy-making process in 
terms of participation. While even the government acknowledged the limited 
contribution of the NCSP towards a more participatory policy-making process (e.g. 
NAP Greece 2005-2006), both secondary stakeholders and social partners abandoned 
their efforts to get involved in 2009. In Greece only secondary stakeholders were 
mobilised to participate in consultation and information (i.e. low degrees of 
involvement) and only in the agenda-setting stage. As mentioned above, the 
decision-making stage was dominated by political leaders (see also Delistathis et al. 
2009). Chapter 4 has shown that monitoring and evaluation was an issue of only 
secondary importance even for the government. However, even the stakeholder 
consultation at the agenda-setting stage was reported to be ‘irregular and sketchy’ 
(Interview in Athens 08.12.2009) while secondary stakeholders often complained 
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that the government used the NCSP only to inform them about decisions that had 
already been taken (ibid.). This remark seems to confirm Beresford and Hoban 
(2005: 1) who maintain that the participation of stakeholders in early stages of the 
policy-making process (i.e. agenda-setting) is often used by the decision-makers in 
order to achieve ‘outcomes which had largely been decided already’ (see also chapter 
2 section 2.4.4)  
 
Regarding participation in the UK, chapter 3 has shown that the SPTF British 
primary and secondary stakeholders were in direct talks with the administration 
every six weeks. Members of the SPTF were involved in the agenda-setting and 
monitoring stages of the NAP process. This means that their views, articulated 
during the on-going direct dialogue, were understood and taken into consideration by 
the British government. According to one interviewee, who was participating in the 
SPTF as a secondary stakeholder, the SPTF was ‘fundamentally shaping the NAPs’ 
(Interview in London 15.12.2009). In fact, many issues which were raised by the 
participants in the SPTF at the agenda-setting stage were incorporated in the NAPs. 
For example, the NAP 2008-2010 started with the challenges (e.g. child poverty, 
income inequality etc) which were identified by the SPTF and its members (UK NAP 
2008-2010: 2-3). Importantly, a document published by the SPTF in 2008 reflected 
its members’ satisfaction with the fact that certain challenges (such as debt and in-
work poverty), which had been identified by the SPTF, appeared subsequently on the 
domestic political agenda (SPTF 2008). However, members of the SPTF have also 
collaborated with the policy-makers in the stage of the implementation of the NAPs. 
Thus, in an effort to meet the fourth objective of the social inclusion OMC, which 
also refers to the mobilisation of primary stakeholders, the government assigned to 
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anti-poverty associations and networks the running of the two biggest in terms of 
participation projects, namely Get Heard and Bridging the Policy Gap (BTPG). The 
cases of the Get Heard and BTPG can be seen as a result of the Europeanisation of 
the British social inclusion policy-making process, at least in regards to the 
participation of the relevant stakeholders. Members of NGOs and networks who 
organised workshops for these two projects confirmed that these new practices had 
been ‘downloaded’ from the EU level. The Get Heard project was modelled on the 
Brussels Meetings of People Experiencing Poverty (Interviews in London 
05.12.2010 and 16.02.2010a). The BTPG was organised according to the European 
concept ‘peer review’ (Interview in Glasgow, 02.12.2010). Get Heard and BTPG’s 
findings were annexed in the British 2006-2008 NSR and 2008-2010 NSR 
respectively.       
 
Following Börzel and Risse (2003) and Radaelli’s (2003b) taxonomies of domestic 
change (see chapter 1 section 1.1.5), the UK accommodated the pressures of 
Europeanisation emanating by the social inclusion OMC. Developments in the period 
2001-2010 show that the UK accommodated Europeanisation pressures by involving 
two groups of stakeholders (i.e. primary and secondary stakeholders) which had not 
participated in the domestic social policy-making process prior to the OMC. 
However, Johnson (2009) has argued that one of the veto actors in the participation 
of primary and secondary stakeholders has been the government itself. According to 
Johnson (ibid: 3), the government was reluctant to formalise an informal 
participatory process fearing that this would ‘override representative democracy’. 
Therefore, despite the notable developments in terms of the participation of British 
primary and secondary stakeholders, the social inclusion policy-making process in 
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the UK was not transformed in terms of participation. From 2001 to 2010 the UK 
added new processes into existing ones without changing the latter; therefore, 
without altering its ‘fundamental logic’ (Radaelli 2003: 38). However, as 
Featherstone (2003) has argued, the Europeanisation of the member states is not 
permanent and member states can retrench. From 2010 onwards when the process of 
participation in the NSRs was formalised by the government, the UK seems to have 
retrenched from the Europeanisation of its social inclusion public policy since the 
formalisation of the process did not succeed in promoting participation. As chapter 3 
has shown, the formally established Social Inclusion Advisory Group failed to 
involve stakeholders since its operations were cut down due to the budget cuts (see 
also Schönheinz forthcoming).  
 
In the case of Greece it seems that the extreme misfit between the EU pressures for 
participation has led to inertia in the case of primary stakeholders and absorption in 
the case of secondary stakeholders. As Radaelli (2003b: 37) has argued, inertia ‘may 
simply happen when a country finds that EU political architectures, choices, models, 
or policy are too dissimilar to domestic practice’. Chapter 4 has shown that in 
general, core OMC objectives and guidelines have been proven largely incompatible 
with Greek necessities. Whereas one of the core priorities of the EU’s social 
inclusion OMC has been participation of primary stakeholders in the domestic 
policy-making process, primary stakeholders in Greece have not even participated in 
the operations of the anti-poverty associations.  
 
Regarding absorption, this amounts to a low degree of domestic change as shown in 
chapter 1. According to Radaelli (ibid.) this change takes place ‘without real 
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modification of the essential structures and changes in the “logic” of political 
behaviour’. Therefore, in the case of secondary stakeholders, the above analysis has 
shown that only an irregular and sketchy process of consultation has started without 
changing the structure of the Greek public policy and, more importantly, without 
changing the behaviour of actors such as the decision-makers.  
 
A main contribution of the present thesis is that it has largely focused on the views of 
the participants of their own participation. It has argued that expectations, political 
activities and loyalties of (primary and secondary) stakeholders depend also on how 
they regard their own participation in the social OMC on the domestic and/or EU 
level. This means that an accurate assessment of the impact of participation on 
participants’ loyalties cannot be made without taking into account the satisfaction (or 
dissatisfaction) of the participants about the OMC. The importance of this statement 
becomes evident if one compares participants’ assessment of the participation 
promoted by the OMC with official assessments. Thus, having as point of reference 
participants’ views of their own participation, in Greece official assessments (such as 
those seen in the NAPs or in the General Secretary’s speech (EPEKSA 2009, see 
chapter 4 section 4.3)) tend to exaggerate the developments in terms of stakeholder 
participation. In line with the methodological framework set out in chapter 1 (section 
1.3.3), the views of the stakeholders were gathered through qualitative research (i.e. 
interviews) conducted for this thesis. The following sections will therefore take into 
account participants’ stances regarding the OMC and the EU. 
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6.2.1.2 Participation at domestic level and expectations, political activities and 
loyalties 
 
This thesis found evidence that domestic participation through the social inclusion 
OMC had differentiated impacts on Greek and British participants’ expectations and 
political activities, while it triggered the redirection of loyalties towards the EU only 
in the UK. According to several studies (e.g. Jiménez 2005; Citrin and Sides 2004; 
Risse and Maier 2003) citizens from Greece and the UK have in the past shown the 
highest percentages among EU citizens of exclusively national identities. A 
Europeanisation of expectations, political activities and loyalties does not entail EU 
authoritative adaptation pressures. As Risse (2001) has noted there are no EU treaties 
which demand the harmonisation of EU citizens’ loyalties. However, Risse has 
argued that the EU’s continuous involvement in the daily life of its citizens is 
expected to have an impact on peoples’ collective identities (Risse 2001). Regarding 
the OMC, the method has developed ‘beyond the intentions surrounding its original 
design’ (Tholoniat 2010: 93). Thus, the OMC has not been designed to bring about a 
shift in the expectations, political activities and loyalties. Yet as part of the EU 
integration process the OMC is affecting the daily life of EU citizens. This thesis 
therefore expected the OMC to have an impact in (primary and secondary) 
stakeholders’ expectations, political activities and loyalties. Building on this 
argument the present thesis found that participation in the domestic social inclusion 
policy-making process has indeed triggered such redirections although in different 
degrees in Greece and the UK as well as between primary and secondary 
stakeholders. Borrowing from the theories of Europeanisation and EU identity the 
main explanatory factor for such changes is rationalism.  
 344 
 
Before analysing the impact of domestic participation on expectations, political 
activities and loyalties through a process of rationalism, an issue which has emerged 
during the field research must be assessed. As stated above, Risse has argued that 
involvement of the EU in the daily life of its citizens is expected to trigger the above 
mentioned redirections. Castano (2004) has claimed that the EU has also to be salient 
in people’s daily life. Regarding the awareness of the OMC, chapter 1 (section 1.1.3) 
used a proposition put forward by independent experts (PPMI 2011) who argued that 
the more people participate in the social inclusion OMC process, the more they 
would become aware of the method (ibid: 14). However, this hypothesis was shown 
to be valid only in the cases of the Social Policy Task Force in the UK and the 
National Committee for Social Protection in Greece. The analysis of the Get Heard 
and BTPG projects was based on the projects’ documentation (workshops reports 
and final reports) and interviews with participants and key organisers. It found that 
despite the fact that the two projects would not have taken place without the OMC, 
participants were unaware of the method and the role of the EU behind their 
mobilisation. Therefore, despite the fact that the European level offered opportunities 
for stakeholders to pursue their interests, it remained invisible to the participants. As 
a result the opportunities for participation were not identified as emanating from the 
EU’s involvement in the field of social inclusion. While participation had an impact 
on participants’ expectations, political activities and loyalties, these were not 
redirected to the EU but remained at the local and domestic level (see chapters 3 and 
5).    
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The above remarks concerning the invisibility of the EU dimension seems to reflect a 
general attitude of stakeholders towards the OMC. As this thesis has shown, the 
participation of primary and secondary stakeholders in the domestic social inclusion 
OMC process did not lead to a socialisation process which would also have triggered 
a shift in expectations, political activities and loyalties towards the EU level. This 
happened because Greek and British secondary stakeholders who participated in the 
OMC process did not see domestic actions to tackle poverty as common European 
actions. Therefore, they failed to disseminate information about the EU’s 
involvement in the field of social inclusion to the primary stakeholders. As with the 
secondary stakeholders, so the primary stakeholders appeared to perceive poverty 
less like a European problem than a national one. This stands in marked contrast to 
one of the core reasons why the OMC was set up in the first place as a response to 
the ‘need to view national policies as a “common concern” and the need to achieve a 
certain policy convergence’ (Jacobsson 2004: 357). As a result, the EU norms, 
concerns, and objectives have often not been present in the domestic application of 
the OMC in Greece and the UK. Earlier in this chapter, it was argued that the higher 
involvement of NGOs and networks in the process can contribute to the learning of 
ideas for problem-solving across the member states as the British case has shown. 
For example, the EAPN-EU in Brussels intends to communicate best practices to its 
different delegations in the member states (e.g. EAPN-Greece and EAPN-UK). 
However, receivers of these practices at domestic level are a few members of the 
delegations. The information that they receive is not disseminated to other members 
of the NGOs not to mention primary stakeholders. As a result, the vast majority of 
participants in the OMC process in both countries focused exclusively on domestic 
concerns and solutions without been exposed to and socialised under European 
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common concerns and objectives which, according to Jacobsson (2004), lead to 
redirection of loyalties. 
 
However, expectations, political activities and loyalties towards the EU may emerge 
even when a process of socialisation is not at work. Haas had already argued in 1958 
in his Uniting of Europe, that participants in the EU integration process were likely 
to redirect their expectations and political activities to the EU level if the latter was 
perceived as possible to offer more opportunities to them to pursue their interests. 
Therefore, Greek and British participants’ expectations, political activities and 
loyalties were redirected to the EU following their satisfaction from the EU which in 
turn depended on the patterns of domestic participation that it promoted. The 
different patterns of participation of stakeholders in Greece and the UK influenced 
differently their expectations, political activities and loyalties. The shifts affected 
both primary and secondary stakeholders in the UK, and only secondary stakeholders 
in Greece. Obviously, the reason behind this difference is that Greek primary 
stakeholders were not mobilised in the context of the OMC.  
 
The more satisfied people were with their participation in the domestic policy-
making process (in terms of degrees of participation, of participation in different 
stages of the policy-making process, and of impact of participation on the NAPs), the 
more the people redirected their expectations and political activities. In Greece, 
participation varied between information which involved primarily the dissemination 
of information by government officials, and formal consultation at the stage of the 
agenda-setting of the NAPs. In both cases, there was limited impact on the domestic 
social inclusion policy-making process. With the launch of the OMC Greek 
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participants (i.e. secondary stakeholders) initially redirected their expectations and 
political activities to the EU level. They perceived the OMC as a benefit from the EU 
which would help them pursue their interests i.e. to participate in, and influence the 
domestic decision-making process. Due to the OMC provisions for participation, 
secondary stakeholders started participating in discussions with the administration. In 
fact, during the period 2001-2010 some stakeholders noticed an increase in 
participation in discussions with the government. This refers especially to the period 
after the second round of the NAPs and the establishment of the NCSP in 2003. Even 
though participation somewhat increased over time, the participating secondary 
stakeholders did not see this as a significant development. Other stakeholders argued 
that participation did not increase at all after the launch of the OMC. In any case, the 
overall outcome was that the OMC eventually disappointed secondary stakeholders. 
They lowered their expectations and did not redirect their political activities to the 
EU level any longer. According to Haas’s (1958: 5) definition of loyalties, only when 
expectations and political activities of individuals are redirected towards the EU for 
long periods of time will their loyalties shift to the EU level.  
 
In the UK, the SPTF was a group of primary and secondary stakeholders who 
participated in the domestic social inclusion policy-making process due to the OMC. 
They were involved in the agenda-setting and monitoring stages of the NAP process 
and they collaborated with the government in the stage of implementation. Evidence 
provided in this thesis showed that participation had an impact on the NAPs and the 
political agenda. As chapter 3 has shown, participation did not develop as a building-
on process, but it was fluctuating, reaching its highest levels in the period 2004-2007 
(i.e. when the Get Heard and the BTPG projects were launched). All interviews 
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conducted for this thesis in the UK, showed that the members of the SPTF were 
satisfied with their participation in the social inclusion OMC. As a result, they 
redirected their expectations and political activities to the EU which they perceived 
as the appropriate framework for pursuing their interests. These shifts in loyalties 
lasted throughout the first ten years of the application of the social inclusion OMC in 
the UK. Even since the economic crisis, which has resulted in austerity measures in 
the UK that have hit the poorest hardest, primary and secondary stakeholders 
considered the EU framework as the framework that has the potential to satisfy their 
interests. If one uses Haas’s definition of loyalties (1958: 5 – see also above), then 
British stakeholders who participated in the SPTF have redirected their loyalties from 
the domestic to the EU level.   
 
6.2.2 Participation at EU level and expectations, political activities and loyalties 
 
The second hypothesis (see chapter 1) postulated that ‘the participation of 
stakeholders in OMC-sponsored EU conferences of people who experience poverty 
will lead to shifts of their expectations, political activities and loyalties to the EU 
level’. The empirical evidence gathered for this thesis has shown that the validity of 
this hypothesis should be seen in context. Expectations shifted from the national to 
the EU level only in the case of the Greek delegates to the conferences and merely 
for a short period of time. In the absence of a participatory process at the domestic 
level, Greek delegates appeared to have strong expectations for influencing the EU 
policy-making process. Based on a rational assessment of the EU framework, Greek 
interviewees stated that once they were offered the opportunity to participate in the 
EMPEP they expected the EU to listen and take into consideration their concerns 
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when formulating social inclusion policies (e.g. Interview in Crete 20.01.2011). 
However, Greek delegates eventually became disappointed by the fact that contrary 
to their expectations, their views and concerns were either not even listened to by 
decision-makers (e.g. MEPs), or not turned into policies which have an impact on 
their daily life. Therefore, the field research showed that the delegates stopped 
redirecting their expectations to the EU level. 
 
For British delegates these conferences did not represent the only forum for 
participation as was explained earlier in this chapter and in chapter 3. Due to 
domestic actors’ positive response to OMC pressures for participation, they had 
started to become involved or even collaborate with the DWP in the social inclusion 
policy-making process. Thus, the participatory process which started in the UK in 
2001 and reached its highest levels in the period 2004-2007 (i.e. when the Get Heard 
and the BTPG projects were launched) prevented British delegates to Brussels from 
shifting expectations towards the EU level. Moreover, British anti-poverty NGOs 
and networks who were preparing primary stakeholders for participation in these 
conferences were intentionally playing down participants’ expectations to protect 
them from disappointment similar to the one experienced by the Greek delegates. 
 
Evidence put forward in chapters 3 and 4 showed that political activities and loyalties 
of both British and Greek delegates to the Brussels annual conferences shifted partly 
from the domestic level to the EU level. These political activities and loyalties did 
not emerge after a positive rational assessment of the EU framework. In other words, 
these redirections of political activities and loyalties did not follow a redirection of 
expectations as Haas (1958) had predicted. Instead, the EMPEP provided a 
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framework for socialisation under common concerns and common objectives. Within 
this framework, political activities were directed to the EU level only while the 
conferences were taking place and were referring to common demands from the EU 
(see chapters 3 and 4). After the conferences, the people shifted their political 
activities towards the domestic level. This last remark relates to an issue raised in 
chapter 2 (section 2.4.3) according to which participation in the policy-making 
process can empower primary stakeholders. Indeed, people who were politically 
inactive before they participated at EU level got empowered once they participated in 
the Brussels conferences and started political activities at domestic level as chapters 
3 and 4 have shown.  
 
A study by Dierckx and Van Herck (2010: 20) showed that participation of primary 
stakeholders in the annual Brussels conferences of people who experience poverty 
triggered a ‘kind of European identity’ among the participants. Dierckx and Van 
Herck’s study appeared to understand European identity as ‘a sense of affiliation or 
membership of a broader community facing shared problems’ (ibid: 20). The 
empirical findings from the fieldwork for this thesis confirm Dierckx and Van 
Herck’s study. Participants in the EMPEP appeared to be socialised under common 
concerns and towards common objectives. Interviewees showed that British and 
Greek delegates focused on the common concerns rather than differences in the type 
and gravity of social exclusion. They therefore felt included in this community. 
However, while this is the type of ‘community sentiments’ that Haas (1958: 9) had 
envisaged, these loyalties did not follow the long-term redirection of expectations 
and political activities. These loyalties were not loyalties to the EU as a framework 
which satisfies personal interests. Instead they were loyalties to an inclusive 
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community of people that was formed in socialisation during the Brussels 
conferences which identified common European concerns and solutions. However, 
these redirections were only temporal and lasted no more than the (two) days of the 
Brussels conferences.    
 
 
6.3 Rationalism, socialisation and the OMC’s contribution towards democratic 
governance 
 
6.3.1 Mediating factors: rationalism, socialisation and the input in the EU. 
 
Concerning whether rationalism is a stronger facilitating factor than socialisation for 
the Europeanisation of loyalties (see chapter 1 section 1.1.5), Risse (2005) has 
criticised Haas’s rationalism (i.e. benefits from the EU → redirection of interests and 
political activities towards the EU → EU loyalties) by bringing forward a vivid 
example: farmers are protesting in Brussels throwing their products at EU 
bureaucrats. The interpretation that Risse has given is that if farmers (who are 
allegedly one of the groups who have benefited most from the EU) turn against the 
EU, then Haas’s assumption that benefits from the supranational level lead to 
loyalties towards that level is not valid. On the one hand, treating farmers’ protests as 
a proof against the existence of loyalties is rather strict. An EU institution’s decisions 
against citizens’ interests and their subsequent protests do not necessarily rule out the 
existence of loyalties to the EU. Similar protests often take place against national 
level political decisions; yet loyalties to the nation-state are very rarely questioned.  
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On the other hand, arguments and findings of the present thesis can strengthen 
Risse’s argument by linking the farmers’ example with the case of Greece. As 
chapter 1 has shown, Greeks (who benefited most among EU citizens from EU 
funding) have changed their attitudes to the EU for the worse after the outbreak of 
the financial crisis. Similar was the case with the Greek secondary stakeholders 
participating in the domestic application of the OMC. As this thesis has shown, they 
redirected expectations and political activities to the EU for short periods of time 
only to abandon them after they realised that the OMC could not provide the 
expected benefits (for reasons explained in section 6.2.1 above). 
 
Risse (ibid: 305) concludes that there ‘seems to be little spill-over from the material 
into the ideational realms.’ Although Risse does not reject rationalism, he argues that 
the transfer of loyalties to the EU also assumes a socialisation process. Loyalties 
mean that actors have internalised European values and norms (ibid.). In other words, 
material benefits alone cannot redirect loyalties. A process of socialisation must also 
be in place. 
 
By studying the case of the European Meetings of People Experiencing Poverty, this 
thesis has shown that socialisation is not a sufficient condition for long term loyalties 
either. In fact, such a socialisation process can only temporarily redirect loyalties to 
the EU. In the absence of a positive rational assessment (lack of expectations that the 
EU can provide benefits), the redirection of loyalties ceased when the process of 
socialisation ended. In the above cases it seems that in the context of the 
Europeanisation of member states, which is an outcome that can be reversed 
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(Featherstone 2003), expectations, political activities and loyalties towards the EU 
level can be abandoned.  
 
However, the analysis of empirical data gathered from the UK has shown that the 
benefits that the OMC provided to participating in the domestic application of the 
OMC stakeholders have indeed redirected expectations, political activities and, in the 
long run, loyalties to the EU. Even during the financial crisis when these 
stakeholders’ interests have been difficult to be pursued, they appear to redirect 
expectations and political activities to the EU (i.e. lobbying, street protests and 
participation in EU-sponsored processes) in order to pursue their interests. The case 
of the British domestic stakeholders shows that loyalties shift ideally to the EU after 
the long-term provision of benefits. However, the absence of benefits does not 
necessarily mean the lack of loyalties, at least in Haas’s thinking. An often 
overlooked point in Haas’s theory on the shifting of loyalties (perhaps overlooked by 
Risse too) is that he clarified at the outset of his study that expectations, political 
activities and loyalties to the EU can emerge even when people are not ‘attracted by 
“Europeanism” as such’ (Haas 1958: 14). People may not envisage a fully integrated 
EU; in fact, they can block steps to integration as chapter 1 has shown. Yet this does 
not mean that they do not pursue their interests at the EU level. As mentioned above, 
this can happen due to the benefits, but also due to the fact that the EU is becoming 
increasingly involved in people’s lives. Farmers’ disposition to protest against the 
EU strengthens the rational interpretation of loyalties and, therefore, confirms Haas’ 
theory. Such demonstrations can be seen as political activities which seek to 
influence EU decisions. They are signs of the acknowledgement by the protesters 
that a supranational community has been emerging. EU citizens may not always be 
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loyal to the EU; however, they acknowledge the existence and power of the EU and 
its relevance for their daily lives. Thus, they turn expectations and political activities 
to the EU level. Actually, farmers have often attacked EU buildings to demonstrate 
against unfavourable decisions.75 These demonstrations can only be seen as long 
term political activities which are carried out for the pursuit of specific 
interests/expectations. This interpretation of loyalties is compatible with rationalism, 
since the latter does not always build on actual benefits, but on expectations for 
benefits. To borrow from the June 2012 elections in Greece, the majority of Greeks 
voted for the allegedly pro-Euro and pro-EU parties while 85% of the population 
demanded Greece remain in the Eurozone.76 This is in sharp contrast to Greek 
attitudes towards the EU (see chapter 1 section 1.3.5.2) which, after the financial 
crisis, appeared to change for the worse. Interview findings presented in chapter 4 
have confirmed that the EU lacks a positive image in Greece. After 2008, the EU 
started being perceived negatively either due to it being viewed as an agent which 
produced the crisis or as an agent which mishandles the crisis (Interview in Athens 
20.12.2010). However, the electorate’s attitudes in June 2012 elections show that the 
majority of Greeks may not be any more attracted by Europeanism, yet they remain 
loyal to the EU due to another rational reason: compared with solutions proposed 
within the national framework the EU appears to be a safer way out of the crisis. For 
this reason the majority of Greeks voted in favour of parties whose pre-election 
campaigns were based on a rather crude promise: to keep the country in the EU at 
any cost. 
 
                                                 
75
 With the completion of this thesis, the most updated incident of a farmers’ protest in Brussels 
involved the pouring of litres of milk in the streets in front of the EP (Reuters 10.07.2012). 
76
 Even Syriza, which was the party accused of planning Greece’s exit from the Eurozone (and the 
EU) emphasised strongly its pro-EU stances and denied allegations for planning Greece’s return to the 
pre-Euro currency. 
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The increasing role of the EU in the daily life of its citizens has been acknowledged 
by all interviewees for this thesis in Greece and the UK. From this perspective the 
assumption that national elites are more loyal to the EU than the rest of the citizens 
due to the entitativity of the EU is questioned. Scholars have explained the fact that 
elites are more loyal to the EU than the general public by pointing out that the EU is 
salient for the former and distant for the latter (Herman and Brewer 2004; Castano 
2004). However, the increasing role of the EU in citizens’ lives and the opportunities 
for participation offered to wider numbers of stakeholders have made the EU salient 
for a wider number of citizens than only the elites. Therefore, the problem seems not 
to be the salience of the EU but the fact that elites are more likely to influence EU 
policy outcomes than ordinary citizens even when the latter participate in EU 
processes. In other words, while the increasing presence of the EU in the daily life of 
its citizens is acknowledged, the citizens’ lack of input in the process of integration 
seems to be an important factor which prevents wider shifts in their loyalties.   
  
6.3.2 The OMC and democratic governance    
 
This thesis’s primary concern was an evaluation of the OMC’s contribution to 
participation of stakeholders and to loyalties towards the EU. However, an important 
issue put forward in chapter 1 was the potential contribution of the OMC to the EU’s 
efforts for improved governance (chapter 1 sections 1.1.2 and 1.1.4). One central 
reason why the EU launched this new mode of governance was to promote 
democratic legitimacy. In this context, the widened participation through the OMC 
has been seen as an example of input legitimacy, while the effectiveness of such 
participation (in terms of policy outcomes) has been seen as an example of output 
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legitimacy (Scott and Trubek 2002). Various scholars have argued that despite these 
intentions, which were reflected in the design of the OMC (i.e. its theoretical 
provisions for mobilisation of relevant stakeholders), the application of the method in 
the member states has brought about only limited participation of new stakeholders. 
For this reason the OMC has not offered input legitimacy (Vanhercke 2011; 
Armstrong 2010; Büchs 2008; de la Porte and Nanz 2004). In fact, the case of Greece 
(chapter 4) confirms these scholars’ argument and questions arguments about the 
potential to achieve democratic legitimacy through the OMC (Scott and Trubek 
2002). Participation in the policy-making process did not increase substantially in 
Greece after the launch of the OMC. At the same time, the impact of the limited 
participation on the NAPs has been insignificant. Therefore, the application of the 
social inclusion OMC in Greece has not offered input or output legitimacy.  
 
Yet, the application of the social inclusion OMC in the UK has offered another 
perspective in the theorising of the OMC as a mode of democratic governance. In the 
UK - as the SPTF and the Get Heard and BTPG projects showed - primary and 
secondary stakeholders participated in large numbers despite shortcomings in 
representativeness (see chapter 3 section 3.5.2). The quantitative overview at the 
beginning of chapter 3 and the interviews conducted for this thesis with key-
stakeholders illustrated rather a lack of policy outcomes which would otherwise 
reduce significantly poverty and social exclusion levels. However, a number of 
issues put forward by the (primary and secondary) stakeholders’ were incorporated in 
the NAPs (see, for example, chapter 5 section 5.2.2). Therefore, the majority of the 
interviewees in the UK argued that governance through the social inclusion OMC 
was indeed democratic. In fact, the SPTF’s published evaluations of the OMC (e.g. 
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SPTF 2008: 45) have seen the developments in participation brought about due to the 
OMC as forms of ‘participatory democracy’. Therefore, for the interviewees and the 
SPTF (2008) the OMC has provided both input legitimacy (wide participation of 
primary and secondary stakeholders) and output legitimacy (input in the political 
agenda).  
 
However, particularly concerning output legitimacy, Armstrong (2010) does not 
regard the SPTF’s input in the NAPs as significant in terms of influence of the 
political agenda. The difference between academics and participants’ evaluations of 
the OMC regarding the method’s contribution towards democratic governance can be 
explained by the fact that academics often assess the application of the OMC through 
a normative perspective. In contrast, primary and secondary stakeholders, who have 
been mobilised in the context of the OMC, view the method as a democratic process 
because prior to the OMC they did not participate in the policy-making process. 
 
Future research should concentrate more strongly on the net impact of the primary 
and secondary stakeholders’ participation in the social inclusion policy in terms of 
policy outcomes. Scholars appear to have the difficulty of accessing the impact of 
participation in the policy-making process on the levels of poverty and social 
exclusion. This difficulty arises from the fact that studies of the OMC suffer from the 
lack of empirical evidence (de la Porte 2010; Zeitlin 2005a). In addressing this lack 
of evidence, de la Porte (2010: 7) has suggested the use of data triangulation to 
assess the OMC which is a method with ‘multiple possible impacts’.  
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By focusing mainly on certain potential impacts of the OMC (e.g. policy learning, 
horizontal and vertical coordination etc), academics tend to see each of these impacts 
as an end in itself. Therefore, they appear to moderate their expectations regarding 
the primary concern of the OMC which is nothing more than the decisive impact on 
poverty.   
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Appendix I List of interview questions to secondary stakeholders 
 
 
1. How many years have you been involved in anti-poverty NGOs/ networks? 
 
2. Do you know whether the Open Method of Coordination is behind your 
involvement in the policy-making process?  
 
3. Why do certain NGOs/networks participate while others do not? 
 
4. In what form does your involvement occur (dialogue, meetings with high-ranking 
officials, written proposals, questionnaires)? 
 
5. In which stages of the policy-making process do you (or the NGO/ network which 
you represent) participate? 
 
6. After you (or the NGO/ network which you represent) are involved in EU 
sponsored actions, do you think that the EU will satisfy your expectations?  
 
7.  Is the EU framework more possible to satisfy your goals, or is it the domestic 
framework which you are still focused on? Have you changed your attitudes towards 
the EU? 
 
8. Do you think that your involvement (or the NGO/ organisation’s involvement) has 
positive policy outcomes? 
 
9. Do you facilitate people to participate in the Brussels Meetings of People 
Experiencing Poverty or at domestic participatory projects? 
 
10. After participation in the EU framework, do people who experience poverty 
expect from the EU a positive impact on their daily lives? 
 
11. After their participation, have primary stakeholders changed the way they see the 
EU (awareness of EU actions, awareness of the OMC, community of people with 
shared concerns, institution which can satisfy interests)? 
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Appendix II List of interview questions to primary stakeholders 
 
 
1. Do you participate as a member of an NGO or as an independent individual? 
 
2. Do you participate at domestic level and/or the Brussels Meetings of People who 
Experience Poverty?  
 
3. Why do some people participate while others do not? Which criteria are used? 
 
4. Were you informed/prepared before you participated? By whom? 
 
5. Is the EU framework apparent while you are participating? 
 
6. Did you have expectations from the EU once you were given the opportunity to 
participate? 
 
7. Was participation different to what you expected? Did you express your concerns? 
Do you think the policy-makers have listened to your views? Have these views been 
taken into consideration? 
 
8. Do you think your views will have an impact in the policy-making process? What 
kind of impact do you expect? 
 
9. After your participation, have you changed the way you see the EU (awareness of 
EU actions, awareness of the OMC, community of people with shared concerns, 
institution which can satisfy interests)? 
 
10. Is the EU framework more able to satisfy your goals or is it still the domestic 
framework which you are still focused on? 
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Appendix III List of interviewees 
 
 
Member of the European Anti-Poverty Network England; interview in Nottingham, 
24.11.2009. 
 
Communications manager of the KLIMAKA; interview in Athens, 07.12.2009a. 
 
Director of the KLIMAKA; interview in Athens, 07.12.2009b. 
 
Director of the European Anti-Poverty Network Greece; interview in Athens, 
08.12.2009. 
 
Director of the Off the Streets into Work; interview in London, 15.12.2009. 
 
Director of the Migrant Resource Centre/Coordinator of the British delegation to the 
2007 (and 2011) European meeting of people experiencing poverty; interview in 
London, 05.02.2010.  
 
Member of the ATD-Fourth World’s national coordination team; interview in 
London, 16.02.2010a.  
 
Policy and participation officer of the ATD-Fourth World; interview in London, 
16.02.2010b. 
 
British delegate to the 2009 European meeting of people experiencing poverty; 
interview in Rhyl, 24.02.2010.  
 
Coordinator of the UK Coalition Against Poverty; interview in Liverpool, 
24.03.2010. 
 
Director of the Poverty Alliance; interview in Glasgow, 02.12.2010.  
 
Director of the IKE; interview in Athens, 20.12.2010. 
 
Coordinator of the Greek delegation to the 2010 European meeting of people 
experiencing poverty; interview in Athens, 01.12.2011. 
 
Greek delegate to the 2009 European meeting of people experiencing poverty; 
interview in Athens, 20.01.2011. 
 
Greek delegate to the 2010 European meeting of people experiencing poverty; 
interview in Crete, 03.12.2011. 
 
Director of the European Anti-Poverty Network, Brussels; telephone interview, 
09.01.2012.  
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